In an apparently grudging concession to Western demands, Russia agreed on March 21 to a deployment of international monitors from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to Ukraine (not including Crimea). The United States and Europe have long advocated such a mission. Just three days earlier, on March 18, U.S. President Barack Obama agreed with German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s assessment that such monitors were “vital.”
Contrary to appearances, however, Moscow has likely won this latest round of the crisis. The West has drastically misread the likely effect that international monitors will have in Ukraine. The last two decades have shown that monitoring missions -- whether in Abkhazia, Kosovo, or Transnistria -- tend to produce “frozen conflicts” that advantage separatists and their foreign patrons. A UN or OSCE mission in Ukraine would almost certainly strengthen Moscow’s hand at the expense of Kiev’s.
International monitors often seem like the most attractive way to manage tense political conflicts. Trained to observe and report objectively on human rights issues and military movements, monitors can credibly verify or challenge the claims of persecution or aggression made by either party in a dispute. Russia has rested its intervention in Ukraine on the purported need to protect Russian speakers. Neutral monitors could evaluate -- and probably debunk -- this assertion.
But monitors’ reports are often less important than the terms under which the monitors are permitted to observe in the first place. Any UN or OSCE monitoring mission in Ukraine would require
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