FOR two years, now, the so-called Jugoslav question has been the subject of the most lively interest and study all over the world. In this connection a violent offensive against Jugoslavia is being directed at world public opinion by the tremendous propaganda apparatus of the Soviet Government, both in the U.S.S.R. and abroad, both directly and indirectly. This propaganda offensive aims to conceal the true essence of the conflict between the U.S.S.R. and Jugoslavia and to represent it as the result of Jugoslavia's "betrayal of Socialism" and her participation in an "imperialist plot." This inaccurate and incomplete view of the matter is further confused by the effort of certain circles to find the cause of the dispute within Jugoslavia herself -- in a sort of supposed "national Communism," or in the "inherent pride of Jugoslavs." Still others have looked on the dispute as a mere passing affair, or even as a prearranged "manœuvre" between Stalin and Tito.

Lack of precedent makes it unusually difficult for students of international relations to grasp the essence of the question through historical analogies. In fact, this dispute is both in substance and expression a completely new phenomenon, not to be explained in accustomed historical terms.

Today -- in contrast to the period before World War II -- the Soviet Union is no longer the only country in which the earlier feudal and capitalist methods of production, which kept the masses of people miserable and backward, have been replaced by new and better methods. Following the war, there emerged in Eastern Europe a whole series of countries in which profound social changes were (and are) being carried out, with greater or less success. The appearance of these countries imposed the necessity of finding a practical solution for an entirely new question, one which so far had been elaborated only theoretically in the classical works of Marxism. This is the question of the relations among countries which have reached a stage in their development where they have left behind capitalist methods of production. The "Jugoslav question" is nothing else than the first open and acute manifestation of the urgency of the much broader question, which goes far beyond the dispute between the U.S.S.R. and Jugoslavia. Many generations to come, in many peoples and states, will have to work out solutions of this fundamental problem, the first tumultuous manifestation of which appeared in the relations between Jugoslavia and the U.S.S.R.

True, in the Cominform resolution of June 1948 the representatives of the U.S.S.R. aimed all their charges directly against Jugoslavia. In reality, however, their move had much more broad and far-reaching significance. It was not merely a virtual ultimatum by means of which the Soviet Government aimed to impose on Jugoslavia the same unequal relations which the Soviet Union had already imposed to a greater or less degree on other Eastern European countries; it was also the signal for increased Soviet pressure along the whole front of relations between the U.S.S.R. and the other Eastern European countries, i.e. Bulgaria, Poland, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Albania. The development of relations between the U.S.S.R. and all these countries in the period following the Cominform resolution is evidence of this fact.

Firstly, there was an increase and sharpening of Soviet political control in those countries by the displacement of leaders who had been prominent in the progressive movement before and during the war, and the substitution for them of people who in most cases came from Moscow after the war and were willing to agree to unequal relations with the U.S.S.R. (in Bulgaria, for instance, Chervenkov was raised to power while Terpeshev, Yugov and others were put aside). At the same time, certain leaders in those countries who did not agree with the policy of unequal relations were physically liquidated, either openly or in secret. In some countries, Soviet leaders were publicly placed in office (Marshal Rokossovsky, for example, in Poland). Arrests, mistreatment, internment and persecution of thousands of Communists and common people who show even passive resistance to the course of hegemony adopted by the Soviet Union has become common. To suppress opposition in Eastern Europe and to secure its own hegemony there, the Soviet Union uses the well-known method of mock trials (e.g. of Rajk in Budapest and of Kostov in Sofia), in which sincere patriots are artificially made to seem to have connections with real spies. These trials are being used to eliminate thousands of honest people under the pretext of a struggle against espionage.

Secondly, the economic exploitation of these East European countries by the U.S.S.R. is becoming more and more acute. Thus in Rumania the number of joint Soviet-Rumanian companies has been increased since the Cominform resolution, thereby also increasing the profits extracted from Rumania for the benefit of the Soviet economy. The foreign trade of all the countries in question is coming increasingly under the direct control of the U.S.S.R. and is being subordinated to the interests and needs of the Soviet economy.

Thirdly, the Soviet Union is asserting full control not merely of the entire political life of each country, but of its whole scientific and cultural life as well. This is shown by the uniformity of the press in following the Soviet prescription; by the idolatrous attitude adopted toward the chauvinistic exaltation of Russian achievements in science and culture; and by exaggerated and uncritical praise of all aspects of life in the U.S.S.R., which leads to such absurdities as the proclamation of the Bulgarian press that the U.S.S.R. is the original home of football!

These facts show that the dispute between the U.S.S.R. and Jugoslavia is only one manifestation of a much broader problem, that is, the problem of relations between the Soviet Union and all other countries which since the war have embarked upon a course of radical social transformation (China now also belongs to this group). This phenomenon, unknown in the past, has introduced an entirely new element into the substance and picture of international relations. Since World War II, in contrast to the prewar period, we do not cover the full field of international affairs when we consider simply the relations between the Socialist and capitalist parts of the world and the pressure of aggressive capitalism on backward and peace-loving countries; now we also have to consider the problems raised by the hegemonistic tendencies of the Soviet Union. Pressure is exerted today not merely by aggressive capitalism but also by the power politics of the Soviet Government. The latter, "in the name of Socialism" and to defend Socialism from aggressive capitalism, is seeking insurance in the East European countries for itself and for its own exploitative and oppressive policies, and to this end is forcing them into a position of inequality.

There is no doubt that the Soviet Union is pursuing an active policy of ending the old capitalist rule in these countries. However, instead of stimulating the initiative of the working masses in these countries, instead of helping to create truly independent and equal democratic and Socialist states, the Soviet Union, in the name of Socialism, is exploiting those countries economically, is subordinating the development of their economies to its own narrow interests, and is placing them in a completely inferior position. Thus a new basic element is introduced into international political relations. In addition to the problem of maintaining the freedom of various peoples in the face of the aggressive policy of monopoly capital, we now have presented to us in acute form another problem: to maintain the freedom of those peoples engaged in building Socialism against the aspirations of the Soviet Government for hegemony and domination.

It is not only the peoples of Eastern European countries who are exposed to this danger, but also democratic movements aiming at deep social transformations in other countries. As long as the Soviet Union seeks hegemony, they are in danger of having to face tomorrow the same difficulties and tasks which confront the peoples of Eastern Europe today. Their aspirations for independent status and economic progress are based on changed social and economic conditions, and these in turn presuppose the equality of peoples. That the danger is real is shown by the fact that Soviet agents are organizing campaigns of slander and persecution against all adherents of progressive democratic movements in Western countries who in any way express disagreement with the Soviet policy of hegemony towards the countries of Eastern Europe (e.g. Konni Zilliacus, Jean Cassou and others). Soviet agents also endeavor to turn various international democratic movements and organizations into mere servile tools of the Soviet Government.

II

The question arises as to the reasons for this policy of the U.S.S.R. How old are its tendencies toward hegemony? Why did they find plain expression only after World War II? Some observers are of the opinion that the situation results from the advanced age of some of the Soviet leaders, or that the revolution in the U.S.S.R. has reached a "Napoleonic era." However, the reasons for the hegemonistic and undemocratic policy of the Soviet Union toward the East European countries must rather be sought in its own internal development.

First of all, the Soviet Union is a country in which productive forces developed at great speed. But Socialist democracy did not develop at a corresponding tempo. Thus in the Soviet Union we have seen the formation of a centralized bureaucratic apparatus which inevitably had to rely on the ideology of Great Russian chauvinism, thus promoting an incorrect relationship between the Russian people and the other peoples of the Soviet Union. (For instance, the Soviet anthem names "Great Russia," not "the proletariat," as the builder of the Socialist state.) Marx pointed out that Socialism faces two dangers after the proletariat takes power: from the counter-revolution of the expropriated bourgeoisie and from the bureaucracy. The first danger has been eliminated in the Soviet Union. But the second has not. Instead of self-government by the people, which Marx and Lenin emphasized as an unconditional principle for the building of a Socialist state, there arose a monopoly of power in all fields, a centralized bureaucracy. Where private property no longer exists, economic relations no longer have room for such subjugation. The tendency of the Soviet Government toward hegemony abroad is merely an expression of the monopolistic position of the heads of the Soviet bureaucracy at home.

The internal contradictions in the U.S.S.R. show a clear tendency to become more acute, and "victories" and "successes" outside can postpone and soften them only temporarily. The contradictions between the development of productive forces and backwardness in social-economic relations has produced stagnation in the field of culture, chauvinistic tendencies in the field of science (alleged superiority of Russian science), and the denial of any contributions to the development of social and Socialist thought by anybody apart from, or prior to, the Russians.

The Soviet Government's present foreign policy in pursuit of hegemony may accordingly be understood if we look at it as the expression of internal practices and conditions in the Soviet Union. It is, in essence, a transference of bureaucratic-monopolistic methods and Russian chauvinistic concepts to the field of action outside the Soviet borders. This became possible after the Second World War when there appeared countries in which profound social transformations were being carried out and which therefore presented new questions in connection with their relations with the Soviet Union.

From the moment the first hegemonistic tendencies of the Soviet Government toward Jugoslavia were revealed in the exchange of letters between the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of Jugoslavia, from March to May 1948, and even after the publication of the Cominform resolution in June of that year, the Jugoslav leadership did everything it could to solve the questions by direct negotiations and to ward off a conflict.

It was natural for the Jugoslav leaders to follow this course. From the very first, they realized that enormous difficulties would attend the development of Jugoslavia if she were subjected to pressure from the Soviet Union and the governments obedient to it. They were prepared to make concessions to the utmost limits. They could not, however, agree to any kind of concession which was likely to endanger Jugoslavia's national independence and keep the country economically backward. Had they yielded to Soviet pressure and agreed to such concessions, they would have come into conflict with the desires of the Jugoslav masses whom they had led in the war of liberation against Fascist Germany and Italy and also later when it was necessary to resist the pressure of aggressive western capitalism.

Another question also presents itself: Why was Jugoslavia the first of the Eastern European countries to offer such determined resistance -- with the support of the entire people -- to the hegemonistic tendencies of the U.S.S.R.? The Jugoslav peoples were the first in enslaved Europe to prepare an uprising against the forces of occupation, thereby delaying Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union, and were the first to begin armed resistance when in July 1941 military and political conditions for it became ripe. Throughout the entire war the peoples of Jugoslavia waged a relentless struggle. They created an army which at the end of the war numbered about a million men. At a cost of 1,700,000 killed, they liberated with their own forces almost their entire territory. One of the great factors in determining the course of the Jugoslav peoples during the war was the fact that they were fighting not only to expel the German occupation forces but also to create a new people's state and to put an end to the backwardness which had prevailed in their country for centuries. They were fighting for the chance to develop the enormous natural riches of their country and to raise the miserable standard of living of the Balkan peasant. They were fighting for true national independence against every kind of exploitation by more powerful countries. Similarly, after the war, when certain expansionist circles in the West thought they could halt the wheel of historical development and restore the monarchist and capitalist control which had kept Jugoslavia in a dependent position, the present leadership of Jugoslavia received the support of all the people in resisting such moves, whatever their form.

And finally, when the Soviet Union inaugurated a new economic exploitation of Jugoslavia, the present Jugoslav leadership received similar support from the people. The Soviet Government sought to impose economic relations similar to those prevailing between developed and undeveloped capitalist countries -- that is, trade at world prices, which makes it possible for an economically more developed country with higher labor productivity to exploit an economically backward country. It sought, through mixed Soviet-Jugoslav companies, to exploit the Jugoslav economy. The Soviet leaders came out against the industrialization of Jugoslavia -- though such industrialization was fully in accord with the country's natural riches and conditions. They attempted to impose political control upon Jugoslavia for the purpose of making it submit to such economic exploitation. This hegemonistic policy inevitably encountered the same resistance from the Jugoslav peoples which they had offered many times in their history, and especially in recent times, against the exploitation and oppression of the Great Powers. In the First World War, for example, little Serbia rejected the ultimatum of the Austro-Hungarian Empire; in the Second World War, Jugoslavia rejected the Tripartite Pact.

When the Soviet leaders realized that their policy of hegemony had met with resistance on the part of the Jugoslav people they loosed a torrent of rage and provocation upon Jugoslavia and began a program of pressure against her the like of which no small country had ever been exposed to before in history. In the execution of this program during the past two years, they have trampled under foot all rules of international relations, written and unwritten. In their relations with the big capitalistic Powers the Soviet leaders proclaim the need to respect international law as the basis of relations among states. But toward Jugoslavia they act as if they were free from all such obligations.

In its relations with neighboring countries where monopoly capitalism has a stake (for example, Iran, Turkey, Afghanistan) the Soviet Government has always been careful to adjust its measures to the rules of international law; it has yielded whenever Soviet moves met with opposition from other Great Powers. But it seemed to hope that because foreign monopolies had been liquidated in Jugoslavia, and since therefore Western countries had no further economic concern for her fate, Moscow could break the established rules of relations between sovereign states and undertake whatever measures it might wish against her.

By pursuing this course, however, the Soviet Government revealed to the world the essentially unjust character of its foreign policy. Previously, the Soviet Government was able to justify its hegemonistic plans by the plea that it had to defend a Socialist state against capitalism and that it was engaged in spreading Socialism. No such justification is possible, however, in the case of a consistently Socialist state. The loud accusations to the effect that Fascism exists in Jugoslavia (a monstrous clamor raised by the Soviet leaders to justify their aggressive policy) are of no avail in disguising the oppressive character of Soviet policy. The Jugoslav cause thus inevitably becomes increasingly the cause of all peoples and of all those forces which fight for the right of peoples to live in freedom and equality and to build their lives as they see fit.

Soviet pressure against Jugoslavia, like the development of Soviet foreign policy as a whole, has evolved through various stages. In all of them its actions have been repugnant not only to international law but even to the official -- or pretended -- Soviet view of the proper relations among states. In the first period, Soviet propaganda against Jugoslavia utilized state-owned radio stations to call openly on Jugoslav citizens to resist and overthrow the legal Government of Jugoslavia, while the Soviet state apparatus tried to inveigle Jugoslav citizens into working against their own country. In these respects the Soviet Government acted against Jugoslavia as it had never acted even against capitalist states. Its actions amounted without question to gross interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state -- a state, moreover, to which the U.S.S.R. was bound by a pact of alliance and friendship.

When these propaganda efforts to overthrow the régime in Jugoslavia failed, it became necessary to seek other methods. The Soviet leaders assumed that the desired results could be achieved by an economic blockade. But as the U.S.S.R. had longterm economic treaties and agreements with Jugoslavia, this involved breaking the most essential rule of international law -- respect for international treaties. The U.S.S.R. proceeded to do so. It organized the bloc of Cominform states to carry out an economic blockade against Jugoslavia, and thus abandoned the doctrine which Soviet law asserts is absolutely essential in international relations, namely, pacta sunt servanda -- international treaties must be inviolable. In contempt of this doctrine the Soviet Union unilaterally and arbitrarily cancelled treaties concluded with Jugoslavia. In Soviet doctrine, to consider treaties as scraps of paper is not merely "a gross violation of international law" but also a "manifestation of criminal aggressive policy." The adoption of such a policy towards Jugoslavia was in fact criminal, alike because the aim was to destroy the economic plans for constructing Socialism in Jugoslavia and because of the particular circumstances in which the process was carried out.

Thus Hungary cancelled treaties with Jugoslavia, refusing to deliver goods as agreed. She did this even though Jugoslavia had over $20,000,000 dollars to her credit in Hungary and although she had made it possible, out of her own resources of foreign currency, for Hungary to purchase materials needed to carry out contracts which had been given to Jugoslavia for the restoration of war-damaged Hungarian factories. Hungary even helped the economic blockade of Jugoslavia by stopping reparations payments provided for in the peace treaty. As for Czechoslovakia, she withheld deliveries of goods already finished and for which Jugoslavia had already paid in materials and credits. Czechoslovakia even withheld the return of machines which Jugoslavia had sent for repair in Czechoslovak shops -- for instance, machines from the Zagreb power plant. Rumania carried the economic blockade so far as not to pay a debt of honor which derived from a loan of Jugoslav wheat during the famine in Rumania -- a loan which, at the time, served as a pretext for refusing aid to Jugoslavia under the post-UNRRA system. Bulgaria, for her part, has refused to carry out her peace treaty obligation to restore the cultural monuments plundered during the war (Jugoslavia had earlier forgiven reparations as a friendly gesture to Bulgaria). The economic blockade was carried so far that the Soviet occupation authorities closed traffic to Jugoslav ships on the upper Danube (above Vienna), notwithstanding the convention for Danube navigation which guarantees free navigation along the entire length of the Danube without any discrimination.

What did the Soviet leaders want to achieve by an economic blockade of Jugoslavia? Their aim was clear. It was generally known that the Jugoslav Five Year Plan was oriented toward the exchange of goods with the Soviet Union and the Peoples' Democracies. The expectation was that an economic blockade would therefore produce the economic collapse which mere political propaganda had failed to achieve. The hope was that Jugoslavia would thus be forced to abandon the Five Year Plan, which would mean abandoning the construction of Socialism. All such expectations and hopes were disappointed. The Jugoslav people stood solidly behind their leadership, and increased their efforts. The pace of construction and the fulfillment of planned tasks did not change and consistent Socialist purposes were not abandoned.

After this failure only one course remained -- open political pressure. This took several forms. The rules of diplomatic immunity were violated. For example, the inviolability of diplomatic mailbags was disregarded, the personal freedom of diplomatic and technical personnel was violated, almost the entire Jugoslav diplomatic representation was expelled from certain countries, the principle of extra-territoriality of official premises and residences of diplomatic personnel was violated, the rank of the first Ambassador to arrive in Sofia was not recognized in order that he might not become Doyen of the Diplomatic Corps, and even physical attacks on Jugoslav personnel were organized. The rules of noninterference in the internal affairs of sovereign states were violated. For example, an intelligence network of foreigners was organized in Jugoslavia, forged passports were issued to Jugoslav citizens in Jugoslavia, subversive leaflets were distributed in Jugoslavia. Terroristic activities, characterized in the Litvinov protocol as well as in international law as a form of aggression, were organized. For example, armed bands were sent into Jugoslavia, and these, as was established at public trials, were organized among criminals by organs of the Hungarian and Albanian security services. Open threats were made against the peace. Thus the Soviet note of July 13, 1949, says that if the Soviet Union did not receive satisfaction, it would find its own efficacious means to secure satisfaction; and at the same moment Soviet divisions were demonstrating along the Jugoslav frontiers. Frontier incidents of all kinds were systematically and constantly provoked. For example, that of October 27, 1949, near Doljni Miholjac, was made to appear a military action, calculated to draw Jugoslav troops into battle. The sovereign right of Jugoslavia to equality as a member of the United Nations was denied. This was seen in the attempt to prevent Jugoslavia's election, as was her right, as a member of the Security Council. Attempts at intimidation were made through the simultaneous and unilateral cancellation of political treaties. For example, pacts of friendship and alliance with Jugoslavia were cancelled on the eve of her election to the Security Council.

Taken together, these actions create a situation which threatens international peace and security. Aware of this, Soviet foreign policy found it necessary to take the reactions of world-wide public opinion into consideration. New ways had therefore to be sought. The result was an attempt to achieve the desired ends by charging Jugoslavia with the very methods employed by Soviet foreign policy itself. Lies and slanders having failed, mock trials were organized in Budapest and Sofia, and these, through the assistance of agents provocateurs, were intended to demonstrate that Jugoslavia was an aggressor. These trials, however, were a complete fiasco. The lies on which they were based were immediately exposed. They remain today merely a proof of hostile action against Jugoslavia, pregnant with nonsense, contradictions and violations of the basic principles of international rules.[i]

In sum, the political pressure exercised against Jugoslavia is built on lack of principle and on violations of international law expressly denounced by Soviet doctrinal authorities.

III

Soon it will be two full years since Jugoslavia began successfully to resist the aggressive pressure of the Soviet Union and other East European countries. How is this effective resistance to be explained, particularly since Jugoslavia has simultaneously met with large-scale successes in carrying out her Five Year Plan?

The explanation lies first and foremost in the fact that the people of Jugoslavia have fully grasped the significance of the conflict with the Soviet Union. They understand that what is involved is not this or that alleged political or theoretical mistake made by the Communist Party of Jugoslavia, but whether equal or unequal relations shall exist between their country and the Soviet Union. They understand that what is at stake is whether Jugoslavia is to be able to raise herself economically, or whether -- as the leaders of the Soviet Union desire -- she is merely to supplement the Soviet economy.

To understand the difficult situation in which Jugoslavia found herself two years ago, when the Soviet attacks began, one must keep in mind that the Soviet leaders, headed by Stalin, enjoyed tremendous authority among the masses in Jugoslavia -- more than in any other East European country, and indeed not less than in the Soviet Union itself. This prestige, built up by the Jugoslav Communist Party among the masses, rested upon the belief that the words of the Soviet leaders were not different from their deeds. The Soviet leaders have lost sight of this fact. The Cominform claims that there is a terrorist régime in Jugoslavia which prevents the peoples from expressing their will. There is no terror, and there is no police force which could prevent such a freedom-loving people as the Jugoslavs, so unflinching in the face of all kinds of tyranny, from saying what they want to say. The fact is that the Jugoslav masses have themselves become convinced of the absurdity of the Soviet accusations. In their letters, Stalin and Molotov denied the struggle for national liberation in Jugoslavia and compared the situation in Jugoslavia during the war with that in countries which had no liberation struggle, such as Rumania and Hungary. It is even alleged that our fight for national liberation was carried on by the Gestapo. No one in Jugoslavia believes such nonsense.

The Soviet leaders do not invent such things merely for Jugoslav consumption, of course. They believe that with the help of their tremendous propaganda machine they will be able to impose these untruths on public opinion throughout the world and thus justify their aggressive course toward Jugoslavia.

Directly after the conflict began, the Jugoslav leadership decided to put the Jugoslav public in possession of all the facts. It published in editions of hundreds of thousands all the letters of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, the text of the Cominform resolution, and later the various other Soviet notes and Cominform documents. Thus the Jugoslav people could come to their own conclusions regarding the nature of the conflict. On the other hand, not one Jugoslav document has been published either in the U.S.S.R. or in the Eastern European countries, or by the Cominform organs in Western countries. No one therefore can speak about objective information or conclusions formed freely by the masses in those countries.

The foregoing facts still do not fully explain the strength of the Jugoslav resistance to the hegemonistic policy of the Soviet Union. To understand that, one must also take into account the harsh experiences of the Jugoslav people in their wartime struggle for liberation, as well as the fact that they not only are defending their independence but also their right to raise their country from its backward condition by the means best suited to Jugoslav conditions. Their determination to do this played a decisive rôle during the most difficult tribulations of the war period. The people's government, formed in Jugoslavia during the war, fostered the initiative of the masses. All kinds of bureaucratic centralism were alien to it. The People's Front grew from the bottom up, as the militant organization of the masses. It rallied the broadest strata of the people in the life-and-death struggle against the Nazi and Italian forces of occupation. The solution of the regional question rendered impossible any manœuvres aimed at provoking conflict among the several peoples forming the federation. The equality of the peoples of Jugoslavia helped the masses to grasp the essence of the struggle for equal relations among Socialist countries.

In the postwar period these fundamentals of policy have found increasingly clear expression as the struggle to promote industrialization, raise the living standard and create conditions for economic and political independence has become a matter of concern to all working people. The effort of the Government to overcome tendencies toward bureaucratic centralism by strengthening the machinery of local government, as the forces of production have developed, has confirmed the popular conviction that the Communist Party's policy is not the business of its leadership only but represents the aspirations of everybody. Here lies the great secret of the Jugoslav resistance. The Soviet leaders did not reckon with it; and during the first years after the war, in the days when Western expansionists were exercising strong pressure on Jugoslavia, it was also beyond the comprehension of many observers from the West.

The wartime struggles of the Jugoslav peoples against Hitlerite Germany and Fascist Italy, and their opposition to the postwar plans of Western circles which aimed at reinstating a capitalist order and monarchy in Jugoslavia, made their resistance to Soviet projects for hegemony something to be expected. Their history made certain that the principle on which they would want to develop their relations with other countries would be one of equal relations and full respect for national independence. This is in fact the principle of foreign policy to which Jugoslavia has adhered and will adhere. It is the principle which underlies Jugoslavia's relations with the Western Powers. The events of the two years during which Jugoslavia has faced exceptional difficulties because of pressure from both East and West indicate that all expectations that Jugoslavia can be forced to depart even to the slightest degree from the basic principles of her foreign policy are completely unfounded.

The economic blockade organized by the Soviet Union caused Jugoslavia to lose overnight 45 percent of her markets and has cost her a great many millions of dollars. In the meantime, her trade relations with some of the more highly developed countries of the West have often encountered difficulties. Czechoslovakia, for instance, was able to conclude various major trade agreements with the West much more quickly than Jugoslavia. Furthermore, although certain credits were granted to Jugoslavia which helped to make up for the losses she sustained through the economic blockade, they have not approached those received by Poland and Czechoslovakia in the first postwar years. During the last two years, for instance, Jugoslavia actually has received from the West, up to the time this is written, $20,000,000 in credits from the Export-Import Bank and a $2,700,000 loan from the International Bank, while for dinars she has purchased $9,000,000 from the International Monetary Fund. Much publicity has been given to this aid, obviously for propaganda reasons.

Such are the conditions in which Jugoslavia struggles for equal relations among peoples, and particularly between large and small ones. Her foreign policy is a striking example of consistent implementation of the principles of the United Nations Charter, not only by words but by deeds.

[i] In the Budapest and Sofia trials, the chief witnesses against Jugoslavia were agents provocateurs, former Jugoslav diplomats who were tried for acts supposedly committed "during the period when they were diplomatic representatives of Jugoslavia," and this despite the fact that the Jugoslav Government was not even asked to relieve them of their diplomatic immunity.

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  • MILAN BARTOS, Professor of International Law at Belgrade University since 1932 and Dean of the Law Faculty since 1945; Jugoslav delegate to the General Assembly of the United Nations and many other international conferences
  • More By Milan Bartos