STALIN'S successors began their tenure with an unusual economic inheritance. Under the dictator's five-year plans, the Russians had achieved very uneven results. Most notably they created a great industrial establishment, but were able to obtain only limited material rewards. Although Stalin meant us not to know many of the magnitudes, I believe we can gauge the main trends. In 1952, the dictator's next-to-last year, Soviet industry produced about 6.5 times as much as it did at the beginning of the five-year plans in 1928. In heavy industries the gains were even greater. Steel production increased eightfold to 34.5 million tons, coal 8.5 times to 301 million tons, and electric power 23 times to 116 billion kilowatt hours. In a quarter-century the U.S.S.R. became the world's second industrial Power.

Although the increase in industrial output consisted chiefly of "heavy" goods, the Russians probably produced more manufactured consumer goods per capita in 1952 than in 1928. They produced much more paper, soap and numerous other products. But the ordinary Russian still had to clothe himself mainly in cotton (only one yard of woolen cloth was produced per capita in 1952) and could buy only 1.1 pairs of shoes yearly. The Russians are accustomed to hearing from their government complaints about the inferior quality of these goods.

In Stalin's last years the average Russian ate a good deal more fish than he did in 1928, and more potatoes and perhaps more grain. He ate a good deal less milk, meat and other animal products. Of these, he had eaten little enough to begin with. Allowing for an increase of 20-25 percent in the population, we can see the trends in the consumption of animal products from the famous livestock figures reported by Khrushchev in 1953:[i]

Jan. 1, 1928 Jan. 1, 1953
Cattle 66.8 56.6
Hogs 27.7 28.5
Sheep and goats 114.6 109.9

In 1928 the city dweller occupied an average of 7.1 square yards of floor space. In 1952 this living space had shrunk to 4.7-5.3 square yards.

After taxes and bond deductions, the industrial worker with an average money wage could buy 10 percent less goods in 1952 than in 1928. This is in terms of a 1937 "market basket." In terms of a 1928 "market basket" containing more meat and other goods that later became scarce, the cut in "real" wages was 37 percent.[ii] Many women went to work in industry for the first time under the five-year plans, so relatively more breadwinners supported the urban population in 1952 than in 1928. For this reason, the city dwellers fared better than the figures on "real" wages might indicate.

With the limited total supplies available, if the industrial worker did not prosper the farmer could not either. Moreover, the government had to restrict the farmers' consumption through an extraordinary exchange. Under the five-year plans, the city population grew apace. In order to care for these people and to meet other commercial needs, Stalin called on his collective and state farmers to provide him with these supplies:

(in million tons)
1926-27 1952-53
Grain 10.3 40.4
Potatoes 3.0 12.5
Milk 4.3 13.2
Meat (live wt.) 2.4 5.0

With few if any less mouths to feed in 1953 than in 1927,[iii] the farmers had to part with much of the additional supplies of potatoes they had been able to produce and practically all or more than all of their increase in grain. (The "marketings," however, probably covered some grain shipments to deficit farm areas.) The total output of milk and meat increased little if at all. In these cases, therefore, the "marketings" meant corresponding cuts in the farmers' consumption.

The urban needs for manufactures were relatively high, so the government could offer the farmer only limited quantities of these goods in return for his sacrifices. Necessarily the "terms of trade" turned sharply against agriculture. Under the government's complex procurement system, the peasant could sell generally very limited quantities of produce on the free collective farm market. For these he could obtain terms fully comparable to the greatly increased prices which the government charged in its state shops for manufactures. Most of the marketings were to the government, and these largely on an obligatory basis. For such deliveries, the government held prices far below those for manufactures.

As regards their final status, the industrial worker gained on the farmer in Stalin's last years. Possibly in order finally to honor a long-standing obligation to the proletarian class which was after all the ultimate sovereign, or possibly merely in order to compensate them for excessive wartime suffering--we cannot know the reason--the dictator at the end rapidly increased the "real" wages of industrial workers from levels far below even the limited 1952 standards. He obtained the needed supplies partly from the expanding consumer goods industries and partly through more onerous exactions from agriculture. The increase in "real" wages was accomplished through a series of price cuts. Since the peasant could also buy more cheaply, the exactions were ameliorated in his case by the more favorable terms.


Stalin died on March 5, 1953. One wonders what he would have done if he had continued where he left off. His successors have been grappling ever since with problems emerging from the trends that have been described.

In August 1953, Premier Malenkov told the Supreme Soviet that "heavy industry is the fundamental basis of our Socialist economy, for without its growth it is impossible to assure the further growth of light industry, the growth of the productive forces of agriculture and to strengthen the defense capacity of our country." He also declared that "a task that cannot be postponed is to increase sharply in two or three years the population's supply of food and manufactures." Malenkov resigned his premiership on February 8, 1955. "The whole activity of the Communist Party and of the Soviet state," his successor told the Supreme Soviet the next day, "is subordinated to the lofty task of improving by every means the life of the workers. . . . The preferential development of heavy industry . . . corresponds to the vital interests of the Soviet state and our people." What policies has the new government pursued?

In their two and one-half years at the summit, Khrushchev and his colleagues have initiated a whole series of measures to increase farm output rapidly. Under Malenkov, they also attempted to accelerate the production of manufactured consumer goods and housing construction. While pursuing these endeavors, they have sought to avoid any undue slackening of industrial growth. If Malenkov had had the opportunity to try to fulfill the consumer goods targets he set for 1956 he might have gone somewhat further than he did in limiting the capital investments needed in heavy industry for future industrial growth. One is free to conjecture that in later years he might have gone still further. In the course of his brief tenure, however, he did not go very far. From Minister of Finance Zverev's annual budget messages of April 22, 1954, and February 3, 1955, and from other official reports, we can surmise that the new government reduced slightly in 1953 and raised slightly in 1954 the share of the national income going to fixed capital investments in the economy as a whole.[iv] In 1953 it reduced little if at all the share of this investment going to heavy industry. It planned in 1954 to cut this branch's share by a few percent, and it may have done so. These were the main trends under Malenkov. Under the financial plan for 1955, which the Government approved the day before Malenkov's resignation, but after it had determined on its post-Malenkov course, the proportion of the national income going to fixed capital investment may have been slightly reduced again. If heavy industry's share of the total was actually reduced in 1954, the cut was to be made good under the plan for 1955.

Over the entire period the government tended to allot to heavy industry about two-fifths or more of its investments in the entire economy. In the United States we have usually devoted one-fourth or less of our total fixed capital investments to all industry.

While the Soviet régime has limited its efforts in agriculture in this way, it invested in this branch in 1953 out of its own resources only 12 billion rubles or less than one-sixth of the sum going to heavy industry. No doubt it was able in 1954 to increase sharply its appropriation to this limited claimant, although perhaps not to the planned total of 21 billion rubles. Despite Zverev's reticence, I believe the government is continuing its allotments at a fairly high level. The plan for 1955 called in addition for the collective farms to invest out of their resources 18 billion rubles, compared with the 12 billions they had invested in 1953.

With the sums at his disposal Khrushchev has been able to initiate many new projects, including mainly a complex program adopted in the summer and fall of 1953 to raise the output on existing farms; a great campaign begun in March 1954 and accelerated in August 1954 to expand the grain-sown area by the use of virgin and idle lands in the East; and a second great campaign begun in January 1955 to extend the cultivation of fodder corn chiefly at the expense of low-yielding grain crops and grasses.

As new programs have been undertaken, the government has persisted in varying degrees with measures initiated previously. It sharply increased its prices to the peasant in 1953, for example, and has maintained them at their new high levels since, although it is not continuing the efforts begun under Malenkov to increase quickly the output of manufactures that the peasant buys. Under commitments made in 1953, the government has been supplying agriculture with considerable quantities of machinery, but (contrary to the original expectation) much of this is now going to the new lands. By 1954 it had raised the output of mineral fertilizer by 26 percent over the 5 or 6 million tons produced in 1952. In view of Khrushchev's remarks at the conference of Southeastern farm workers on March 19, 1955, one wonders nevertheless whether he is still pursuing the ambitious goal announced in 1953 to increase fertilizer output more than threefold by 1959 and more than five times by 1964: "In order to increase grain production up to the needed amounts under the existing distribution of crops it is necessary to raise the yields sharply. And for this it is necessary to increase fertilizer production by several times, which requires enormous capital investments in the chemical industry. But we can achieve this aim within a shorter period of time and with a smaller expenditure of funds, if we pay particular attention to corn."

The current goal of the new lands program is to increase the sown area by a total of from 69,000,000 to 74,000,000 acres by 1956. The new acreage, which is to be seeded mainly although not exclusively to grain, is equal to more than one-fourth of the total grain area in all of Russia in 1953. The entire wheat area of the United States at its peak in 1949 was 76 million acres. On September 12, 1955, Pravda reported that Russia's farmers already had plowed up 72 million acres under this program. The corn acreage is to increase from 9 million acres in 1953 to 69 million acres in 1960. Nearly 45 million acres had been planted to corn by the summer of 1955.


Under his five-year plans, Stalin's overriding concern was industrial growth. Yet, notwithstanding his meager achievements in agriculture, he launched in his lifetime a number of large projects to accelerate farm production. He certainly initiated collectivization chiefly in order to gain control of agriculture, especially the disposition of the harvest; but he hoped also to raise output, and when he was confronted instead with unparalleled losses, he hastily allotted more capital to this branch (possibly to a very limited extent at the expense of heavy industry) in order to ease its distress. Our statistical barometers do not register any similar change in course in the aftermath of war, but the dictator's last years saw the launching and substantial implementation of a great long-term shelter belt project and also some progress under plans for the wholesale reconstruction and extension of the Soviet irrigation system. Stalin had many reasons to merge the 254,000 collective farms of 1950 into the 97,000 of October 1952; no doubt a desire to improve efficiency and raise output played a rôle.

Khrushchev is seeking to continue with accelerated industrialization. He is also striving far more urgently than Stalin ever did to raise farm production to new high levels. Why is he so impatient in this regard? The reasons must be complex. A new government has decided at long last to improve the diet of a people whose numbers are growing by 1.5 percent or 3,000,000 a year. Since it also wishes to continue rapid industrial growth, it must feed a city population that is increasing by 4.5 percent or 3,500,000 a year.[v] In his report of September 3, 1953, Khrushchev cited "the violation of the principle of material self-interest" as a major factor in the lag in agriculture, and no one at all familiar with the facts will dissent. The government has decided that it cannot continue indefinitely to feed new city dwellers, as Stalin did, primarily at the peasant's expense. At least for a time, it must try to do this mainly by increasing total output. While endeavoring to feed his people better generally, Khrushchev is also seeking a new agricultural basis for accelerated industrialization.

In trying to raise output, the government initially stressed better terms for the peasant. Although it has maintained the increased prices that were granted under Malenkov, it is now attempting to raise farm output chiefly through other more radical measures. In this way, it may avoid even the limited cuts in investments in heavy industry that Malenkov made. Without undue reliance on imports, light industry in any case might easily outstrip its agricultural raw material base.

We must not read into Khrushchev's sense of urgency any evidence that there is any extreme public destitution. Khrushchev must be more concerned than Stalin was to raise living standards. He is still striving, but in changed circumstances, "to overtake and outstrip" the advanced capitalist countries, "technically and economically." For a time agriculture must participate more actively with industry in the great contest.

Malenkov's New Course might have become newer as it aged; but it was not really very new, and there is now even less reason than before to think that any serious break with the past was ever intended. Under Bulganin the government's path is surely rather old, although there are still novel aspects.

In the great Party debates on economics in the late twenties, the Right Deviation under Bukharin argued that industry could not progress in sharp disproportion to agriculture. The government could industrialize only so far as, through the offering of sufficiently favorable terms, it could obtain from agriculture the market surpluses needed to feed the growing cities. Bukharin was right under his assumption of a market relation between the government and the peasant. But Stalin collectivized agriculture, and Bukharin was wrong in fact. Is Khrushchev nevertheless not confronted with Bukharin's problem in a new guise?

If we turn with heightened interest to consider the recent accomplishments and prospects we must do so cautiously. The government so far has not reduced materially its capital allocations to heavy industry. Even if his present exertions prove unsuccessful, Khrushchev still might have many cards to play before accelerated industrialization could be seriously threatened in agriculture.


We can measure only very roughly the recent trends in Soviet industrial production. Since 1950 output has grown at about these yearly rates (measured in percent).[vi]

1950-51 15.0-16
1951-52 8.7-11
1952-53 10.4-12
1953-54 9.4-13

The rate of growth since 1951 probably has been below--although not far below--the extraordinary rates which Stalin achieved under his first two five-year plans. The high 1950-51 increase represents a decline from even higher tempos that were realized in earlier postwar years when reconstruction was in full swing.

In Stalin's last few years, consumer goods industries may have grown a little more slowly than heavy industries. They may have grown a little more rapidly than heavy industries in 1953 and 1954.[vii]

The higher of the two figures cited above for the growth of total industrial output for years since 1950 are Soviet official claims, which for a reason just explained in a footnote must be considered more seriously than similar data have been in the past. On February 9, 1955, Bulganin reported to the Supreme Soviet a 1955 goal to increase industrial output by 9 percent. The reduction from previous tempos, I believe, was due primarily to a planned retardation of light industry. The Central Statistical Administration has since claimed an actual increase in total industrial output in the first half of 1955 of 12 percent over the first half of 1954. Through the first half of 1955, therefore, there was no slackening to speak of in the growth of industry generally, although heavy industry must have regained its former superiority over consumer goods.

Stalin's successors have been less frank about agricultural progress under their rule than about that under Stalin's. No doubt they have made limited gains. The Government acknowledges that farm output fell by 3.5 percent in Stalin's last two years. The grain harvest of 1953 reportedly was "close to" that of 1952 and that of 1954 was "higher than" that of 1953. The harvest of 1955 was "significantly greater than in past years," although below plan. Other crops in 1953 were either "approximately the same as" or by unspecified amounts "higher than" in 1952; and the story is much the same for 1954 compared with 1953. From 1952 to 1954 cotton increased an estimated 3 percent.

In January 1953 cattle herds were smaller than in January 1951, while there were more sheep and goats and more hogs. From October 1953 to October 1954 the different herds increased by 3, 7 and (in the case of sheep only) 2 percent. Cow and sheep herds both grew by 6 percent from July 1954 to July 1955, while hog numbers remained the same and other herds are unreported. Partly through an increase in yields, collective farms (which own about one-third of Russia's cows) produced 52 percent more milk in the period October 1954-July 1955 than they had in the corresponding interval two years before. Addressing the people of Sevastopol on October 14, 1955, Khrushchev could report that "the collectively owned livestock is growing and as a result the production and procurement of meat, milk and other animal products have expanded significantly, although there is still rather little of them."

Some new lands in the East already yielded a grain harvest in 1954, and this tended to offset losses in the Ukraine and Volga basin due to a drought. In 1955 the new lands in turn experienced a drought. The harvest in the U.S.S.R. as a whole increased again despite this.

We do not know how the government has divided the recent gains in farm output between city and country. Obviously it has experienced difficulties, at least in the case of foodstuffs, in its attempts not merely to maintain but raise urban living standards. One of its first acts in 1953 was to continue the series of annual price cuts that Stalin had initiated in 1948. Except for milk, it reduced markedly the prices of foods along with those of manufactures. Later in the year the government also cut compulsory public bond subscriptions. In order to meet the increased demand, Mikoyan reported to a conference of trade workers on October 17, 1953, that the government expected to import in that year 4 billion rubles ($1 billion at the official exchange rate) of consumer goods. It also drew on inventories and reserves. But empty shelves, queues and high collective farm market prices all attest that its efforts were at best only partly successful. The government again cut prices in April 1954 but much less than the year before (e.g. meat was now omitted from the list of articles affected). Except for some minor articles, it had omitted up to the time these lines were written to make any price cut at all in 1955. It is again calling on the public to subscribe to its bonds at about the pre-1953 rates. By all accounts, the shortages in state shops nevertheless have not abated. Although cases have been reported of uncontrolled boosts, I believe that as a rule the new government has followed the course set by Stalin in his last years of allowing only very limited increases in money wages.

As a result of the higher prices which they have been receiving for their produce since the fall of 1953, the farmers are now obtaining a larger share of the Soviet supplies of manufactures than they did under Stalin.


Khrushchev's agricultural endeavors are difficult to assess. Because of the soil or the climate or both, much of the vast territory of the U.S.S.R. is unsuitable for agriculture and much of what is suitable is inferior. "The Fertile Triangle, which includes most of the farmland of the Soviet Union," Professor Chauncy Harris has written,[viii] "is to be compared to the spring wheat belt of the Dakotas and the Prairie Provinces of Canada, where agricultural yields per acre are relatively low and irregular from year to year, where the variety of crops that can be grown is not great, and where measures for increasing intensity of agriculture through fertilization or more labor are less rewarding than in areas of higher rainfall or longer growing season."

Stalin had exploited only to a limited extent the opportunities for the effective use of fertilizer, however, and if (as is now uncertain) the government persists with the 1953 program in this regard it will not go unrewarded. Although he glowingly portrayed for the benefit of the Central Committee the American experience with corn, Khrushchev realistically assumes that his crops of this grain will often have to be cut for silage before they ripen. The actual results of his extraordinary program under the adverse Soviet climatic conditions must be conjectural. Excluding the areas that he incorporated in the U.S.S.R. in 1939 and 1940, Stalin added to the Soviet grain-sown area during all his five-year plans less than 15,000,000 acres. Khrushchev is seeking by 1956 to sow primarily in grain another 69,000,000 to 74,000,000 acres, or more than one-fourth the 1954 acreage. Western experts appear to agree that he can often obtain good returns on the new Eastern lands in their first few years of use; that the returns are likely to diminish thereafter; that there is a real danger of "dust-bowls" under the kind of intensive use the Russians are planning; and that marginal weather conditions make for unstable yields and frequent crop failures.[ix]

The U.S.S.R. still has a huge farm labor force, and there can be no thought of any basic shortage in this regard for many years to come. The foreign visitor to a Soviet collective farm notices first of all the great numbers of workers about. Labor economy is still in order momentarily to meet the increased requirements of the new programs, and in the long run to meet continuing industrial recruitment needs; but Russia's problem in agriculture is above all to raise output. One must be on guard against identifying these two aspects in thinking about the possible results of mechanization. Our most dramatic gains from the use of machinery in the United States generally have taken the form of labor economies rather than higher yields per acre. The machine has contributed to our bumper crops, however, by facilitating extensions in the cultivated area; and in many ways (e.g. through the resultant improved and more rapid plowing, cultivation, etc.) it has also contributed materially if not spectacularly to higher yields. Consequently, if Khrushchev can find the capital, he can achieve real gains in this way.

The gains will be the greater because of the limited expansion of farm power under Stalin. Horses eat grain, and for this as well as other reasons, the dictator never sought to replace many of the draft animals that were lost under collectivization and during the war. Instead he supplied the farmers with tractors. At his death, Russia's total horse herds (consisting largely though probably not exclusively of farm work animals) numbered about 17,000,000 less than at the outset of the five-year plans. Stalin meantime had endowed agriculture with a tractor park of but 16,000,000 horsepower. The total stock of farm power of all sorts (animal and machine; draft and other) may not have increased as much as output. Only through the concentration of the machines in the Machine-Tractor Stations and their most intensive use were the Russians able to achieve anything like their claimed high degree of mechanization. Due to frequent breakdowns, this may not always have been economical of the machines themselves, while the inefficiency and crop losses resulting from the bureaucratic operations of the M.T.S. are a constant theme of Soviet self-criticism. Stalin also left his heirs much to do in regard to farm buildings and other capital improvements.

Through the payment of higher prices, reorganization of the procurement system, transfers of agricultural specialists from superior agencies and many other measures, Khrushchev hopes to improve the efficiency of his collective farms and farmers. In the long run these actions may be among the most fruitful he has taken, but in 1954 the government found it expedient to raise once more the obligatory minimum number of "labor days" which the collective farm member must devote to collective farm work (the agricultural tax goes up 50 percent for any household for which any member does not perform the minimum). Despite a new decree decentralizing planning, it initiated in 1955 a campaign which caused Soviet farmers to sow corn on a wholesale scale, often in clearly unsuitable areas. On January 25, 1955, Khrushchev could still report to the Central Committee: "It is above all necessary to cut down on the impermissibly great losses of grain during the harvest. It is completely intolerable that delays in harvesting on many collective and state farms have resulted in losses of up to a quarter of the standing crop, and sometimes more." The production of manufactured consumer goods which the peasant wants has slackened, and the government must still feed the mushrooming cities. For Khrushchev not the least of the attractions of the new lands program must be the opportunity it affords to make more extensive use of a state farm system which is more amenable to government controls.

The Central Committee of the Party has asked Russia's farmers by 1960 or 1961 to increase their grain harvest to 164,000,000 tons or about 65 percent above 1954;[x] to double their 1954 output of meat and milk; and to more than double their 1954 egg crop. Khrushchev certainly should be able to do better than Stalin did in the face of the collectivization and war losses, but--to take now the standpoint of industry--we may at least conclude that agriculture is momentarily more of a retarding factor than it was under Stalin, and that very possibly it will remain so. Also, I believe one must view partly in this light the current heightening of emphasis on labor productivity and technological progress in industry (e.g. Bulganin's July 4, 1955, report to the Party). Increases in labor efficiency are to the good from any standpoint, but momentarily labor requirements have increased in agriculture, and many young city people and farmers who might otherwise have gone there are needed in agriculture to raise corn or to till the new lands. More basically, the government is reluctant to invest the additional sums in machinery which might still release large numbers of extra workers for industry. It is reluctant to do this partly because of the shortage of capital and partly because it is not entirely sure of its urban food supplies. If as a result of gains in industrial labor productivity there are fewer city mouths to feed in relation to industrial output, it is true there will also be more rural mouths, but at least the task of extracting surpluses is less onerous. The task was already a heavy one for Stalin, and this was not the least of his reasons for striving so eagerly, despite the huge agricultural labor reserve, and in violation of rather basic precepts of rational economy, to economize labor in industry through heavy capital outlays as well as greater worker efficiency. In their current endeavors to raise labor productivity, his successors can be expected to strive for the same results for the same reason. With all their farm workers, and the vast possibilities of replacing them with machinery, the Russians must be very economical of labor in the cities.

The accumulated urban housing shortage and city "overhead costs" generally must work in the same direction, so we may list labor along with agriculture as likely retarding factors for industry. There also will be others. With all of their progress under the five-year plans, the Russians are still borrowing from the West technologically. With an industrial labor productivity no more than one-half that of the United States, they are borrowing less overtly than before, but none the less persistently; and despite all barriers they will still be able to learn much from us for many years to come. "The most important technical achievement in Soviet electric power stations," according to the Soviet journal Planned Economy, [xi] "is the application of steam of high pressure (90 atmospheres) and high temperatures (up to 500 degrees Centigrade)." Equipment of the type in question has been used in the United States for many years.

This source of progress must tend to diminish in importance in the course of time. The level of the best Soviet scientific work is very high, and the Russians now have over 500,000 trained engineers and technicians, or about as many as we do; but their opportunities to employ productively their vast investments in industry should tend to decline.

Considering quality and location as well as quantity, we see that the Russians are not as well supplied with industrial minerals as their usual data on reserves suggest. At Magnitogorsk, for example, they already were experiencing a shortage of good iron ore at the end of the war. In the future, the U.S.S.R. will be hampered by diminishing returns in this area, although probably not very materially.

Together, I believe, these adverse factors could be important, but Khrushchev may be able to offset them at least in part. If only he can avoid any real break in the tempo of heavy industry, he may be able in time to concentrate even more of the capital it produces on its own further growth. Possibly he could do this --as he unquestionably hopes he can--while still increasing his investments modestly in other branches including agriculture. With good luck the Russians conceivably might continue for many years to lift themselves by their own bootstraps in this way.

While devoting perhaps one-fourth of the national income to capital investments, Stalin also found the means needed to support a Cold War military force. His successors could hardly cut their military budget on economic grounds alone, and it is difficult to perceive a rhyme of any sort in their cyclical changes in these outlays to date. (They planned a slight increase in 1953 and a cut in 1954; and while they fixed a 1955 goal above the 1954 one, they recently announced that they will reduce their armed forces this year by 640,000 men.) But circumstances permitting, they might obtain additional resources for industrial expansion in this way, and so cope the more effectively with their adversities.

Industrial production in the United States grew during the first half of this century at an average rate of 4.1 percent a year. It grew by 5.5 percent a year from 1948-53, and by 3.6 percent annually from 1950 to 1954. Soviet industry lately has been growing at two to three times these American tempos. The Russians could slow down and yet continue to beat us in this strategic sphere. Khrushchev has expressed confidence that in the "peaceful competition" between two systems Communism will be victorious. He is encountering difficulties which might prove serious, but we must not overrate them at this early stage.

[i] Khrushchev's figures for prewar as well as postwar years refer, I believe, to the livestock herds within the post-World War II Soviet boundaries. Accordingly, the increase in population has been estimated for the same area.

[ii] Janet Chapman, "Real Wages in the Soviet Union, 1928-52," Review of Economics and Statistics, May 1954.

[iii] The farm population decreased in the prewar years, but the addition of new territories in 1939 and after was an offset. The rural (i.e. non-urban) population increased from 121,000,000 in 1927 to about 129,000,000 in 1953.

[iv] I am indebted to Mr. Norman Kaplan for aid in this connection. Reference should be made also to R. W. Davies, "Investment-Consumption Controversy," Soviet Studies, July 1955.

[v] The total city population was around 80,000,000 in 1953. In his January 25, 1955, report to the Central Committee, Khrushchev revealed that the city population had increased by approximately 17,000,000 in the previous five years.

[vi] The figure cited in Section I on the increase in industrial output under Stalin, and the lower rates shown here for 1950-54, are from Donald Hodgman, "Soviet Industrial Production 1928-51," (Cambridge, Mass., 1954, p. 89, 134). Hodgman's calculations refer to "large scale" industry. On the basis of an unpublished estimate of Richard Moorsteen, I reduced his 1928-37 index by one-fifth in order to make it represent "small scale" industry as well. Hodgman extends his calculations only to 1953. I have obtained the corresponding 1953-54 increase by the use of his methods. For recent years Hodgman had to rely on only a limited sample of Soviet production data for different industries. Soviet official measures of total output show the higher increases shown in the text for the years 1950-54. The Soviet calculations for 1950 and after are now in terms of 1952 ruble prices. For this reason they no longer seem open to the serious criticisms that were raised against them in their earlier "1926-27 ruble" version.

[vii] Davis, op. cit., p. 59.

[viii] "Growing Food by Decree in Soviet Russia," Foreign Affairs, January 1955.

[ix] Lazar Volin, "The New Battle for Grain in Soviet Russia," Foreign Agriculture, November 1954.

[x] I assume the goal is in terms of the same "factual" yield as the realized figure for 1954 released to the American farm delegation. See The New York Times, August 21, 1955.

[xi] Roland Gibson, "Recent Technological Progress in the Soviet Union," Social Research, Summer 1955.

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  • ABRAM BERGSON, Professor of Economics, Columbia University; member of the Allied Reparations Mission, Moscow, 1945; author of "The Structure of Soviet Wages" and other works
  • More By Abram Bergson