Foreign Affairs: 100 Years
A New Americanism
Why a Nation Needs a National Story
WILL the dismantling of the Stalin myth, the most startling result of the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, be followed by the modification or abandonment of the basic goals of Stalin's foreign policy? Or merely by a change in Soviet manners and methods? Nikita Khrushchev's bitter attack on Stalin, delivered to a secret session of the Congress on February 25, has now been published in America, at least in part, in what appears to be an authentic version.[i] It gives evidence of substantial changes in the "style" in which the post-Stalin Party Presidium proposes to exercise its dictatorial power at home, while pursuing the same basic goals of building heavy industry and military power. But it gives no evidence of doubt as to the correctness of Stalin's basic foreign policy.
True, Khrushchev attacked Stalin bitterly for his blind faith in Hitler's word and for his refusal to believe Churchill's warnings against the impending German attack on the Soviet Union. The available extracts depict Stalin as a bullheaded and uninformed meddler in military strategy and, by implication, enhance the military stature of both Khrushchev and the army command. Stalin is also accused of "an incorrect position with respect to the nationality question." "He undertook a whole series of reprisals against several nationalities and national minorities." Most striking is the downgrading of the "Short Biography" of Stalin. "The short Stalin biography, which appeared in 1948, is an expression of that uncontrolled self-praise, an attempt by Stalin to show himself as 'an infallible genius'."
The Khrushchev speech condemns Stalin (but no others) for his stubborn efforts to "break" Tito "with his little finger." (This passage was not included in the version published in the Belgrade Borba on March 20.) Since then the Jugoslav Communists have received a double satisfaction, through the disbanding of the Cominform in April and the resignation of Molotov as Foreign Minister on May 31. Apart from the obeisance to Tito, the Khrushchev speech does not question a single one of Stalin's foreign policies, his methods or his achievements. So far as foreign policy is concerned, the key to the current changes in tactics may be concealed rather than revealed in Khrushchev's reference to "the tremendous damage which Stalin caused to the Soviet Union and the international working-class movement."
True to their ingrained Stalinist discipline, the non-Soviet Communist Parties have hastened to repudiate their previous grovelling obeisances to Stalin's leadership and nervously promise to return, like the Soviet Party, to "true Leninist principles." In Bulgaria, Chervenkov has been demoted, at least outwardly, while in Hungary Rakosi continues in control of the Communist Party. Changes in the Polish Party have been more far-reaching than in the Czechoslovak Party.
These and other manœuvres provide the basis for a wide range of speculation. The retention of Rakosi in Hungary may be due to the relative scarcity of Moscow-trained Communists. Or perhaps the Bulgarian and Polish Communist Parties were much more closely affected by the Stalin purges of the late 1930's, and therefore the reaction against "Stalin's methods" of "the crudest physical pressure" may have made it necessary to rearrange the "pecking order" within the satellite leaderships.[ii]
Only a Soviet leadership supremely confident of the stability of its rule within the Soviet Union could have undertaken such a drastic operation as the direct repudiation of the Stalin myth. In the European satellites de-Stalinization offers some minor risks to Soviet goals. While it may not be an easy or quick process to rehabilitate "Leninist" methods of operation and control at home, within the Soviet Union the more senior Communist cadres remember vividly the pre-Stalinist or pre-1935 "methods of party work," and the refurbished leadership can therefore appeal to a genuine Leninist myth. In the satellites, the Stalinist system, with all its paraphernalia of multiple controls and terror, was imported in the baggage trains of the Soviet Army. It did not develop out of a previous Leninist tradition. To modify the simple command of "Eyes on Moscow!" is a difficult matter.
In Poland, where the attacks on Stalinist methods have gone farthest, considerable confusion and uncertainty have been evident. Loyal Polish Communists must now proclaim that their leaders were wrong in claiming that everything Soviet was best and in denying the importance of Poland's special conditions and traditions. The resistance heroes of the Polish Home Army, after years of being condemned as "agents of Western imperialism," are now praised for their valiant if "misguided" attempt to liberate Warsaw in mid-1944. In literature, "socialist realism," itself subject to some redefinition and stretching in the Soviet Union, is no longer offered to Polish writers as the sole way to please their political masters.
With the continued rapid expansion of the Soviet economy, the satellites' resources and production seem no longer to be needed so desperately by the Soviet Union as in the years of reconstruction and the Korean War. If the satellites are now to carry on an increasing proportion of their trade with the non-Soviet world, many of them may envy the Jugoslav Communists their ability to trade freely with both East and West and to secure direct assistance from the West, and particularly from the United States. If somewhat more flexible forms of economic and cultural relations are to be developed between the Soviet satellites and the non-Soviet world, the problem of defining and conforming to a wavering line of Soviet demands may cause many uncertainties, both in Moscow and in the satellite capitals. Moscow will certainly retain the essential controls, through its penetration of the satellite parties, armed forces and secret police, but the task of its apparatus of control and of the satellite Communists will be a more complex and ticklish one than it was in the "good old days" of Stalin's commands.
For Communist China, the effects of the de-Stalinization are likely to be less noticeable. For one thing, it is very hard to say how far Stalin went in trying to penetrate the control channels of the Chinese dictatorship. Since the Khrushchev-Bulganin visit to Peking of mid-October 1954, the outward and hierarchical position of Chinese Communism has been made more and more equal to that of Soviet Communism. Whether the "tremendous damage which Stalin caused to the . . . international working-class movement" has any reference to Sino-Soviet relations remains obscure.
Since the close of the Congress in Moscow the Chinese Communist Politburo, without blaming Stalin directly, has spoken out strongly against ". . . some of our comrades mechanically applying Stalinist formulas in the Chinese revolution," from 1927 to 1936, and their "dogmatic errors."[iii] Some further hint of dissension between Moscow and Peking perhaps may be read into or out of the speech made at the Party Congress by D. T. Shepilov, since appointed Foreign Minister:
The progress of the socialist revolution in China has been even more unique. . . . From the point of view of pedant Marxists such an approach to the question of transforming exploitative ownership into socialist ownership almost amounts to flouting the principles of Marxism-Leninism. But in reality this is creative Marxism-Leninism in action, a masterly application of Marxist dialectic to the specific conditions of China, boldly and wisely carried out by the heroic Communist Party of China. (Stormy applause).[iv]
Does this laudatory reference to the path chosen by Chinese Communism reflect or veil a recent struggle between the two major centers of Communism over Mao's insistence on pursuing a "Chinese path to socialism?" More recently, rumors have seeped out from satellite capitals of a speech by Khrushchev, during his visit to Warsaw in March for Bierut's funeral. He is said to have attacked Stalin for subjecting Sino-Soviet relations to a dangerous strain by attempting to clamp his control on the Chinese Party and economy.
Among the Communist Parties of the non-Soviet world the effects of the de-Stalinization campaign are likely to be slight. These Parties are too weak and insecure to do more than switch abjectly to the new Soviet line. Perhaps they will lose some of their fringe followers, but the leadership cores have been jumping obediently through the hoop held up for them by the rejection of "Stalinist methods." However, over the next few years the Moscow leadership must reckon that any minor losses of following or of prestige caused by the repudiation of the "father of the peoples" will be more than offset by the greater flexibility in tactics now gained through rejecting Stalin-worship and by broadening the Communists' opportunities to enlist the coöperation of other political and social forces behind slogans of "peace," Soviet-style, and anti-Americanism.
In his public speech of February 14, Khrushchev proclaimed three important "principles" of Soviet foreign policy, leaving it to foreign commentators to describe them as "new." These are: the principle of "peaceful coexistence" of two systems, the rejection of the "inevitability" of war, and the approval of various forms of transition to "socialism," the term by which Communists describe their own dictatorship.
Khrushchev rejected the allegation that the Soviet Union puts forward the principle of peaceful coexistence purely from tactical considerations and proclaimed it as "a basic principle of Soviet foreign policy." Repeating the standard Stalinist interpretation of the nature of war, he attributed the origin of all wars and all threats of war solely to the unfortunately prolonged survival of the capitalist system and again claimed that only the Soviet system, in the long run, supports and guarantees peace.[v]
When we speak of the fact that in the competition of the two systems--capitalist and socialist--the socialist system will triumph, that does not mean by any means that victory will be achieved through armed intervention by the socialist countries in the internal affairs of the capitalist countries.
Both the meaning and the implicit limitations of Khrushchev's standard restatement of the principle of "peaceful coexistence" were clarified by Shepilov's elaboration:
The fact that the prerequisites for the transition to socialism mature at different times in different countries, the fact that individual countries break away from the capitalist system at different times, means that the simultaneous existence of both capitalist and socialist states is inevitable on our planet.
Shepilov then went on to warn the Communist Parties against the idea of a genuine or lasting reconciliation:
The capitalist and socialist outlooks cannot be reconciled. . . . We are convinced that the final victory in the historical competition between the two systems belongs to socialism as the higher, more progressive, social system.[vi]
The second "principle," as refurbished by Khrushchev, is that "war is not inevitable at the present time." In support of this assertion, Khrushchev cited the formation of a Soviet bloc of 900,000,000 people, the formation of a very large uncommitted "peace bloc," and the growth of "pro-peace" and anti-imperialist forces within the imperialist world.
This "new" principle received further elaboration in a speech by Suslov, one of the Kremlin's most trusted theorists:
The balance of forces in the world arena has now changed radically in favor of the supporters of peace and not the supporters of war. It stands to reason that, in so far as imperialism remains, the economic basis for the outbreak of wars also remains, and danger of the unleashing of military adventures by the more reactionary monopolistic circles, particularly against the countries of socialism, does not disappear. . . . Now, under the new historical conditions, there are mighty forces possessing considerable resources for preventing the imperialists from unleashing a war and, if they try to start one anyway, for crushing the aggressors and for burying forever both war and the capitalist system. . . .[vii]
This formulation, stated somewhat more fully than in Khrushchev's speech, repeats almost word for word one of the basic "principles" as set forth by Stalin in his "Economic Problems of Socialism," published in October 1952. Neither Khrushchev nor Suslov credits the "imperialists" with any positive contributions to the preservation of peace. At best, the capitalists' "subjective" protestations of their desire for peace are still regarded in Moscow as a sign of "reasonableness" inspired by fear of the powers of the Soviet bloc; at worst, as a camouflage for preparations to launch a war against it.
Khrushchev's third "principle," endlessly repeated and lauded by other speakers at the Congress, dealt with "the forms of transition of various countries to socialism." Khrushchev cited with approval Lenin's assertion of mid-1917 that "All nations will come to socialism, that is inevitable, but not all will come in the same manner, each will introduce its own peculiarity into one or another form of democracy, into one or another variety of the dictatorship of the proletariat. . . ."
To buttress Lenin's prediction, Khrushchev cited the appearance of the "People's Democracies" and of Communist China.
The leadership by the Communist Party of China, by the Communist and Workers Parties of the other countries of People's Democracy, of the great cause of socialist reconstruction, taking into account the peculiarity and particularities of each country--that is creative Marxism in action. . . . It is true that we recognize the necessity for the revolutionary reconstruction of capitalist society into socialist society. That distinguishes revolutionary Marxists from reformers, opportunists.
Khrushchev went on to deny that the only "path to socialism" is through civil war. He pointed out that civil war had not been necessary for the triumph of the "people's democracies" in Eastern Europe after 1944. He failed to mention the decisive rôle of the Soviet armies, the secret police and the Communist Party apparatuses in imposing Soviet control on them.
In some countries, Khrushchev said, there might even develop a "parliamentary path" to Socialism. The working class may gain "a firm majority in parliament and transform it from an organ of bourgeois democracy into an organ of true popular will. (Applause)." He continued:
Of course, in those countries where capitalism is still strong, where it has in its hands an enormous military-police apparatus, there the serious opposition of the reactionary forces is inevitable. There the transition to socialism will take place in conditions of sharp class, revolutionary struggle.
Under all forms of transition to socialism the indispensable and decisive condition is the political leadership of the working class headed by its progressive part. Without this, the transition to socialism is impossible.[viii]
Khrushchev's "new" principle is simply a briefer restatement of the position set forth by Stalin in October 1952, and in many previous declarations. At that time Stalin went into even more graphic detail, pointing out that in some countries where capitalism and the bourgeoisie were weak the people, led by the vanguard of the "toiling masses," the Communist Party, would be able to seize power through elections and without civil war. Whether the "transition to socialism" is to be peaceful or bloody is, for Stalin and Khrushchev alike, determined by the will and capacity of the "capitalists" to resist. The will and the duty of the Communist Party to seize power and thereafter to exercise complete control are, for them, not in question. So much for Khrushchev's alleged "conciliatory" revision of Stalinist doctrine!
In order that Communists would not be misled into relaxing their "Bolshevik vigilance" against "compromisers" and "opportunists," Suslov spelled out further Khrushchev's statement of the Kremlin's view:
The enemies of Communism portray the Communists as advocates of armed uprisings, violence and civil war at all times and under all conditions. This is an absurd slander of the Communists and the working class which they represent. The Communists and the working class, of course, prefer the most painless forms for the transition from the one social system to the other. . . . Whether the methods are more peaceful or more violent depends, not so much on the working class, as on the extent and forms of resistance of the exploiting classes which are being overthrown and which do not wish to part voluntarily with the vast property, political power and privileges they possess.
And Suslov also stated clearly the traditional Soviet view that only the Communist Party can be relied upon to "build socialism."
. . . Insuring a transition to socialism requires the establishment of political leadership of the state by the working class, headed by its vanguard. . . . Political leadership of the state by the working class is necessary in order that over a shorter or longer period, depending upon the specific conditions, the capitalist class be deprived of ownership of the means of production and that the means of production be made public property, that all attempts by the overthrown exploiting classes to restore their rule be repulsed, and that socialist reconstruction be organized.[ix]
In other words, the Kremlin's position remains unchanged. Just as Stalin wrote in 1952, the Communist Parties are willing to achieve power by parliamentary means, but only in order to destroy the parliamentary system and to establish the dictatorship of the Communist Party.
Despite this uncompromising insistence upon the future "hegemony" and monopoly of power by the Communists, the Twentieth Party Congress also emphasized the desirability of reëstablishing coöperation with the moderate Socialist and labor parties. Immediately after reaffirming the aim of the Communist Parties to achieve dictatorial power, Shepilov went on to appeal to the non-Communist Socialists.
The attractive force of the idea of socialism has grown so much that--besides the proletarian Marxist revolutionaries--politicians, groups and parties who do not interpret socialism in accord with principles of revolutionary Marxism, but who are ready to fight against imperialism and for the vital interests of the working class and all the working people, declare themselves supporters of socialism. This is why in many instances the existing differences and viewpoints can be relegated and are relegated to the background when it is a question of common interest in fighting against the capitalist yoke, for freedom and democracy. Communists are opponents in principle of sectarian narrowness. They advocate that all the efforts of all kinds and varieties of mass movements of the present day must be merged into an anti-imperialist stream.[x]
In his speech Suslov spelled out somewhat further the new line of seeking rapprochements with the Social Democratic parties:
Unquestionably, the split of the international workers' movement, when all the forces of the people should be united to fight the menace of a new war, is doubly intolerable. Life has raised a number of important questions on which we have points of agreement with the Social Democrats. . . . In today's situation the workers' movement faces such cardinal tasks as defense of peace, national freedom and democracy. In many capitalist countries the working masses are obviously swinging strongly to the Left. The vast majority of the rank-and-file members of the socialist parties, Christian trade unions and other organizations favor peace. It is to be presumed that the idea of unity will take stronger and stronger hold among the various groups of the working class and lead to practical results. But this will not happen of itself, it will depend largely on us Communists, on our efforts along this line.[xi]
Since the Twentieth Party Congress the Soviet leadership has made intensive explorations of the attitudes of the leaders of the Social Democratic parties in Western Europe. Outstanding leaders of the Norwegian and Swedish Socialist Parties have visited Moscow. Khrushchev and Bulganin have met with the leaders of the British Labor Party, and the visit of Guy Mollet to Moscow was prematurely advertised as a step toward a Socialist-Communist rapprochement. The bearlike courting of the sophisticated Western Socialists by the Kremlin has not so far increased the prospects for a revival of a "united front from above," similar to the alliance achieved in France of the mid-1930's.
If anything, the arrogance of the Soviet leaders, the obvious dangers concealed in their new attempts to embrace the Socialists in a death-hug, has worked against the Kremlin's immediate aims. Whether the more discontented local organizations of the Socialist parties will be equally adamant in resisting pressures for a "united front from below" is less certain. Perhaps the Kremlin is counting on a falling off in the present prosperity of Western Europe and on the growth of popular resistance to military expenditures to promote electoral and other forms of coöperation between Socialists and Communists "from below." Their present gestures, however futile for the moment, may pay political dividends in case of an economic crisis, which, they declare, has been postponed only by the armaments race.
In the underdeveloped countries prospects for developing cooperation between Communists and Socialists are far better than in Europe. The level of sophistication concerning the real aims of the Communist Parties is far lower. In Burma, India and Indonesia, popular understanding of the differences between Socialists and Communists is vague, and the Communists can hope, by vigorous propaganda for the united front, to absorb some of the more impatient following of the Socialist parties. Pursuit of a "united front" policy in the underdeveloped and newly parliamentary countries of Asia can be facilitated by the overtures now being made to the Socialist parties in Western Europe, for the Kremlin's new tune may blunt the warnings which the Western Socialists have so often given to their neophyte colleagues in Asia. Whether President Tito's confidential descriptions of his treatment by the Kremlin, given to selected leaders during his visits to India and Burma, will have any lasting effect is doubtful.
A more novel feature of the new Soviet line is the strong insistence on cultivating close relations with the so-called "peace bloc," made up of "those countries which are not permitting themselves to be drawn into military blocs." Khrushchev, and other orators, constantly cited India, Burma, Indonesia, Afghanistan, Egypt and Syria as the principal countries making up this third force in world politics. As during his visit to India and Burma in November and December 1955, Khrushchev spoke at the Congress in support of the "five principles" advanced by Nehru and strove to emphasize the common aims of the Sovietled bloc and the "uncommitted bloc." In effect, the Soviet leaders have been saying since mid-1955 that, in the absence of war, the future of the world may be determined by the third force which has been taking shape in Asia. Instead of the traditional Soviet slogan that "whoever is not with us is against us," the Kremlin spokesmen are now saying "whoever is not against us is with us."
When Khrushchev praises those countries which remain aloof from military alliances, he glosses over completely the greatest military bloc of all, the Sino-Soviet alliance, buttressed by the Warsaw alliance of May 1955. In many countries, apparently, the inconsistency of his boasting of the "indestructible" Sovietled bloc and its great military power, while simultaneously praising those countries which remain uncommitted, is scarcely noted.
By laying stress upon the "peace bloc" comprising two-thirds of humanity, the Soviet leadership can also hope to secure widespread support for particular goals: the seating of Communist China in the United Nations; the condemnation of the United States for the military support which it has accorded to the Nationalist Chinese régime on Taiwan; the denunciation of the refusal of South Vietnam to accept Communist-rigged elections. The spread of a "neutralism" which prevents the consolidation of non-Soviet forces brings many benefits for Soviet policy. Neutralism, as the Soviet leaders have emphasized constantly, remains a commodity for export beyond the periphery of the Soviet bloc, not for toleration within it.
The Kremlin's claim to be "leading the forces of peace" has been reinforced, in many parts of the world, by the broad appeal of its offers to accept a limitation on the numbers of conventional forces and by the unilateral reductions, claimed or promised, in the size of the Soviet forces. With that, Moscow has continued to press for the prohibition of nuclear weapons, thus attempting to deprive the opposing forces of their best means of resistance to any revival of direct Soviet threats. With the turning of Dairen over to the Chinese Communists and of Porkkala to Finland, the Soviet leadership can proclaim that it no longer has any bases beyond its own territory and has thus strengthened, as in Iceland, demands for the withdrawal of American and NATO forces from bases located in other countries.
During the past year the Soviet leadership has also added the instrument of long-term economic development programs to its armory of political warfare. The Soviet agreements with Afghanistan, India and Burma, and the offers to Egypt, Syria and Pakistan, have made a strong impression. They provide important and dramatic evidences of Soviet economic achievements and thus enhance the prestige of local Communist and pro-Communist forces. Offered ostensibly without political strings, the Soviet trade deals, initially at least, strengthen the independent bargaining power of the beneficiaries. An especially attractive feature is, of course, that the development assistance is given through longterm loans, at low interest, and with provision for repayment from the export surpluses of the recipient country.
All told, the offers which the Soviet bloc has made under these programs may now amount to about $900,000,000. Except in Afghanistan, the prospect that the Soviet Union would, in the next few years, be able by economic pressure to take over political control of any of its beneficiaries seems remote. If the Soviet leadership fails to gain direct political domination through this program, will it continue it? Probably, but on a modest scale. With a steel production of about 50,000,000 tons in 1956, scheduled to grow to 75,000,000 tons in 1960, and with one of the two largest machine-tool industries in the world, the Soviet Union will be, increasingly, in a position to divert a small percentage of its capital goods output to support its political objectives in non-Soviet parts of the world. Its ability to fix terms and interest rates by government fiat and its capacity to absorb almost any form of imports give it certain advantages. In general, Moscow's assistance programs, based on "aid through trade," are likely to be used primarily to strengthen its political influence in the uncommitted third of the world and particularly to weaken the influence of the West.
By 1949 the Soviet leadership had seen free Europe consolidated, slowly and painfully, but nonetheless consolidated against the Soviet military menace. If the Soviet Union had achieved its goal in Korea, in 1950, by swift conquest, it would probably have switched rather quickly, even under Stalin, to a campaign for stabilization and relaxation, in order to slow down the arming of the West. The United Nations opposition to the Communist seizure of South Korea plunged the Kremlin into a severe case of war jitters and led it to adopt drastic, hasty and wasteful revisions of economic and armaments programs, in both the Soviet Union and the satellites.
The Soviet leadership was at first fearful that the resistance of the free world in Korea was but a first step toward organizing a concentric attack against the new and not yet consolidated Soviet empire. After the MacArthur hearings, held in the spring of 1951, had given clear proof of the American desire to confine the war to Korea, the Kremlin began gradually to relax its tense nerves and its strained efforts. In the economic field the shift was visible by the summer of 1952. The Nineteenth Party Congress, in October 1952, laid stress on competitive coexistence, on the development of a long-range effort to undermine the stability and security of the free world by measures short of war.[xii] This program was doubtless implemented somewhat hesitantly because of Stalin's physical and mental decline.
Almost as soon as Stalin died, the new leadership began exploring at a gradually quickened tempo various minor steps for relaxing international tensions. A major review of Soviet foreign policy and its methods appears to have taken place in January and February 1955, following the displacement of Malenkov from the leading rôle. This resulted in the partial eclipse of Molotov by the new Khrushchev-Bulganin leadership in the conduct of Soviet diplomacy, even prior to his replacement by Shepilov. There followed, during the rest of 1955, a series of dramatic steps designed to melt or break up the ice pack which Stalin's policies had formed around Soviet policy: the treaty with Austria, the evacuation of Porkkala, the Soviet leaders' pilgrimage to Belgrade, the Geneva Conferences, the establishment of relations with the German Federal Republic, the military supplies for Egypt, new disarmament proposals, negotiations with Japan for a peace treaty, the Khrushchev-Bulganin visit to India, Burma and Afghanistan.
As so often in the conduct of Soviet policy, the public stocktaking provided by the Twentieth Party Congress has confirmed and systematized trends which were already strongly evident in the preceding months. Khrushchev's restatements of Soviet goals, enlivened by new and flexible tactics, and flavored by the denunciation of Stalin's methods of rule, are, at bottom, an expression of continuity of basic goals in Soviet policy. As under Stalin, the Kremlin seeks to slow down and reverse the consolidation of the free world, to promote neutralism beyond its own orbit, to get rid of all strategic limitations on East-West trade, to confine American power to North America, and to await new targets of opportunity. Above all, it sees in Asia a promising field for Communist expansion.
Since Soviet strategic planning is now shifting its primary attention from continental wars to intercontinental nuclear warfare, the Kremlin may well prefer to develop a lengthy period of lower-key diplomacy, while waiting to see which side will first have available a decisive stockpile of the intercontinental missile. During the period of the race for the long-range missile the Soviet leadership may seek to avoid menacing talk and alarming acts and may endeavor, by using a flexible armory of political, economic and psychological weapons, to improve its position vis-àvis the principal obstacle to its ambitions, the United States. If the Soviet Union is the first to achieve the missile in decisive quantities, it may then feel free to revert to the Stalin method of threats and force. So far as the results of the Twentieth Congress go, it is clearly the manners rather than the goals of the Kremlin that have changed since Stalin's death and posthumous dethronement.
[i] A large number of details concerning the Khrushchev speech were given by the Moscow correspondent of the Belgrade Borba, March 20, 1956, p. 1, 3. For the fuller but still probably incomplete version see The New York Times, June 5, 1956.
[ii] The rehabilitation of the Polish Communist Party, dissolved by Stalin in 1938 (Pravda, February 21, 1956), may have undermined the seemingly impregnable position of Jakob Berman, long regarded as Stalin's agent in liquidating the pre-1938 leadership. The simultaneous restoration of Béla Kun to posthumous favor (Pravda, February 21, 1956) may not have any similar consequences for Rakosi.
[iii] "Concerning the Historical Experience of Dictatorship of the Proletariat," editorial in Jen Min Jih Pao, summarized in Pravda, April 7, 1956; cited from Current Digest of the Soviet Press, May 16, 1956, p. 5.
[iv] Pravda, February 17, 1956; cited from Current Digest, March 28, 1956, p. 19. Shepilov, formerly Editor of Pravda, is a candidate-member of the Party Presidium and a member of the Party Secretariat.
[v] Pravda, February 15, 1956.
[vi] Pravda, February 17, 1956; cited from Current Digest, March 28, 1956, p. 19.
[vii] Speech by Suslov, Pravda, February 17, 1956; cited from Current Digest, April 4, 1956, p. 23. M. A. Suslov is a full member of the Party Presidium and a member of the Party Secretariat.
[viii] Pravda, February 15, 1956, p. 4.
[ix] Suslov, Pravda, February 17, 1956; cited from Current Digest, April 4, 1956, p. 23.
[x] Shepilov, Pravda, February 17, 1956; cited from Current Digest, March 28, 1956, p. 20.
[xi] Suslov, Pravda, February 17, 1956; cited from Current Digest, April 4, 1956, p. 23-24.
[xii] Cf. "The Nineteenth Party Congress," by Philip E. Mosely, Foreign Affairs, January 1953, p. 238-256.
A Question of Russian Interests, Not Psychology