The Amendment submitted by Senator Henry Jackson to the Administration's pending Trade Reform bill, along with its counterpart in the House of Representatives, is a curious blend of foreign policy idealism and domestic politics. The exaggerated claims of both proponents and opponents in the long and often emotional debate over the Amendment cannot obscure the underlying issue, which is as old as the nation-state-whether and when should one nation apply pressure to alter those policies or practices of another which, if not exclusively "internal" in impact, are at least not clearly within the traditional foreign policy realm. Although any amendment enjoying the formal sponsorship of nearly four-fifths of the members of the Senate and nearly two-thirds of the members of the House appears almost certain to be passed in one form or another, both the Congress and the Administration must now think through more carefully the implications and consequences of enacting the Amendment in its present form.

II

The Jackson Amendment would deny to any "nonmarket economy country" eligibility for most-favored-nation tariff treatment (MFN) and participation in the Federal government's export credit, credit guarantee and investment guarantee programs during any period in which that country denies to its citizens the right or opportunity to emigrate, specifically by imposing more than a nominal tax or other charge. The primary objective of the Amendment is the elimination of Soviet "education" or exit taxes and other restrictions on the emigration to Israel of Soviet Jews.

That is a worthy objective, consistent with basic principles of human rights, with which few can in good conscience disagree. (I personally have supported free Jewish emigration in addresses in the Soviet Union as well as the United States.) As a means of achieving this objective, however-even as a somewhat awkward vehicle for conveying congressional support for it-the Amendment, to say nothing of the debate thereon, has been less clearly focused. For in fact it attempts too much to be effective and too little to be meaningful.

Inconsistencies abound among both its critics and proponents. Congressional "doves" who proclaimed that no amount of American might could alter the determination of tiny North Vietnam are now convinced that the minimal economic blow contained in the Jackson Amendment will move a superpower. The Administration which formulated the "linkage" theory of Soviet-American relations now rejects any attempt to link trade and human rights-an even-less-relevant-than-usual linkage proposed by those who previously scoffed at the theory. Businessmen argue that our economy needs Moscow's trade when in fact exports financed extensively by credits can only aggravate our short-range balance-of-payments problem.

The Secretary of State pleads that most-favored-nation status and credits were specifically pledged by the Administration in a solemn commitment to Moscow in 1972-a commitment that we dare not breach, he says, for fear of "provoking the Soviet leadership into returning to practices in its foreign policy that increase international tensions." But Moscow surely knows from bitter experience during the Johnson Presidency, and perhaps knows better than an Administration frequently forgetful of Congress' role in foreign affairs, that solemn commitments of this kind on matters of trade and finance can under our Constitution be made only with the ultimate consent of the Congress.

The Amendment backers have talked about overall Soviet treatment of Jews, but the Amendment itself is confined to emigration. Soviet Jews seeking religious freedom and political equality may well wonder why so many eminent American legislators are interested in them only if they are willing to leave their country, and how passage of the Jackson Amendment will ease their lot if they are not. Similarly, while the plight of Soviet author Alexander Solzhenitsyn and academician Andrei Sakharov has been cited with some frequency in the speeches of Senator Jackson and his cohorts, there is no evidence that either of those brave men wishes to leave the Soviet Union or that their safety would be any more assured by a relaxation of emigration restrictions. If trade with the United States were truly a prize for which a desperate Moscow would make unprecedented concessions-the unproven premise of the Jackson Amendment-the obvious question is why we should not condition it upon a whole range of human rights and disarmament proposals as well as emigration.

A nation's emigration policies are hardly the most crucial test of its merit as a trading partner or in any other role. Most nations, including Israel, restrict or tax emigration or foreign travel to some degree. Underdeveloped nations, for example, understandably fear that their ablest citizens, if allowed to leave, will not return from studies or visits in countries where higher incomes are available. The United States itself arbitrarily imposed bans, until they were held invalid, on travel to Cuba, North Vietnam and elsewhere, and before that the total denial of passports was a common practice until it too was held unconstitutional.

Methods for controlling emigration may vary, and the use of substantial exit taxes, spotlighted by the Jackson Amendment, is only one of many techniques. Repeal of the Kremlin's tax would make difficult any finding, under the wording of the Amendment, that a denial of emigration remained. But if the experience of other countries is any indication, the manipulation of passport requirements, national security restrictions, political sanctions, bureaucratic delays and other methods are equally effective, and more difficult to identify.

Then too, the widely varying patterns of government intervention in the economy among underdeveloped and developed nations alike make difficult any unanimity among economists as to which nations have "nonmarket" rather than "market" economies. Nor is there any reliable relationship between a nation's economic system and its restrictions on travel or other freedoms. The United States currently extends credits and MFN status to a wide variety of non-Communist governments which restrict emigration, intimidate intellectuals and trample on human rights.

If the denial of our trade credits and most-favored-nation treatment could truly end a nation's internal repression, or if a nation guilty of the latter should as a matter of conscience be denied the former, then one wonders why this approach is not applied by our country or by this Amendment to all countries. If, on the other hand, the backers of the Amendment prefer to concentrate now on the rights of Soviet Jewry, it is unfortunate that debate over the Amendment has also delayed extension of most-favored-nation treatment to Romania, China and others.

III

But even if emigration is the right subject and Communist countries are the right target, the question remains whether trade in general and most-favored-nation status in particular constitute the right lever. In the past we have occasionally withheld our foreign aid, our military supplies or even our diplomatic representation from various nations as a sign of disapproval or means of pressure, but at the same time we have usually been willing to do business with these countries.

Part of the problem arises from confusion over the term "most-favored-nation." Congressional debate has frequently labeled the extension of this status a "concession," a "subsidy," a "favor," a "preference," or a "privilege." In fact it is none of these. On the contrary, it is a recognition of normal, equal status, in effect a determination that no nation or nations will be favored. It simply assures the recipient that its goods will enter the United States at the same low tariff rates applicable to comparable goods of our other trading partners who make available equal status to us. It is a common worldwide approach-indeed Israel at last report still granted most-favored-nation status to the Soviet Union despite their bitter disagreements on other matters. As George Kennan has written:

It involves no one-sided transfer of funds or goods; no loans, no gifts . . . [no] act of benevolence. . . . There is no more reason why normal trade relations between this country and the U.S.S.R. should be regarded as an exceptional favor bestowed by us on them than there would be for regarding such relations as an exceptional favor bestowed by them on us.

That equal status was enjoyed by the U.S.S.R. for 16 years, starting in 1935, until Congress cut off normal trade relations with all Communist countries early in the cold war. Today, as the conflicts between Washington and Moscow subside, Senator Jackson and other backers of this Amendment assert their support for expanded East-West trade in nonstrategic goods on a nondiscriminatory basis.1 But if trade is truly a "trade" in which both sides, over the appropriate period of accounting, benefit equally-and neither the Soviet Union nor the United States would accept it on any other basis-then any U.S. barrier to Soviet imports, such as denial of MFN status, not only curbs expansion but also imposes an equal handicap on both economies. Thus a meaningful trade relationship with the Soviet Union will be difficult to achieve and sustain over the long run if its goods are denied equal access to our markets, limiting its opportunities to earn the dollars with which to purchase our goods. MFN is a symbol that Moscow seeks, and its denial is a stigma that Moscow resents.

Yet it is ironic that nearly all the attention in the debate over the Jackson Amendment has been paid to MFN instead of to long-term credits and credit guarantees, which are much more important. (Moreover, the Amendment makes no mention whatever of rules governing the transfer of U.S. technology, which may be even more crucial to Moscow.) Such credits and guarantees are also extended by the United States as a matter of equality to all kinds of governments engaged in all kinds of restrictive practices. But such credits are different from MFN in one important respect. Backed by the federal government at bargain rates, they truly are a valued form of unilateral help, particularly in the short run. At a time when the Soviet trade deficit with this country could approach a billion dollars a year, credits are essential to Soviet buyers as well as American exporters; and Moscow is understandably more concerned about continuing to participate in U.S. Export-Import Bank and other export and credit guarantee programs than it is about receiving most-favored-nation status.

Granting, then, that MFN and credits have some symbolic and economic importance, how significant are they as a lever on Soviet behavior? Here one can only speculate. To this author it does not seem likely that either the various claims advanced by the Amendment's sponsors in Congress or the fears expressed by its detractors in the Administration would be borne out by the practical effects.

On the one hand, it is doubtful that a substantial expansion of trade with the United States is either so promising or so desperately needed by the Soviet Union, or so seriously affected by our withholding of MFN or even export credits, that the Kremlin would determine its policy in any area-emigration, other internal controls, détente or even trade itself-on the basis of this Amendment's success or failure. The steady growth of the Soviet economy during the cold-war years, despite a barrage of Battle Act, Trading with the Enemy Act and other U.S. restrictions, reflects both its traditional refusal to become too dependent upon American imports and its ability to find adequate markets and sources of supply in Europe, Japan and elsewhere. Soviet officials resent the repeated American assertion that they have little to sell which this country might want to buy-an ironic assertion in the light of those U.S. legislative and administrative rulings which have denied them any opportunity even to market certain goods here, ranging from small furs to giant turbines. Nevertheless, it is a fact that the near-term prospects for a much larger volume and variety of quality Soviet exports to the United States, particularly in the manufactured goods most affected by MFN, are slim whether or not most-favored-nation status is extended.

The Soviets know, moreover, that the mere availability of credits and MFN does not in itself assure the trade deals they seek, and that the absence of such terms does not inevitably cancel or prevent the deals otherwise available and now being made. The largest potential Soviet export to excite speculation in this country is natural gas. But that commodity, like most of the Soviet minerals and raw materials now constituting the bulk of its imports here, faces little or no U.S. import duty with or without MFN. Similarly, if the gas project's viability can be assured, private American financing will undoubtedly be forthcoming in the context of the energy crisis even without Export-Import Bank participation. Indeed substantial private credits will also be available in all likelihood to finance a considerable expansion of American exports to the U.S.S.R.2

Thus the Jackson Amendment's impact upon the Soviet economy is likely to be too minimal either to achieve the objectives of its supporters or to fulfill the fears of its opponents. The net result of our cutting off credits and holding back MFN would not be so unmanageable from the point of view of Soviet leaders as to enable the United States to dictate the terms upon which trade is to be expanded. More likely, the ultimate Kremlin concern for the economic consequences of the Amendment will be too small, and its resentment at being publicly pressured will be too great, to produce any important change in its emigration policies in particular or its treatment of Jews and intellectuals in general. It would be contrary to our knowledge of the whole philosophy and experience of the U.S.S.R. to expect it to yield on this political issue as the result of our economic sanctions. The same would be true of any great power, including the United States. Were we to be threatened by another nation with a loss of trade equality unless we freed our "political" prisoners, for example, or broke up alleged monopolies, we might well react by reversing whatever consideration we were giving to moving as commanded and instead stiffen our resistance. While brave Soviet Jews and intellectuals have been quoted on both sides of this question in the current congressional debate, their firing-line perspective is not necessarily the best or only measure the American Congress should use in determining the risks and benefits to them and others as a result of the passage or defeat of this legislation. Certainly no one, including the Amendment's backers, expects the Soviets ever wholly to reverse a basic ideological tenet and remove all emigration restrictions.

Even if the Soviets were to make some positive concession or offer to do so, once passage of the Jackson Amendment occurs, in order to test the atmosphere, our government would have difficulty applying the precise wording of the Amendment in a realistic way or even measuring its success. This is not only because formal declarations by the Soviet Union have approximately the same practical effects as its recent ratification of the U.N. International Covenants on Human Rights. It is also because the emigration rate of Soviet Jews has already increased 3000 percent since 1970, continuing even during the latest Middle East hostilities. In the past 15 months the exit tax has been announced, then waived for some, then formally promulgated, then suspended for others, then reaffirmed, and then paid for others by foreign friends, and during it all the overall rate of expansion in the continuing wave of emigration to Israel seemed to vary hardly at all. If these moves toward relaxation of the tax were merely a ploy to deter adoption of the Jackson Amendment, then that could indicate a Soviet willingness to make concessions on this subject-or it could foretell a retightening of controls if the deterrent fails to stop passage of the Amendment. But if this generally expanding wave is instead a reflection of Kremlin acknowledgment that confinement of this many highly visible dissatisfied citizens is unwise or unfeasible, then neither passage nor defeat of the Jackson Amendment is likely to affect the size of that wave very much.

On the other hand, the Administration now warns that passage of Senator Jackson's Amendment could risk an end to détente and jeopardize the current talks on arms limitations and reduction of forces. Senator Jackson, with equal hyperbole, insists that there is and can be no genuine détente without free emigration, and that failure of his Amendment will enable the Kremlin to adopt a hard line internally and then externally. Avoiding the semantics of exactly when a détente is a détente, few can question that the avoidance of global incineration through stable superpower relationships overshadows the Soviet government's treatment of its citizens. But surely, if the Amendment is unlikely to have a significant effect on either the Soviet Union's economy or its emigration, it is unlikely to cause its leaders to reopen the cold war as Secretary Kissinger has warned.

The current Soviet-American détente, as recent experience in the Middle East demonstrates, is a fragile phenomenon based not on intangible personal relations but on national interests far more durable than symbolic issues like MFN. Predictions of an economically interdependent America and Russia bound to a peaceful relationship have been overstressed. To be sure, American trade and credits are regarded by the Soviets as an important benefit of détente; and the total refusal of those benefits could lead to a rise in influence within the Kremlin by anti-American militants. But Moscow's interest in the present improved relationship is also based on a desire for quiet on the Western front, on a desire for alleviation of U.S.-U.S.S.R. armaments-race burdens and risks, and on a desire for links with the United States sufficient to prevent a Sino-American conspiracy. The Soviets are thus unlikely to either retain or renounce détente merely because the Jackson Amendment is voted up or down.

IV

In this perspective the dividing line between internal and external policy is not as clear as Administration spokesmen imply when they oppose the Jackson Amendment as intervention in the Soviet Union's internal affairs. This is the key philosophical issue underlying the whole debate-not only whether this is interference with another nation's internal policy but when, if ever, such interference can be justified.

Examining these questions in a broader context than that of Soviet Jewry suggests no simple or single answer. Internal policies frequently affect or reflect external policies. There is nothing new about foreign antagonisms being aroused by a nation's approach to emigration or immigration: witness the reactions to the former U.S. exclusion of Chinese, or the barriers erected by several countries to nonwhites, or the forced expulsion of East Asians from Uganda. In addition, the very reliability of a government's foreign policy is certain to be judged in part by the extent to which its domestic policies are cruel or honorable, immoral or self-restrained, arbitrary or open to correction, and indifferent or responsive to such universal standards as rational debate and human life itself. A lack of decency at home neither inspires nor earns trust abroad. The world would have learned much about both Stalin's and Hitler's intentions abroad by paying more attention to their activities at home. Were the pogroms of November 1938 to be ignored because they were an internal matter?

Consumers in this country often refuse to buy goods from a manufacturer or shopkeeper who mistreats his help. This is not always a moral or even a political judgment but a shrewd assessment of what kind of man they want to do business with. In similar fashion, residents of a close-knit community feel entitled to be concerned with the terror waged by a neighbor within his own house against his own family. They do not feel they are meddling in his internal affairs but meeting their responsibilities as human beings, upholding standards of decency in the neighborhood which ultimately affect them all, and acting out of the fear that a man who is violent to his wife and children may someday turn on them.

On the other hand, too much analogizing and moralizing on this subject clearly leads down a dangerous path, a path most Americans claimed to have disavowed after the long, disastrous slide into Vietnam. A solemn resolve not to concern ourselves with the political systems or internal conflicts of other nations has been repeatedly expressed by the leaders of all parties and factions. True to this resolve, we have not in recent years used any of our military or economic power, and very little of our diplomatic influence, to force a change on several governments charged with excessive force against their own citizens. Surely, one would conclude, we would never use that power with respect to governments charged not with bloodshed but with the curtailment of citizens' rights. If our goal is to make the world safe for diversity, as President Kennedy stated, then the governments we are obligated to leave alone are bound to include some whose treatment of their own inhabitants we find objectionable. We have no right, no obligation and insufficient power to intervene on behalf of the hundreds of millions of human beings around the world who are subjected by their rulers to curbs on their liberty.

It is also absurd to say that we will trust only those governments in the world community which have the support of their own citizens. Hitler had massive support; and democracies, whose policies tend to fluctuate with public opinion and to change with governments, are not always more stable, effective or reliable negotiating partners than one-party or one-man governments.

Thus principles divide. Any attempt to construct a coherent and consistent philosophy on the eternal question of intervening in another nation's internal affairs sooner or later runs headlong into real-life cases with which one's emotions or fortunes are involved. Many Americans, while deploring the very necessity of a Central Intelligence Agency and its participation in other people's politics, simultaneously complain that our government has not brought pressure to bear on the Greek junta. Others, who endorsed noble inter-American resolutions on the cardinal sin of intervention and called for hands off Allende, now want restraints imposed on his successors. Still others favored intervention to save Guatemala from domestic communism but have no interest in saving democracy in the Philippines or South Korea. Still others choose to ignore denials of human rights in our own country, or those practiced by our allies such as Portugal or client-states such as South Vietnam, but vigorously protest such practices in North Vietnam or Cuba. Even those Americans who have supported the U.N.'s gradual development of international legal standards, including specific and enforceable convenants under which the dividing line between external and internal behavior fades away, would resist stoutly any other nation's attempt to condition our trade or security pacts upon improved guarantees for our own minorities.

Such inconsistencies are inevitable, because few principles pertaining to intervention in another's domestic affairs, covert or overt, are universally applicable. The Alliance for Progress, for example, exerted economic pressure on Latin American countries to adopt internal political, social and economic reforms. It was denounced by Cuba as blatant internal intervention, welcomed (if not implemented) by most recipients as a friendly and humanitarian effort, and justified in Washington as a national security move on grounds that the United States could not risk becoming the only democracy south of the Canadian border. All three descriptions had merit. Similarly, we denounce as "blackmail" the embargoes placed by Arab governments on their export of oil to the United States, which they term justifiable to prevent the strengthening of their enemy's primary supplier. Again both may be right.

In truth, all nations, including the United States, while consistently mouthing the principle of nonintervention in internal affairs, continue to intervene in one form or another whenever the available means are in proportion to the primary motivation or provocation. Direct military action, for example, cannot be justified unless the other nation's activities pose a clear and present danger to the intervening nation's security, whereas a severance of diplomatic relations, which obviously is almost totally without effect, is often taken merely to display displeasure with less extreme activities.

In a democracy such as the United States, the motivation must generally be implanted in the public mind if the intervention is to endure; and public opinion on questions of intervention in "internal" affairs is rarely consistent. In some countries we seem to take totalitarianism, repression or domestic slaughter for granted. Apparently we assume that the indigenous population prefers or deserves it, or else we cannot readily identify with little-known faraway peoples, or else we simply cannot comprehend mass destruction as distinguished from the mistreatment of a few well-publicized individuals (which can often move us to action).

To be sure, politics plays a role in our inconsistencies, along with a certain amount of liberal faddism. Inhumanity in Bangladesh or Biafra has aroused a passionate response, not matched proportionately by the reaction to less-publicized conditions in Ruanda and Burundi. Americans of Irish, Polish and Jewish descent have over the years petitioned the Congress to intervene against repression in the lands of their forefathers, while those of Paraguayan or Tibetan ancestry were too few to form a caucus. Black Americans are now urging our intervention in South Africa and denouncing it in Uganda.

But it is more than ethnic politics that underlies U.S. government actions in response to other nation's political practices. For better or worse, Americans are a moralistic people in foreign affairs, brought up to believe that this country has stood for human rights around the world since the days of Jefferson and Paine. They are unwilling to accept the notion that intervention in another nation's political affairs is justified to protect our military bases or business interests, but not to alleviate human suffering or oppression. Arguments that such intervention itself might be immoral, to say nothing of irrelevant to our national interests, or that the citizens of another country cannot be dependent upon our intervention for their security, or that our actions on their behalf might only increase their suffering, are accepted in the abstract-particularly after the trauma of Vietnam-but not when they are confronted with particular cases. Even so hardnosed a realist as the late Dean Acheson, while delivering a scathing rejection of reliance on morality in foreign policy, acknowledged that "our governmental goal for many years has been to preserve and foster an environment in which free societies may exist and flourish." There are no free societies without free human beings.

It was thus inevitable that both sides of the Jackson Amendment debate would be guilty of inconsistency with past positions on the intervention question. Businessmen denouncing the Amendment as unwarranted meddling in Soviet internal policies were strongly in favor of our applying economic sanctions against any Latin American government nationalizing industrial or mining properties. Legislators indifferent to South African curbs on the movement of Bantus within as well as outside that country insist that they support the Jackson Amendment because it expresses a universal principle. Liberals who said we had no business interfering with the domestic politics of the Dominican Republic line up to vote for the use of our economic power to change Soviet emigration policy, joined by conservatives who opposed as a matter of principle any economic sanctions against Rhodesia's suppression of its black majority. And an Administration willing to juggle governments and ministerial portfolios in each of the Indochina states needs a better explanation of its opposition to the Jackson Amendment than a self-righteous protest against ever interfering in another nation's internal politics.

V

Most members of Congress today appear ready to reject Senator Fulbright's protest against the Jackson Amendment's "meddling, even idealistic meddling" in Soviet affairs. They are not out to "transform the domestic structure" of the Soviet Union, as alleged in one Kissinger exaggeration. Neither do they accept Senator Jackson's exaggeration that Moscow's decision is whether or not "to become a member of the community of civilized nations." They are instead unwilling, in the absence of changes in Soviet emigration policy, to endorse a Soviet-American trade relationship that could strengthen the Soviet economy. For rightly or wrongly they believe that such strengthening merely postpones Soviet reforms, or reinforces Soviet repression, or appears to reward recent Soviet curbs on intellectual freedom and human rights. That is not intervention in another nation's internal affairs, in their opinion, but if it is they are willing to make the most of it.

Thus, without any serious attempt to justify the logic of its concentration on emigration instead of human rights, on nonmarket economies instead of all repressive regimes, and on MFN instead of more effective means, the Jackson Amendment appears certain to be enacted. Once the issue was publicly raised and widely discussed as a Trade Bill Amendment, few Senators and Congressmen have been willing to expose themselves to the charge of "putting dollars ahead of freedom." Few want to appear silent or indifferent on an issue of human rights. MFN and credits may have been an illogical lever with which to alter Soviet restrictions on Jewish emigration, but it has been the only leverage offered them.

And beyond those for whom the Amendment is an act of conscientious protest, others support it because of long-held anti-Soviet or anti-détente sentiments; still others as another barrier against foreign imports from any country; and still others for reasons of presidential, party or local politics. That is a formidable coalition, and has been from the start. While passage of the Amendment will unfortunately strengthen the Arab myth that, despite its tiny proportion of the electorate, the "Jewish vote" controls the Congress, it will surely destroy any lingering myth in the Soviet Union that Wall Street is in control of Washington. For American business has been virtually the only voice outside the government to oppose the Amendment.

In retrospect it can be seen that the Administration, which had ample warning, misled the Soviets as well as itself into believing that MFN would be forthcoming, that credits would be retained, and that the Jackson forces would be rebuffed. But instead of ignoring the question of emigration and human rights in its draft legislation on trade reform, the Administration should from the start have recognized the issue's inevitability and preëmpted it, by seeking to bring all parties together on a reworded amendment or even a separate bill.

That effort might have worked. The Jackson Amendment takes an all-or-nothing approach, discouraging even a meaningful concession by the Soviet Union. It would require all the affected countries to end not only all exit or education taxes but all infringements on emigration if they are to qualify for MFN and credits. A more flexible approach might well have obtained a more favorable response from the Soviet Union, whose leaders are sophisticated enough when consulted in advance to recognize the political necessities in this country. Such an approach could have included other countries, other denials of freedom and other levers in addition to or even in place of MFN and credits. If this country is to compete in world markets over the long run with the Japanese and others, it must soon forge a whole new pattern of flexible foreign trade and investment controls and incentives which can be turned off and on as our foreign policy and other interests require; and this issue presented a logical place to begin.

Unfortunately it may now be too late to recast the wording of the Jackson Amendment and the terms of the debate. Flexibility in legislation generally requires a delegation of discretion to the President; and this Congress at this time with this President is reluctant to offer that. Legislative lines, moreover, harden as time passes, as language becomes familiar and as election day draws closer. But those who prefer practical results to symbols and slogans, and who seek both an end to discrimination against Soviet Jews and an end to discrimination against Soviet trade, may still have time to work out a more sensible legislative approach that pursues both goals realistically.

Footnotes

1 My own support for this position is of long standing, expressed in "Why We Should Trade with the Soviets," Foreign Affairs, April 1968.

2 To the extent that they are not, the gap created by our barriers to the Soviets earning dollars in this country can continue to be offset in part by their requiring American exporters to accept payment in Soviet goods for resale or "switch" transactions, and also by their utilizing credit balances and currencies in third countries (for example, by stipulating the American exporter's components in goods which they purchase from those countries).

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