The Sources of Soviet Conduct
Political Ideas in the Twentieth Century
Atomic Weapons and American Policy
The Illusion of Disengagement
On Peaceful Coexistence
The Search for Stability
The Challenge of Change in the Soviet Bloc
The Practice of Partnership
The Framework of East-West Reconciliation
The Limits of Détente
After the Cold War
On Power: The Nature of Soviet Power
The Rise, Fall and Future of Détente
What Went Wrong With Arms Control?
Containment: 40 Years Later
Containment Then and Now
Beyond the Cold War
From Cold War Toward Trusting Peace
Toward the Post-Cold War World
America's Stake in the Soviet Future
Beyond Boris Yeltsin
Can Russia Change?
Russia Leaves the West
The Costs of Renewed Confrontation
Mission to Moscow
Why Authoritarian Stability Is a Myth
What Has Moscow Done?
Rebuilding U.S.-Russian Relations
Moscow's Modernization Dilemma
Is Russia Charting a New Foreign Policy?
The Dying Bear
Russia's Demographic Disaster
Managing the New Cold War
What Moscow and Washington Can Learn From the Last One
Russia's Perpetual Geopolitics
Putin Returns to the Historical Pattern
Putin's Foreign Policy
The Quest to Restore Russia’s Rightful Place
The Revival of the Russian Military
How Moscow Reloaded
Why Putin Took Crimea
The Gambler in the Kremlin
Trump and Russia
The Right Way to Manage Relations
Why New Russia Sanctions Won't Change Moscow's Behavior
Washington's Approach Lacks Clear Goals
The Kremlin's Latest Crackdown on Independent Media
Russia's New Foreign Agent Law in Context
Containing Russia, Again
An Adversary Attacked the United States—It’s Time to Respond
Putin's Past Explains Russia's Future
What to Expect After the Election
Has a New Cold War Really Begun?
Why the Term Shouldn't Apply to Today's Great-Power Tensions
Plato identified necessity as the mother of invention. General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev’s recognition of the failures of the Soviet economy has inspired an inventiveness in Soviet policy, foreign and domestic, not seen since the death of Lenin. Gorbachev represents a rare combination of pragmatic realism on the one hand, and creative policymaking and public relations on the other. Just as economic determinants are finally imposing constraints that should make the Soviet Union a less formidable military adversary, Gorbachev has already made the Soviet Union a more daunting diplomatic competitor.
Across the East-West agenda, from nuclear and conventional arms control to Afghanistan and Cambodia, Gorbachev has seized the initiative. In the process he is winning too much of the credit for results achieved. Even when all he did was belatedly answer da to long-standing Western proposals on intermediate-range nuclear missiles, his skillful presentation of acquiescence persuaded most Europeans that the Soviet Union, not the West, deserved applause for both authorship and execution of this agreement. Today 63 percent of Americans give Gorbachev a "favorable" rating, ahead of any other foreign leader except Britain’s Margaret Thatcher. In the Federal Republic of Germany, Gorbachev’s approval rating tops President Reagan’s by almost two to one.
The American response to Gorbachev’s active diplomacy so far has been to hold fast, persisting in policies and proposals developed to address Leonid Brezhnev’s Soviet Union, not Gorbachev’s. Persistence can be a virtue, certainly preferable to reckless accommodation. Moreover, because Gorbachev is essentially dealing from internal weakness, his unilateral adjustments of Soviet policy are producing significant gains for the West. The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the elimination of all land-based intermediate-range nuclear forces, acceptance of highly intrusive verification procedures (including mandatory on-site inspection), and encouragement of the projected Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia—these realize important U.S. objectives.
But by yielding the initiative to Gorbachev, the United States is defaulting on profound opportunities. The failure of American policymakers to develop any concept or strategy
Loading, please wait...