Hitler's Reich [Excerpt]
The First Phase
The Expansion of Japanese Rule
The Jews of Eastern Europe [Excerpt]
America Rearms [Excerpt]
Armistice at Munich [Excerpt]
Hitler Could Not Stop [Excerpt]
The Downfall of France [Excerpt]
Anglo-American Pitfalls [Excerpt]
Let Japan Choose [Excerpt]
Pearl Harbor: Documents: The Rising Sun in the Pacific
America at War: Three Bad Months [Excerpt]
Hitler's Transfers of Population in Eastern Europe [Excerpt]
The Spirit of Resistance [Excerpt]
America at War: The First Year [Excerpt]
America at War: The End of the Second Year [Excerpt]
The Road to D-Day [Excerpt]
America at War: The End Begins [Excerpt]
America at War: Victory in Europe [Excerpt]
America at War: Victory in the Pacific [Excerpt]
America at War: The Triumph of the Machine [Excerpt]
The Atomic Bombings Reconsidered
Political Problems of a Coalition [Excerpt]
Turning Points of the War
That Was Then: Allen W. Dulles on the Occupation of Germany [Excerpt]
The Nuremberg Trial: Landmark in Law [Excerpt]
The Sources of Soviet Conduct [Excerpt]
The Atom Bomb as Policy Maker [Excerpt]
The Illusion of World Government [Excerpt]
The Myth of Post–Cold War Chaos [Excerpt]
. . . Soviet pressure against the free institutions of the Western world is something that can be contained by the adroit and vigilant application of counterforce at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet policy, but which cannot be charmed or talked out of existence. The Russians look forward to a duel of infinite duration, and they see that already they have scored great successes. It must be borne in mind that there was a time when the Communist Party represented far more of a minority in the sphere of Russian national life than Soviet power today represents in the world community.
It is clear that the United States cannot expect in the foreseeable future to enjoy political intimacy with the Soviet regime. It must continue to regard the Soviet Union as a rival, not a partner, in the political arena. It must continue to expect that Soviet policies will reflect no abstract love of peace and stability, no real faith in the possibility of a permanent happy coexistence of the Socialist and capitalist worlds, but rather a cautious, persistent pressure toward the disruption and weakening of all rival influence and rival power.
Balanced against this are the facts that Russia, as opposed to the western world in general, is still by far the weaker party, that Soviet policy is highly flexible, and that Soviet society may well contain deficiencies which will eventually weaken its own total potential. This would of itself warrant the United States entering with reasonable confidence upon a policy of firm containment, designed to confront the Russians with unalterable counterforce at every point where they show signs of encroaching upon the interest of a peaceful and stable world.
But in actuality the possibilities for American policy are by no means limited to holding the line and hoping for the best. It is entirely possible for the United States to influence by its actions the internal developments, both within Russia and throughout the international Communist movement, by which Russian policy is largely determined. This is not only a question of the modest measure of informational activity which this government can conduct in the Soviet Union and elsewhere, although that, too, is important. It is rather a question of the degree to which the United States can create among the peoples of the world generally the impression of a country which knows what it wants, which is coping successfully with the problems of its internal life and with the responsibilities of a world power, and which has a spiritual vitality capable of holding its own among the major ideological currents of the time. To the extent that such an impression can be created and maintained, the aims of Russian Communism must appear sterile and quixotic, the hopes and enthusiasm of Moscow's supporters must wane, and added strain must be imposed on the Kremlin's foreign policies. For the palsied decrepitude of the capitalist world is the keystone of Communist philosophy. Even the failure of the United States to experience the early economic depression which the ravens of the Red Square have been predicting with such complacent confidence since hostilities ceased would have deep and important repercussions throughout the Communist world.
By the same token, exhibitions of indecision, disunity and internal disintegration within this country have an exhilarating effect on the whole Communist movement. At each evidence of these tendencies, a thrill of hope and excitement goes through the Communist world; a new jauntiness can be noted in the Moscow tread; new groups of foreign supporters climb on to what they can only view as the bandwagon of international politics; and Russian pressure increases all along the line in international affairs.
In would be an exaggeration to say that American behavior unassisted and alone could exercise a power of life and death over the Communist movement and bring about the early fall of Soviet power in Russia. But the United States has it in its power to increase enormously the strains under which Soviet policy must operate, to force upon the Kremlin a far greater degree of moderation and circumspection than it has had to observe in recent years, and in this way to promote tendencies which must eventually find their outlet in either the breakup or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power. For no mystical, messianic movement -- and particularly not that of the Kremlin -- can face frustration indefinitely without eventually adjusting itself in one way or another to the logic of that state of affairs. . . . [Full Article]