THE events of the last few months in South Africa have justified the prediction that the most effective opposition to apartheid would come from the non-Europeans themselves. The South African crisis developed during 1951 over legal and constitutional issues dividing the two European political groups. In March 1952 the Appellate Division of the South African Supreme Court decided these issues against the present Government. The crisis then entered its second phase, with the Government seeking a solution by political action which for a time seemed to bring the Union within measurable distance of civil war. That possibility has now receded. But the launching of a well-organized and disciplined passive resistance campaign by non-Europeans, under joint Indian and African leadership, has brought to the surface the question of white-colored relations which underlies all South Africa's politics and was the basic cause even of the constitutional crisis.

The moral and material issues raised by the Defiance of Unjust Laws Campaign will in fact dominate the 1953 election, despite the present efforts of the political parties to evade their implications. To understand the actual form in which these issues will be put to the almost entirely white electorate, it is necessary to recapitulate briefly the story of the last two years. When Dr. D. F. Malan's Nationalist Party, allied with Mr. N. C. Havenga's Afrikaner Party, won the 1948 election, the two parties (which have since been amalgamated) had a majority of only seven out of a total of 153 seats in the Assembly. One of the new Government's first acts was to curtail severely Smuts' program which had brought 80,000 European immigrants into the country in the previous three years. Secondly, it extended from two to five years the period required for British and Commonwealth immigrants to qualify for South African citizenship and the vote. The first measure was justified by the need for selective immigration, and the second by the desirability of ensuring a single loyalty; many Afrikaners still regard with suspicion English-speaking South Africans who have several generations of Union residence behind them.

A no less powerful motive was the desire to maintain the present preponderance (64 percent) of Afrikaners in the white population. Political nationalism has canalized the historical grievances and aspirations of the Afrikaans-speaking people. In the last six years the Nationalist Party tried to broaden its appeal to all Europeans in face of the colored danger, but with very limited success. In 1948, it polled only 45 percent of the total vote. Few immigrants, British or continental European, vote Nationalist, preferring the broader basis of the United Party. The one major exception is the German immigrant who, for obvious historical reasons, opposes the party which General J. C. Smuts twice led to war with Germany. The Nationalists capitalized this hostility by cancelling Smuts' deportation of 250 families from South-West Africa for pro-Nazi activities during the war, and by allotting to the mandated territory six seats (two more than Smuts had proposed) when it was politically incorporated in 1950. They won all six by a majority which was almost exactly equal to the strength of the German vote.

With an increased majority of 13, the Nationalists introduced legislation early in 1951 to take the Cape Coloreds (half-castes) off the common electoral roll. The Coloreds had had qualified male suffrage on the common roll in the Cape Colony since 1853. This was guaranteed to them at the time of Union by the South Africa Act of 1909; under that Act, restriction of the franchise is possible only by a two-thirds majority of both Houses of Parliament sitting together. By 1950 nearly 50,000 Coloreds were registered voters in the Cape, where they constituted 8 percent of the electorate of that province. They are generally thought to hold the balance between the major parties in between five and ten constituencies--and few vote for Dr. Malan. Their disfranchisement would, therefore, cause a swing of between ten and 20 seats in favor of the Nationalists, less the four separate Colored seats which were to be created. Both parties realized that this swing might decide the 1953 election.

In justice to the Nationalists it must be said that they were not merely concerned with the electoral advantage. It distresses them deeply that non-Europeans should partake in the common political life and possibly be able to decide the result of a European election. Further, since Smuts' United Party had cooperated in 1936 to pass a very similar measure disfranchising the Cape Natives by the constitutional two-thirds majority, the Nationalists knew that opposition among Europeans to their Separate Representation of Voters Act derived not so much from dislike of curtailing non-European rights as from fear of the electoral consequences. Thirdly, the Nationalists had reason to believe they were acting within the letter of the law. There was a considerable body of legal opinion and a judgment of the Appeal Court in support of their contention that, when the Commonwealth of independent Dominions was created in 1931, the legal safeguards in the clauses of the South Africa Act entrenching the Colored franchise and some other matters fell away.

The Opposition parties contested the legal issues and further insisted that, whether or not the entrenched clauses were held to be of full legal effect, the Government was morally bound to observe the constitutional procedure laid down in the Act of Union. Ethically, this argument is incontrovertible. In accepting the autonomous sovereignty offered by the Statute of Westminster in 1931, all parties in the Union Parliament had bound themselves unequivocally to honor the entrenched clauses of the Act of Union. General J. B. M. Hertzog, the then Nationalist Prime Minister, amended the resolution of Parliament accepting the Statute to include words suggested by General Smuts, then leader of the Opposition: "On the understanding that the proposed legislation will in no way derogate from the entrenched provisions of the South Africa Act." Smuts with his usual prescience exactly foresaw the present controversy when he said:

I think we ought to put it on solemn record that we adhere to the South Africa Act, the entrenched provisions of which are looked upon very seriously by the people of this country. We do not want to depart by an indirect method from the deliberate provisions laid down twenty years ago.

This attitude toward the entrenched clauses was most explicitly endorsed in the debate of 1931 by at least three Ministers of the present Government. Mr. C. R. Swart, now Minister of Justice, said:

We feel that the entrenched clauses are a matter of good faith, and I cannot imagine that any Government would alter them by a bare majority . . . I feel just as strongly as hon. members on the other side that the entrenchment of certain clauses is a matter of honor.

Those who believed with the Government that the Colored franchise was no longer legally entrenched had, therefore, to close their eyes to the moral obligations, or pretend that the Coloreds were not being deprived of their rights because they were to receive "equivalents." Legally, they relied upon the wording of certain clauses of the Statute of Westminster, the technicalities of which are no longer important; they were settled by the Appeal Court's ruling of March 20, 1952, which held that the entrenched clauses were still of full legal effect and that the Separate Representation of Voters Act, having been passed by simple majorities, was "invalid, null and void and of no legal effect and force."


For the tensions and apprehensions of the next few months the Government really had only itself and its supporters to blame. Shortly before the judgment was delivered, Dr. Malan made the provocative statement that, if the decision went against him, he still had a "trump card" to play. A few hours after judgment he declared that for an appointed judicial authority to thwart the legislative sovereignty of parliament "had created an intolerable and unacceptable situation." Reviving the myth that the Act of Union was imposed by Britain upon an unwilling South Africa, Dr. Malan and his three senior Ministers issued a manifesto on March 24 which saw in the judgment of a Court, none of whose members were of British extraction, "a revival of the attacks of imperialism on Nationalism" in an effect to maintain "the constitutional enslavement of South Africa to the legislation of a superior British Parliament." The Afrikaans press, stigmatizing the Colored franchise as "the last vestige of Cape-British liberalism," called on the Government to rely on the "National nation" in its struggle for "the freedom of the Afrikaner." At a rather later stage, when feeling was running very high over the Government's legislative reaction to the judgment, Mr. Japie Basson, M.P. for Namib, said: "We are in the middle of a life and death struggle. It can rightly be considered as the Third South African War for Freedom." And the most responsible Afrikaans daily wrote that the crisis was due

to the British Imperialist Jingo unleashing a struggle against Afrikanerdom to win back what had been taken from him since the beginning of the century. The English-language press attacks us in a manner reminiscent of the lying propaganda which preceded the Jameson Raid and the Second War for Freedom.

What the Nationalist Government actually did was to introduce an Act, described by Dr. T. E. Donges, the Minister of the Interior, as "courtproof," creating a High Court of Parliament to sit in appeal on the Appeal Court. This High Court was empowered to revalidate the Separate Representation of Voters Act by the same simple parliamentary majority which is not legally competent to enact it; and did so. Nationalist politicians and press admitted that they did not much care for this device, but saw no alternative.

The Opposition points out that the Act of Union was a solemn compact, freely devised by a purely South African National Convention and voluntarily entered into by the elected legislatures of all four provinces. The compromises on certain fundamental points, which are enshrined in the entrenched clauses, represented the minimum measure of agreement without which one or another province would not have accepted Union. In enacting it the British Parliament, which alone had full legislative authority in South Africa in 1909, added nothing to and subtracted nothing from the agreement which South Africans had reached among themselves.

Legally and historically, this argument is unassailable. It is possible to regret that the founding fathers decided for a semi-rigid constitution. There are men on both sides today who would prefer a completely unfettered Parliament on the British or New Zealand models. And there are others who believe that the Union, with its deeply divided racial blocs, conflicting political traditions and subject races, needs a more, not a less, rigid constitution. But until the present constitution as contained in the Act of Union is legally amended, there is no legal way round the two-thirds provisions of the entrenched clauses. As for the Act creating the High Court of Parliament, the Opposition considers it as illegal as it is immoral. The Cape Division of the Supreme Court has upheld that belief, and on November 13, the Appellate Court ruled unanimously that the High Court of Parliament set up by the Government was illegal.

The Opposition had bound itself to accept the verdict of the Court and to fight the moral issues of the Union compact and a Bill to establish written constitutional rights at the coming election. The Government had, however, consistently refused to give a similar undertaking, if the decision should go against it. Until very recently there was a real possibility, which its press and politicians seemed to endorse, that it would in fact try to nullify or evade an adverse verdict and proceed to disfranchise the Coloreds as if both the Separate Representation Act and High Court were valid. This is what many people understood Dr. Malan to mean when in May he declared: "We are going ahead with our plans to protect the sovereignty of Parliament, no matter what happens." Mr. J. G. N. Strauss, leader of the Opposition, speaking on behalf of the United Democratic Front of his own United Party, the Labor Party and the Torch Commando,[i] felt constrained to warn the Government that the Front would oppose illegal measures by every legal means and would meet force with force, if the Government sought to impose invalid laws. Certain elements in Natal took a rather different line, threatening that the province would secede if the Government withdrew from the contract of Union by abrogating the Constitution.

But even though Dr. Malan had remarked that "we as a Government cannot allow ourselves to lose," he announced, after the Appeal Court had spoken, that he would abide by its decision and would keep the Coloreds on the common voting list for the elections in April. He intends to fight the elections on the two main planks of the sovereignty of Parliament and the black menace. The change of emphasis is almost certainly due to a belief that the second of these issues has now been raised in a form which will materially assist the Nationalists at the polling booths.

The depth of conviction with which the Nationalists hold their racial doctrine must not be underestimated. The Afrikaner people derive (with, of course, many later accretions and some continuous assimilation) from the original Dutch settlers and Huguenot refugees of the later seventeenth century. They came to a continent whose peoples knew nothing of Christianity or European civilization. Biblical fundamentalists and Calvinist predestinarians by religion, the Afrikaners explicitly reject the doctrine of "the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family," which forms part of the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights. They are certain, on the contrary, that a man gets what he deserves only when it is allotted to him by God. In their surroundings the Afrikaner settlers found abundant justification for their conviction that "everyone should be treated according to what God ordained for him after the pattern of inequality which He Himself created." Early and naturally, their consciousness of being chosen took on a racial aspect. Genesis IX 25 ("a servant of servants") and Joshua IX 23-27 ("hewers of wood and drawers of water") were cited as scriptural sanction for the view that "God not only willed the existence of different races with different functions, but gave to each people a specified epoch and a place in which to live." All available evidence supported the view that South Africa had been selected for the Afrikaner people to rule.

There are, of course, many Afrikaners today who no longer apply their Calvinism so literally. But in considering the forthcoming election, it is the majority belief which matters. Although a minority in the total population, Calvinists are a majority of the white population of the Union. And wherever Calvinism has been a majority faith, it has been authoritarian. The South African trend is, therefore, authoritarian--all the more rigidly so because the whites fear that they will be swamped by the nonwhites who outnumber them four to one.

It is true that the authoritarian and theocratic tendency of South African Calvinism is in conflict with the strong individualism of the Voortrekker tradition, and if there was no colored majority to be considered, this conflict would certainly be more apparent. But the possibility, however remote, that the Opposition, unfortified by scriptural or religious dogma, might weaken on the color question, gives the Calvinist theocratists great political strength.[ii]

This leads logically to the demand that democracy be qualified so as to minimize the possibility of victory by a "non-Christian" party. And the repeated declarations that "South Africa is subordinate to no power on earth but is under the authority of God alone," present the franchise not as a symbol of individual freedom, but as a duty to be rendered to God who has created the State as an instrument of His sovereignty. Properly, only Christians should qualify for the franchise; possibly, some think, only Calvinists. One of the suggested tests for selecting immigrants is that they shall at least be Protestant. This combination of religion, racial pride and fervent patriotism is well exemplified by a recent article in Die Transvaler, which declared:

Dr. Malan has asked us to trust the Government in this crisis at the cross-roads of color. We do it with all our hearts. They, the Government, are the patriot's ark of faith under God's dispensation. They will lead the volk to the heights of complete freedom, to the other side, on the road which under Nationalist leadership has been followed step by step since the days of Andries Pretorius in order to liberate South Africa from the conqueror and his accomplices.

As J. W. Patten made clear in an earlier article,[iii] there is a great deal of difference between pure, total apartheid on the one hand and practical apartheid on the other. Despite the continued protests of a section of the ministry of the Dutch Reformed Churches and of the Afrikaans intelligentsia, Nationalists still reject the former as wholly impracticable. Apartheid, therefore, means in practice an attempt to stabilize the present position of exclusive white political supremacy (the baasskap), cheap black labor with an industrial color bar confining non-Europeans to unskilled employment (at least in theory), residential segregation in the urban areas, social segregation in all public places and transport, the prohibition of sexual intimacy between the races, and the total denial of non-European rights except "in their own sphere." With all of this the Opposition parties agree in principle, and wish merely to amend some of the laws in order to make them less arbitrary and more amenable to appeal in the courts. The difference is between explicitly and aggressively asserting a permanent racial superiority and tacitly assuming it. The difference is important, for those who explicitly commit themselves to a herrenvolk ideology cannot compromise, even on details, and the conception of racial superiority as a duty to be fulfilled adds daily an increasing quota of discourtesy and petty bullying to the slow but massive accumulation of racial bitterness. Yet even so, it should be noted that of the four Acts of the present Government to which the African National Congress and the South African Indian Congress called attention in January 1952 when they warned Dr. Malan of their intention to resort to passive resistance against discriminatory laws, the Opposition substantially disagrees with only two. It almost entirely concurs with the other regulations which the sponsors of the passive resistance campaign singled out for special mention.


The Defiance Campaign was launched late in June 1952. It has proceeded so far with a dignity and discipline which even experienced and sympathetic observers did not believe possible. The Government has used its arbitrary powers under the Suppression of Communism Act to proscribe most of the leaders, only a few of whom are genuine Communists, and is said to be considering more severe penalties, including flogging the demonstrators; so far, only juvenile demonstrators have been beaten with light canes. At the time of writing, more than 7,000 resisters have submitted passively (even joyfully) to arrest and have gone to prison rather than pay their fines. But though the organized Defiance Movement has remained peaceful, there have been ugly riots at Port Elizabeth, Kimberley and East London, in which blood has been shed and lives lost. None of these arose from a Defiance incident, but they have been stimulated by the rising tension. They exemplify the extent to which racial relations have deteriorated and show the danger that hooligan or extremist elements may take control of the non-European movements.

The response of the Nationalists is straightforward: the movement must be sternly suppressed and the non-Europeans taught who is baas. As Mr. J. G. Strydom, the Minister of Lands and a likely Nationalist Prime Minister in the near future, said on September 13: "The white man will only succeed in remaining in South Africa if there is discrimination, in other words, only if we retain all power in our hands." But Nationalists are not unaware of the difficulties that the campaign has raised for the Opposition parties, who must condemn it or commit electoral suicide by seeming to accept equal citizenship as an ultimate goal. But Mr. Strauss, their spokesman, has repeated his party's long-standing pledge to consult non-Europeans and obtain their coöperation. However, his four-point program--social segregation, no miscegenation, residential segregation, and the use of non-European labor for the benefit of the community as a whole "on our farms, in our kitchens, in our factories and in our mines"--is so far short of what even moderate non-European leaders could reasonably be expected to accept that it clearly illustrates his dilemma. He cannot obtain the agreement of non-Europeans without making concessions which the white electorate will reject. His promise to "lift the color question out of politics" seeks to postpone the attempt to resolve this dilemma. His second promise of greatly increased white immigration is offered as a long-range solution.

A few months ago, before the Defiance Campaign began, an election on the present rolls would almost certainly have gone to the United Party. Now much, perhaps all, of the ground which the Nationalists had lost by their constitutional manœuvres has been regained for them by their greater certainty and firmness toward what appears to be the beginning of a social revolution. The United Party and its allies try to blame the Defiance Campaign entirely on the Nationalist Government. But the latter's greater forcefulness in legislation and administration has merely precipitated something which has been long maturing among the colored peoples and which was some day bound to break. The tensions and frustrations which the campaign expresses will not disappear with a Nationalist defeat.

The hard core of voters on either side will not be much affected either way. Some of the floating vote of about 20 percent may be led to believe, as Mr. Strauss assures them, that there is a way back to the policy of Hertzog and Smuts, in other words, that more moderate language and less militant application of laws, plus some small concessions, will restore tranquillity to race relations. But it is rather more likely that the tactics which paid the Nationalists so well in 1948 will be even more successful today. They will ably and relentlessly expose the inner contradictions of the United Party's color policy, arguing (as Mr. Strydom and Mr. E. H. Louw, the Minister for Economic Affairs, have already done) that coöperation must lead eventually to votes for non-Europeans and the abandonment of the industrial color bar. They will exploit the remarks of the United Party's tiny liberal wing and brand the party as pro-Communist because it opposes the present refusal of the Nationalists to allow alleged Communists the right of trial and appeal. Offered the choice between the full-blooded white supremacy of the Nationalists and the United Party's more moderate version of the same attitude, many unattached voters may well take an even more short-term view of their own self-interest than they did in 1948, when there was no organized colored agitation.

But, in fact, the apparently "safe" way of European self-interest is no longer safe. The Nationalists' aggressive racial ethos has brought to the surface all the latent contradictions of South Africa's traditional racial policy--the precarious balance between compromise and repression which Hertzog and Smuts so long pursued and which lesser men cannot maintain. Faced squarely with the logical implications of "white leadership with justice" which both the European parties profess, the non-Europeans have chosen to work out their own salvation. The present movement may be crushed temporarily; but sooner or later it will revive and go gradually from strength to strength, providing a tangible focus for all the discontents of the "have-nots," stimulated by persecution and self-sacrifice, possibly even by martyrdom. If the whites remain intransigent, the Defiance Campaign can hardly hope to continue non-violent. And, indeed, in view of the temperaments of both white and black, few expected it to remain so as long as it has. Even with a monopoly of modern weapons, one-fifth of the population will find it impossible, physically, morally and economically, to hold down indefinitely the other four-fifths, once these develop a capacity for mass action.

The Nationalist policy of practical apartheid has two aspects --the control and subordination of non-Europeans in the "European areas" and the development of non-Europeans "in their own areas." So far, a good deal has been done about the first and nothing at all about the second. As Africans are to lose even their present pitiful freehold rights in the urban locations and are to be offered a special type of education "in keeping with their national characteristics and traditions" and their future rôle in a white-dominated economy, it seems that only the Native Reserves are to be really "their own areas." These are the permanent home of 40 percent of the Bantu, many of whom, however, need to work in the "European areas" as migratory laborers. During the last 16 years a promise to increase the Reserves by 2 percent has been less than half redeemed, and European opposition virtually rules out any hope of enlarging them significantly. Even though much might be done to increase their productivity and carrying-capacity, they can never provide homes and jobs for more than a minority of the Natives.

Practical apartheid, therefore, hardly differs from the United Party policy of accepting the majority of non-Europeans as permanent residents of the European areas. The Nationalists are even being forced to acquiesce in the urbanization and integration of unskilled black labor in the European economy, which theoretically they hope to reverse but which the United Party approves. And despite the warnings of their Churches and intellectuals, both parties hope that these processes can continue to provide an exclusively privileged white community with cheap and submissive labor, conveniently kept in its place without any political or economic concessions.

Present prospects are that the Nationalists may win another bare majority on a mandate to enforce apartheid and establish the sovereignty of Parliament. Without a two-thirds majority, they will still be blocked by the Act of Union, and there may be a renewal of the constitutional conflict between the two European factions. Senator H. F. Verwoerd, the Minister of Native Affairs, has promised that his Party will go ahead with or without the two-thirds majority, if it wins the election. This is, however, the lesser issue. For their color policy, as Dr. A. Keppel-Jones recently said, is certain to make South Africa untenable for the white man within this century. And how much else of Africa too? All over southern, central and east Africa the Nationalist breach of pledged words and moral obligations, their attempt to evade legal obligations and the decision of a much respected Court when it was favorable to colored interests, have created suspicion among Africans which is paralyzing efforts to work out a basis for genuine interracial partnership. For the success of that effort, everything depends upon mutual respect and trust. If uncompromising white nationalism and implacable black nationalism finally confront each other in the Union, European leadership will end long before the Native peoples are ready to carry the burden alone.


The Defiance Campaign has really posed the issues between white and black in their final form. The present political crisis reflects a divided European mind which will not yet face any of the three alternatives. The first is the elimination of the white man--an outcome which neither the Europeans nor non-Europeans desire, but which is the logical result of the present policies of both the Nationalists and their opponents. The second alternative is the one urged by the Afrikaans Church and intellectuals --total apartheid, with complete partition and exchange of populations as its goal. This demands that the Europeans make tremendous material sacrifices, eliminating African labor from their economy[iv] and surrendering sufficient land and natural resources to create a viable African society. The third is that those who favor economic integration must accept the moral and material implications of such a policy: that non-Europeans must be gradually admitted to equal citizenship and equality of economic opportunity, as they attain to the standards of civilization; and the corollary is that Native education, housing, health, nutrition must be tackled on a national scale with high priority, not for racial reasons but because a large mass of people live in conditions of ignorance, squalor and disease which threaten the welfare of the whole community as much as they degrade the sufferers.

All these alternatives are fraught with risks and unpalatable sacrifices, either material or emotional--the inescapable consequences of a multiracial society and the penalty for previous procrastination. It would be expecting too much of human nature to hope that either party will fight the coming election on a truly constructive platform while traditional policies hold out any chance of success. But the next five years will be crucial, no matter who wins in 1953. If the Nationalists declare for total apartheid as their ultimate objective, or if the United Party declares for total integration, the way will be open for honorable compromise on the details of a gradual policy and all men of goodwill will have a rallying-point and a goal to work for. But if neither party budges from its present position, the non-Europeans will be driven against their will to oppose white men as such, and the two white groups will move toward solidarity over the short distance which separates them on color questions. For lack of a constructive policy, both black and white will find themselves near despair, and near the temptations of force to which it leads. Moderate leaders will inevitably give way to extremists, reason to passion and the baser political motives. Then, indeed, events will justify the prophecy of a prominent Nationalist who said: "All we can hope to do is to stave them off, stave them off for as long as possible."

The number of white South Africans who are thinking of emigrating for their children's sake shows a growing awareness of how close the country is to that sort of moral and material bankruptcy. Another piece of evidence pointing in the same direction is the appalling increase in Native crime, as shown in the following figures for the Witwatersrand, the industrial and mining area around Johannesburg in the Transvaal.

Murders Grievous Assault Serious Crime
1945 186 2,475 69,036
1948 231 3,381 89,130
1951 472 4,776 158,513

W. P. Schreiner, an Afrikaner and one of the Cape leaders at the time of Union, said:

It is idle to think of building anything permanent in South Africa by the mere goodwill of ourselves, the European-descended minority of its people. We shall, if we deserve it, remain dominant, where career is open to talent and to civilized men, with no discrimination or distinction upon such grounds as color or race. Life's experience has taught me that the golden thread of justice in every matter is the only way out of the labyrinth.

The future of white civilization in Africa depends on a revival of the faith and vision which inspired those words, and of the old indigenous liberal tradition which seemed to die with J. H. Hofmeyr, Smuts' Deputy Prime Minister, in 1948. Total apartheid seems to ask too great material sacrifices ever to be practicable. It is, in fact, against the best interest of all races and likely to reduce both white and black to penury. Africa needs European leadership and enterprise for generations to come, if that can be contrived without affronting African self-respect or closing all avenues of advance to the colored races. The sole justification for considering partition is the well-founded apprehension that racial attitudes may at last prove ineradicable, that the European's fear of being swamped and his consequent refusal to allow any substantial opportunity to non-Europeans in a mixed society may never abate. Only those who have lived in South Africa long enough to understand the depth and persistence of these prejudices and emotional responses to the racial situation can fully appreciate how slender are the chances of the liberal solution being applied in time.

[i] The United Party forms the main Opposition. The Labor Party holds a few industrial seats on the Witwatersrand, representing white labor. The Torch Commando is a popular, extra-parliamentary movement of some 250,000 members, loosely pledged to get the Government out and safeguard the Constitution.

[ii] There is a secret Nationalist society known as the Broederbond (Band of Brothers) which is thought to be the driving force behind Afrikaner Nationalism. Dr. Malan and the majority of his Cabinet and Parliamentary supporters are members. Apostates have revealed that of its 3,460 members, 2,039 are teachers and 356 ministers of the Dutch Reformed Churches. The heavy representation of Church and school reflects a deliberate emphasis in the Nationalist program.

[iii] "Alternatives to Apartheid," by J. W. Patten, Foreign Affairs, January 1952.

[iv] At present, nine-tenths of the mine-workers, three-quarters of agricultural labor and two-thirds of industrial labor are non-European.

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