Time for NATO to Close Its Door
The Alliance Is Too Big—and Too Provocative—for Its Own Good
When Adlai Stevenson toured the ten capitals of South America in June 1961 on a special mission for President Kennedy, one of the questions he raised at each stop was whether the American Presidents should attend in person the closing days of the forthcoming meeting at Punta del Este, Uruguay, which was to draft the basic charter of the Alliance for Progress. Stevenson received conflicting advice. Some Presidents welcomed the idea as a way of giving top-level political impetus and drama to this unprecedented program of inter-American coöperation. Others feared the public relations impact of a possible recriminatory debate, so soon after the Bay of Pigs, between President Kennedy and Cuba's Dorticós-or perhaps even Fidel Castro himself. In his own report, Stevenson reflected these divided opinions, and Kennedy finally decided not to pursue the idea. The delegations at Punta del Este the following August, therefore, were headed by Finance and Economic Ministers-in our own case, by Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon.
Now, almost six years later, the successor Presidents have met at the same spot to discuss the same basic topics-how to strengthen inter-American coöperation to accelerate Latin America's economic and social progress under free institutions. With one exception, those present signed a Declaration of the Presidents of America.[i] Their document, signed April 14, 1967, is neither a routine protocolary joint communiqué nor a declamatory masterpiece. Its tone is quiet but firm, and on its critical points it is more definitive than the Charter of the Alliance for Progress adopted in 1961.
With the captains and kings departed from Punta del Este, what appraisal can be made of this six-year effort to promote a peaceful and democratic economic revolution in the continent? Has it been merely "plowing the sea," in Bolivar's famous phrase, to be swallowed up by new waves of population expansion, of political disintegration and military caudillismo, of peasant and urban slum unrest exploited by extremist demagogues, and of nationalist tensions too strong for the frail strands of Latin American unity? Is it true, as suggested recently in Foreign Affairs by President Frei of Chile, that the Alliance has "lost its way"?[ii] Or, in the light of the new directions and objectives laid down by April's Summit Meeting, does it promise to set a new long-term course for Latin American development, for inter-American coöperation and for Latin America's place in the world?
In a paradoxical fashion, the Summit Meeting itself was historic but undramatic. It was undramatic because it lacked major surprises. The only effort to create a sharp confrontation between Latin America and the United States proved abortive. The probable dimensions of additional aid from the United States in the years immediately ahead had already been defined in President Johnson's message to Congress of March 13. Only some of the delegates, and very few of the press corps, appreciated the potentially dramatic significance of the new trade-policy directions indicated by the United States in relation to all less developed countries, including Latin America.
Nevertheless, the Summit Meeting can fairly claim the adjective "historic." To some extent, this is inherent in the very fact that the meeting took place. Only once before in modern times had a similar number of chiefs of state been gathered together; this was at Panama in 1956, where the purpose was mainly to establish personal relationships. This time, although the continent was facing neither a military nor a political crisis, the Presidents addressed an agenda of far-reaching substantive content.
The truly historic significance, however, resides in those decisions which would not have been reached in the absence of a presidential meeting. First and foremost was the commitment to a Latin American Common Market. In the words of President Frei, in the most applauded of the public presidential speeches at Punta del Este, "The decision to create a Common Market in a fixed time period represents . . . the profound and historic justification for this meeting."
The concept of Latin American economic integration as a major factor contributing to the economic development of the Hemisphere was first propounded almost two decades ago by the U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America under the leadership of Raúl Prebisch. It is an idea of Latin origin, which has only in recent years won the wholehearted endorsement of the United States. Six years ago, the Charter of Punta del Este, although it included a chapter on Latin American integration, did not even venture to use the words "Latin American Common Market."
The term "common market" does appear in the Treaty of Montevideo of 1960, which established the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA). It is also to be found in the Economic and Social Act of Rio de Janeiro of 1965, and in the Protocol of Amendments to the O.A.S. Charter signed at Buenos Aires last February. Prior to the recent Summit Meeting, however, the Latin American Common Market had been a vague, formless and timeless aspiration. Now it has been transformed into a specific commitment of the Latin American Presidents, to be brought into operation in a period of not more than fifteen years beginning in 1970, with indications of the mechanics to achieve it, and procedures to set these mechanics in motion, and with a pledge of moral and financial support from the United States.
What started as the brainchild of a few economic technocrats, therefore, has now become a political commitment at the highest level. But it would be wrong to underestimate the difficulties of creating a fully functioning Latin American Common Market. The advantages of a wider market for industrial development, which is a universal aspiration in the Hemisphere, might seem so obvious that one could expect governments and business communities to leap at the prospect. The European example, as well as the Central American example closer at home, should be encouraging to the larger nations of South America. In fact, however, there are widespread doubts and resistances, some legitimate, some flowing from the normal fear of the unknown, and others reflecting vested interests in limited markets.
The European analogy has severe limitations. The diversity in present economic conditions in Latin America is far greater. The complexities of tariffs and other trade restrictions are compounded by the severe inflation which continues at different rates in several of the most important countries. It will not be easy to work out a common external tariff which gives reasonable but not excessive protection to the hemisphere-wide economy.
At the governmental level, the poorer and smaller countries show an evident fear that the main benefits of integration may go to the "big three" (Argentina, Brazil and Mexico), even though the relatively advanced industrialization of these three countries itself constitutes dramatic evidence of the advantages of market size. There will also be political as well as economic problems in consummating the marriage of LAFTA with the Central American Common Market and bringing in Panama and the Caribbean island nations. It will be necessary to battle continuously with nationalist forces in building the requisite common institutions and in reducing excessive divergencies in domestic economic and social legislation.
Among the Latin American business communities, two opposing schools of thought are readily discernible. One consists of established entrepreneurs who enjoy monopoly positions within highly protected national markets, whose high unit prices more than offset their high unit costs, and who therefore oppose any new competition, whether regional or international. On the other side stand the more progressive groups who understand and want to take advantage of the opportunities wider markets would create, and who are willing to take their chances in regional competition. The participation of these latter groups in the annual LAFTA negotiations has made possible fair progress in reducing trade barriers during the past five years. The success of the common market movement will depend heavily on their support.
Some Latin American leaders have also expressed the fear that, in their words, "all the benefits" of the common market might go to large foreign investors. In economic terms, this is an irrational fear. Under present conditions, it is clear that the major benefits of foreign investment adhere to the host country, regardless of the stock ownership and the destination of profits. Those benefits include added output, foreign exchange savings, tax revenues, employment opportunities, transmission of skills and stimulation of affiliated local supplier and marketing enterprises. American manufacturing investors in Latin America in the postwar period have typically reinvested a larger share of their profits than they have withdrawn in capital or dividends. Nevertheless, the existence of this fear is a political fact of life. The foreign investing community would be well advised to associate itself in one way or another with national Latin American companies as the process of industrial expansion is carried forward.
Less controversial than the decision to create a common market, but no less decisive for the ultimate success of Latin American integration, was the presidential emphasis on physical integration through multinational projects. Of all the contrasts between Latin America and Europe, which together make the differences greater than the similarities, none is more striking than the physical disjunction of this Hemisphere. Telecommunications are still primitive. Arteries still lead mainly to seaports rather than connecting neighboring nations. The great opportunities for developing international river basins are only now beginning to be considered. Even in cultural habits, the élites of Latin America today typically know the civilizations and cities of Europe and North America better than they know their own neighbors. In addition to their obvious benefits in facilitating regional trade and opening up Latin America's "inner frontiers," multinational projects can provide a solvent for certain longstanding frontier disputes which still plague bilateral relations in parts of the Hemisphere.
Economic integration is, of course, only one element in improving the prospects for accelerated development in Latin America. It is a necessary but not sufficient condition, and it is decidedly no panacea. The most important factors continue to be those stressed in the original Charter of Punta del Este under the concept of self-help: the national efforts to mobilize resources, to direct them into productive public and private investment and to modernize and reform economic and social institutions.
The race with population expansion gives special urgency to this task. This is not because of limited space in most of Latin America in the short run. The so-called "inner frontier" of South America, south and west of the Amazon jungles, still remains the largest readily habitable and almost empty region on the face of the globe. Although it is gradually becoming settled, this is not the area where the largest population increases are concentrated. They are in the explosively growing urban slums throughout the Hemisphere and in the most depressed rural areas where productive land is insufficient even with extensive agrarian reform. Food production per capita, although slightly increased during the past six years, remains below prewar levels.
The major impact of the population expansion on development, however, is the huge number of new jobs that are needed as a result of the young age structure of the population. Unless overall rates of growth can be accelerated, the prospect is for ever-increasing concentrations in urban slums, miserable in human and social terms and ripe for extremist political exploitation. Hence the critical necessity of promoting simultaneously the modernization of agriculture and the expansion of industry, along with continued investment in basic economic and social infrastructure.
The sections of the presidential Declaration devoted to agriculture, education and health may appear at first blush no more than a conventional restatement of goals already long since agreed upon. The first two, however, are by common consent the sectors in which progress in the last six years, although significant, has been least adequate to the needs. National planning has made great strides in such fields as highway and electric-power development. Tax structures and administration have been improved in almost every part of the continent, and promising institutions are being developed to encourage small and medium industry and housing construction. But agriculture and education have been the most intractable fields for either operational planning or translation of plans into tangible results. They are both inherently complex; they both require efficient systems of decentralized administration; and they deal with sectors of the community notoriously resistant to change. Here again, it may be hoped that commitments at the highest political level, both in national programming and in inter-American coöperation, can give effective impetus to action where discussions at lower, more technical levels have proved insufficient.
The Summit Agreement on science and technology breaks new ground. The original Charter of Punta del Este was virtually silent on this topic. At the Summit, the Presidents called for a national science policy in each country and for the establishment of a far-reaching regional scientific and technological development program, including exchanges of personnel and information, the strengthening of the few existing institutions for advanced training and research, and the creation on a multinational basis of new training and research institutions at the postgraduate level. President Johnson suggested that to implement this program, there be considered the creation of an Inter-American Science Foundation. If these decisions can be fully carried out, they should greatly accelerate the creation of an autonomous Latin American scientific capability and should help stem the brain drain in these vital areas. A generation hence, it may well be judged that this portion of the Action Program by itself justified the convening of the Presidents.
The chapter on elimination of unnecessary military expenditures is brief and highly circumspect in its phrasing. In this field, one should avoid being misled by the widespread myth of a Latin American "arms race." The facts are closer to what this author recently described as an "arms crawl." Of the total Latin American budgets (excluding Cuba) of about $1.5 billion, only $150 to $200 million per year go into military hardware, scarcely a vast diversion of resources from productive employment. The internal security problem, moreover, is no imaginary figment, as recent guerrilla actions in Venezuela, Colombia, Bolivia and Guatemala make manifest. On the other hand, war between Latin American neighbors should be considered unthinkable today, not only because of the United Nations and O.A.S. Charters and the Rio Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, but also because it suits no nation's interest. There does remain, nonetheless, a latent danger of a cycle of competitive arms acquisitions set off in one country and followed by others for obsolete reasons of traditional military rivalry. This danger, it is hoped, can be lessened by the presidential declaration of intent to limit military expenditures to real needs.
Trade was the other great theme of discussion at the Summit. It was the area where Latin America showed the widest feeling of disappointment-or at least insufficient satisfaction-at the outcome. It came closest to a confrontation between a unified Latin America on the one hand and the United States on the other. The views expressed on the Latin side were almost a classic illustration of the cleavage in "North-South" attitudes on trade and development expounded in the recent masterly study by John Pincus.[iii] Let it be said in respect for the growing Latin American maturity, however, that the Latin Presidents did not blame the inadequate pace of economic progress exclusively on the policies of the "North." They were equally emphatic on the continuing need for national self-help and institutional reform.
Latin America's concern over its position in world trade is certainly understandable. Between 1956 and 1965, the Latin American share of world exports fell from 8.6 percent to 5.9 percent. Inadequate foreign exchange is a bottleneck in the economic expansion of most of the Latin countries, and debt servicing absorbs a disturbingly high proportion of export earnings.
A Western Hemisphere dialogue on trade policy is to be welcomed, moreover, since in the early years of the Alliance for Progress these topics have enjoyed a less frank and thorough interchange than national development plans and aid policies in the key economic and social sectors. Such a dialogue may help to dispel simplistic myths which distract attention from real solutions.
On the side of the industrialized nations, for example, including the United States, recent analyses have shown that tariff structures result in higher levels of protection against semi-processed or finished goods from the less developed countries than might be supposed from a casual examination of average tariff levels. Subsidies and quotas remain as all- too-frequent exceptions to the proclaimed ideal of free and fair international competition. European practices in these respects are considerably more damaging than our own to the interests of developing countries.
On the Latin American side, one still hears frequent allegations of the alleged "constant deterioration of the terms of trade," with overtones of an alleged malicious conspiracy by industrialized countries to hold down Latin American export prices while raising the prices of manufactured goods. Specious calculations are often made of "trade losses," comparing Latin America's actual export receipts with what would have been earned had prices remained at some peak level. In fact, although the Latin American terms of trade did fall sharply from the Korean War boom of the early 1950s (and the subsequent coffee price peak induced by frosts in Brazil), they have improved by almost 10 percent since 1962 and have been remarkably stable during the past three years. The purchasing power of Latin American exports, taking into account both volume and prices, has improved by 48 percent since 1958, following on several years of virtual stagnation.
From such errors of diagnosis flows the illusion, which was echoed at Punta del Este, that the Latin American foreign-exchange problem could be solved once and for all if only the industrialized countries would guarantee markets for traditional export commodities at "just prices." But if these guaranteed markets were to be for products in stagnant demand in the industrialized countries, this would amount to an inefficient and quite inequitable form of barely disguised aid, which is scarcely to be expected as a realistic policy matter.
Improved access to markets outside Latin America, both for traditional and for newer types of exports, is a more promising route. This requires changes in both commercial policy and business practice. On the policy side, the Summit Agreement contained two significant advances, the importance of which was largely overlooked in the press commentaries. The first is a joint commitment by Latin America and the United States to seek the elimination of discriminatory preferences against Latin American exports, which in practice means the European Common Market arrangements for imports from the associated African states. While the statistical record shows little evidence so far of actual damage to Latin American exports, the potential damage is serious and is a matter of acute concern to Latin producers and governments.
The second, and more important, innovation was the announcement by President Johnson of his intention to explore at home the possibility of introducing a system of "temporary tariff advantages for all developing countries by all industrialized countries," and to seek the coöperation of other industrialized countries in this effort. Such a departure from this country's long-held adherence to unconditional most-favored-nation treatment would follow a line of policy urged by the group of 77 less developed countries at the 1964 Geneva meeting of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. It will undoubtedly figure as a central theme of the Second UNGTAD Conference at New Delhi in early 1968.
In past years, many Latin American spokesmen have favored a Western Hemisphere preference system, some going so far as to propose "one-way free trade" between Latin America and the United States. Taken literally, this is far from a realistic idea. More sophisticated Latin Americans recognize that at least some reciprocity would be a prerequisite to the negotiation of any Western Hemisphere system. They also see the political dangers of carving up the world into economic spheres of influence.
The Summit Agreement reflects a deliberate option in favor of a global system of preferences for all less developed countries, with its correlative implication of the abandonment of European discrimination against Latin America. It is noteworthy that the group of nine Latin American experts, whose report was the main seedbed of proposals for the Summit, showed a clear preference for a global rather than a Western Hemisphere system. On the other hand, should global preferences prove impossible to negotiate, it is plausible to expect a strong demand from Latin America, with considerable backing in the United States, for a move toward some form of commercial preference system within the Western Hemisphere.
As in the case of commodity agreements, it would be a gross error to expect any system of commercial preferences, whether global or regional, to resolve all of Latin America's export problems. It is often forgotten that Puerto Rico enjoyed unlimited access to the United States market for half a century before any real exploitation of these opportunities took place through "Operation Bootstrap." The fact is that, outside its traditional export lines, most of Latin America has been singularly backward in taking advantage of existing market opportunities in the more industrialized countries. Businessmen in the newer lines of production have looked almost exclusively to home markets. Governmental policies have often not only failed to assist but have positively discouraged the expansion of exports. The Summit Action Program calls for measures to correct these deficiencies. Moreover, it can be expected that the attitudes induced by economic integration within Latin America, with its pressures for greater competitiveness and cost consciousness, will be reflected as well in greater export efforts for non-traditional products in world markets. Any new preference system will help create opportunities, but the task of exploiting them will depend on the businessmen and governments of Latin America itself.
In short, there simply are no simple panaceas for the Latin American trade problem. Neither commodity agreements nor preferential arrangements by themselves offer comprehensive solutions. Nor is there a simple choice between trade and aid. The only satisfactory long-run solution lies in development itself, in the industrialization and agricultural modernization and diversification of the Latin economies, with priority for the production at competitive costs of items in growing world demand. The natural and human resources of the continent should make this perfectly feasible. International action to help bring about these results is more likely to be facilitated by the objective joint analysis of obstacles and remedies than by doctrinaire confrontations invoking abstract principles of equity.
President Frei's charge that the Alliance for Progress has "lost its way" contains two strands: one of substance and one of ideology. The sense of frustration he describes is not his or Chile's alone. It has been general among Latin Americans and thoughtful North Americans concerned with Latin America.
Six years of the Alliance have certainly not brought about a revolutionary transformation in Latin American conditions of life. Despite the notable advances in education, health and housing, the building of roads and power plants, industrial expansion and the somewhat uncoördinated attacks on agricultural productivity and land reform, the deficits and deficiencies in all these fields continue to loom large. The continent has not yet "taken off" into self-confident, self-sustained growth. There remain many regions of appalling poverty and there are substantial sectors of various national communities which do not feel themselves active participants in economic and social progress. No doubt some of the expectations aroused by the rhetoric of 1961 were excessive and could not have been fulfilled in any event. Others have not been met because of inadequacies in both national performance and external coöperation, even though the quantities of external aid have exceeded the figures pledged six years ago.
On the substantive side, most of President Frei's points will be met if the commitments at the Summit are converted into practice: Latin American economic integration; discouragement of wasteful military expenditures; the promise of new coöperation on the trade front; stronger multilateral guidance for aid policies; and higher targets for economic growth. The importance of higher growth goals cannot be overstated. Unless Latin America as a whole can be brought up to rates of growth paralleling the postwar records of such countries as Italy, Greece, Taiwan, Japan and Puerto Rico, overt and disguised unemployment will rise to levels that are politically and socially intolerable. Higher growth rates will require both greater domestic efforts and more outside aid.
A substantially larger volume of outside aid could be used productively under present conditions in Latin America. Over the next few years, as the move to a common market gets under way and as multinational projects and more comprehensive domestic programs in agriculture and education are formulated, this absorptive capacity will rise still further. It is to be hoped that international institutions and private capital will respond fully, and that when reduced military burdens in Southeast Asia afford some relief to our present balance-of-payments and budgetary preoccupations the United States Government may add to the moderately expanded aid level recently recommended by President Johnson. Once higher growth rates are established (and given a favorable world trading environment), one can expect that most of Latin America will be able to end its dependence on outside concessional aid during the 1970s, even though a substantial net inflow of public and private capital should continue for many years to come.
The ideological criticisms of the Alliance are more subtle. It is true that, in 1961, its founders hoped that it might generate a mystique of peaceful democratic revolution which would sweep political leadership and Latin American public opinion on a tide sufficient to overcome the resistance of vested interests and the obstacles of traditional political rivalries. That did not happen. Some observers associate the loss of glamor in the Alliance with the death of President Kennedy, but the historical record cannot sustain this interpretation. The failure of the Alliance to catch fire as a political watchword was already evident by mid-1962,[iv] and the atmosphere surrounding the São Paulo meeting of Economic Ministers in November 1963, only a few days before the Kennedy assassination, was one of frank crisis, with many delegates audibly wondering whether the Alliance would survive another year.
The performance under the Alliance has in fact been more substantial, and confidence in the soundness of its goals and methods has been greater, during the past three years than at the start. The Alliance today is more of a going concern than ever. But the truth is that the idea of an overwhelming inter-American mystique to support the Alliance never did catch hold.
Of greater consequence is the fact that, without carrying banners labeled "Alliance for Progress," the main leadership groups of Latin America today, except for dwindling minorities on the right and left extremes, are devoted to precisely the kind of institutional modernization and reform that was called for in the Charter of Punta del Este. Legislative debates and administrative policy-making are now concentrated not on whether, but rather on how, to press forward these reforms. There is a growing sense of confidence, strikingly evident in preparations for the Summit, that these methods can succeed and that the responsibility for their success is essentially Latin American, with aid from the United States playing a vital but only complementary role. Confidence in the continuation of that role, in turn, was bolstered by the quiet bilateral diplomacy of President Johnson outside the formal Summit sessions. This is a major change in basic attitudes since 1961, and it constitutes the greatest achievement of the Alliance for Progress in its first six years.
To be sure, the ideal of representative democracy is far from being a consolidated practice. In a period of rapid economic and social change, when whole new sectors of populations are being brought into political consciousness and activity and long entrenched structures of social power are visibly giving way, it should be no surprise that political institutions are also in flux. To expect the model exercise of representative democracy where economic and social backwardness are still pervasive would be quite unrealistic. Even on this front, however, it is comforting to note that in the last year there was a record in Latin America of nine democratic elections, with the results respected in all cases, as against only one unconstitutional coup d' état.
There is also a growing trend toward experiments in direct local community participation in development and toward more effective encouragement of coöperatives and other voluntary associations. It is not easy to reverse the paternalistic tradition which reaches far back into Iberian history, but even the modest efforts so far employed have demonstrated the existence of large resources of local initiative and energy which can be put to constructive use.
It was a striking feature of preparations for the Summit that Ministers and Presidents alike shied away from rhetoric in order to concentrate on concrete action. At their Buenos Aires meeting, the Foreign Ministers took the unprecedented step of eliminating the "general debate"-the traditional inter-American occasion for endless speeches intended for home consumption without expectation of affecting the course of negotiations. The sober tone of the Presidential Declaration reflects the same spirit.
With all this said, it must none the less be recognized that ideology and mystique, and their accompanying slogans, are indispensable components of political life. It can be argued that the Alliance for Progress contains an implicit humanistic ideology of progress at a revolutionary pace, integrating all elements of national societies under free institutions. Many of its tenets are paralleled in the recent papal encyclical Populorum Progressio. But how that ideology should be articulated in the political parlance appropriate to each country, with its own traditions and conditions, is better left to national leadership than subjected to an artificial inter-American consensus.
The task of national leadership in Latin America is not easy. Although the Cuban example has long since lost its glamor in Latin America, the Marxist dialectic has retained its appeal for a disturbingly high proportion of Latin American intellectuals and educated youth. The challenge of participating in rapid development under free institutions should be more than enough to enlist the idealism of young Latin Americans, but the philosophical and popular statements of the creed of democratic progress still remain to be well formulated and the institutions to capture youthful energies for constructive ends are still all too few.
Punta del Este also marks a new phase in the underlying philosophy of inter- American relationships. While "divide and conquer" has never in fact been a guideline of our Western Hemisphere policy, the Summit leaves no doubt that the watchword henceforth is to be "unify and coöperate." Such a policy involves its risks. They include the danger that, as it is sometimes put, "Latin America may gang up on us," and also the danger that Latin America as a unit may choose a separate way in world affairs antagonistic to our interests.
Against those risks must be weighed the benefits that growing unity can bring to Latin America's own more rapid development, and the benefits to the United States of a more prosperous, more self-reliant and more stably progressive group of neighbors to the South. If the policies agreed on at the Summit can engender in Latin America the kind of development experienced in recent generations in such countries as Canada and Australia, the results will surely make for a world environment more suited to our own broadest interests.
In the short run, Adolf Berle was entirely correct in pointing out five years ago that Latin America needs the United States much more than the United States needs Latin America.[v] But there is every reason to expect that even before the year 2000, when 600 million Latin Americans will be sharing the Hemisphere with 300 million North Americans, the voice of Latin America will be heard more loudly and insistently on the world stage. Without indulging in over-romantic "grand designs," one can descry the possibilities of a major new force emerging in support of the rule of law, the maintenance of free institutions and the primacy of humane values.
All this will depend, however, on the success of the programs laid down by the Presidents in April. There is certainly no guarantee of success. Latin America is still in the latter stages of a half-century struggle to cast off social and economic molds inherited from the colonial era, and the birth pangs of modernity are severe. It would be all too easy to relapse into a new and prolonged time of troubles.
As President Johnson said on departing from the Summit: "Economic and social development is a task not for sprinters but for long-distance runners." But if the determination of the Summit can be sustained in Latin America, and can be backed by sustained coöperation from the United States, then future historians will be able to say that what was started at Punta del Este in 1961, and redirected and reinvigorated at Punta del Este in 1967, came to constitute the great divide in Latin America's political and economic history.
[i] Cuba was not invited, its régime having been excluded from the O.A.S. in January 1962. The President of Bolivia elected not to attend. The President of Ecuador attended but did not sign. The Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago participated fully as the Chief of Government of a newly admitted member state of the Organization. El Salvador was represented by its President-elect, and Haiti by its Ambassador to the United States. The other seventeen American Republics, including the United States, were all represented by their Presidents in person.
[ii] Eduardo Frei Montalva, "The Alliance that Lost its Way," Foreign Affairs, April 1967.
[iii] John Pincus, "Trade, Aid and Development." New York: McGraw-Hill (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1967, Chapter 5.
[iv]See, for example, my lecture of August 8, 1962, at Salvador, Bahia, on "Productive Tensions in the Development of the Western Hemisphere," reprinted in my volume, "A New Deal for Latin America," Harvard University Press, 1963, Chapter 7.
[v] Adolf A. Berle, "Latin America: Diplomacy and Reality." New York: Harper and Row (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1962, Chapter I.