The War on Terror in Retrospect
Anatomy of an Overreaction
The Strategy of Terrorism
License to Kill: Usama bin Ladin's Declaration of Jihad
It Could Happen Here: Facing the New Terrorism
The Taliban: Exporting Extremism
The Sentry's Solitude
Somebody Else's Civil War
America the Vulnerable
The Reluctant Imperialist: Terrorism, Failed States, and the Case for American Empire
America's Imperial Ambition
The Law of War in the War on Terror
Combatants or Criminals? How Washington Should Handle Terrorists
Grading the War on Terrorism
Is There Still a Terrorist Threat?: The Myth of the Omnipresent Enemy
Al Qaeda Strikes Back
Can the War on Terror Be Won?
How to Fight the Right War
Terror and the Law
The Limits of Judicial Reasoning in the Post-9/11 World
How al Qaeda Works
What the Organization's Subsidiaries Say About Its Strength
Recalibrating Homeland Security
Mobilizing American Society to Prepare for Disaster
Al Qaeda Without Bin Laden
How Terrorists Cope With their Leader's Death
Al Qaeda's Challenge
The Jihadists' War With Islamist Democrats
Despite nearly a decade of war, al Qaeda is stronger today than when it carried out the 9/11 attacks. Before 2001, its history was checkered with mostly failed attempts to fulfill its most enduring goal: the unification of other militant Islamist groups under its strategic leadership. However, since fleeing Afghanistan to Pakistan's tribal areas in late 2001, al Qaeda has founded a regional branch in the Arabian Peninsula and acquired franchises in Iraq and the Maghreb. Today, it has more members, greater geographic reach, and a level of ideological sophistication and influence it lacked ten years ago.
Still, most accounts of the progress of the war against al Qaeda contend that the organization is on the decline, pointing to its degraded capacity to carry out terrorist operations and depleted senior leadership as evidence that the group is at its weakest since 9/11. But such accounts treat the central al Qaeda organization separately from its subsidiaries and overlook its success in expanding its power and influence through them. These groups should not be ignored. All have attacked Western interests in their regions of operation. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has also long targeted the United States, but its efforts have moved beyond the execution stage only in the last two years, most recently with the foiled plot to bomb cargo planes in October 2010. And although al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has not yet attacked outside its region, al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) was reportedly involved in the June 2007 London and Glasgow bomb plots.
It is time for an updated conception of al Qaeda's organization that takes into account its relationships with its subsidiaries. A broader conceptual framework will allow for a greater understanding of how and to what degree it exercises command and control over its expanded structure, the goals driving its expansion strategy, and its tactics.
AL QAEDA'S LOST DECADE
Although al Qaeda had tried to use other groups to further its agenda in the 1980s and early 1990s, Osama bin
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