NOW that hostilities are over in Spain, General Francisco Franco's troubles are just beginning. It is easier to run a country in war than in peace. In war everything is subordinated to the single goal of victory and any method or policy gains validity on that basis; in peace there are multiple goals, not the least of which is the well-being of the people you rule. Franco must begin at the beginning, not to reconstruct a previously existing state but to create a new one, for Spain can never return to what it was. One may well question whether the Caudillo will have time and opportunity to create his new state, for events are moving fast in Europe and Spain is riding the same storm as Germany and Italy. But whatever the immediate future brings -- war or peace -- Franco's problems are worth examining.
First, the reader must grant certain premises for which proof is easily available but outside the scope of this article. From its inception, the Rebel movement was militantly supported by the army, the aristocracy, the Church and "big business," and by certain representatives of the working, farming and student classes to be found chiefly in the Carlist and Phalangist organizations. It had the forced acquiescence of the traditionally peaceful "man-in-the-street." But it could not have succeeded without the constant and overwhelming military support of Germany and Italy, aided indirectly but effectively by the so-called "nonintervention" policy of England, France and the United States. Unless those things are kept in mind, there can be no understanding of what has happened or is about to happen in Spain.
What, in the light of this, are Franco's problems? They can be expressed simply, but not so easily solved. He must form some sort of a permanent government, restore order, disband the army, get business going normally and the land working, reconstruct what has been destroyed, resume education, decide what part the Church is to play in education and national
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