At the end of January 1967, the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), the ruling party on the mainland of Tanzania, announced the Arusha Declaration, named for the town in the northern part of the country where the Declaration was first promulgated. Supplemented by subsequent formulations throughout 1967, it has become something of a milestone, for it enunciated an ideology and articulated policies especially designed for the needs and conditions of an African country,

According to Arusha, TANU stands committed to policies of socialism and self-reliance. Socialism is understood as a social situation which excludes exploitation of one man by another or of one class over another. The major means of production are to be under the control and ownership of the workers and peasants through the agency of the government and through coöperatives. Self-reliance means that development as a whole must be achieved through reliance on Tanzanian resources (which are chiefly agricultural) rather than through dependence upon foreign aid in capital development and technical assistance. This should enable Tanzania to remain independent in making and carrying out foreign policy. The Declaration also sharpens the definition of political commitment for both members and leaders of TANU who will be instrumental in carrying out this policy.

The Arusha Declaration does not aim to create a. classless society at the expense of the country's economic development, but it gives social goals primacy over more narrowly defined economic ones. It calls for a rectification of a mistaken emphasis in the past on industrial growth, and a new concern with agriculture and rural society in general. The agricultural policy also emphasizes self-reliance in instructing the people to be self-sufficient in food, clothing and housing. The country is to exploit its resources of land and agriculture, the people and good leadership. The policy of socialism and self-reliance is itself seen as an exploitable resource.

Arusha's economic policy breaks with the recent past only to return to some specific measures of an earlier period. For the primacy of rural development, with emphasis on cottage industry, primary schooling and piecework payment in communally organized work settings all had their precedents in the colonial period. The political and social context in which these practices are now to be undertaken, however, is obviously greatly different from that of colonial times and even from that of Tanzania's recent past. For the Arusha Declaration marks a determination on the part of Tanzania's leadership not to be bound to the same course as other independent countries in tropical Africa.

Indeed, Arusha is a reaction against Tanzania's incipient tendency to reproduce patterns of development which have become clearer in more economically advanced African countries and which are felt to be inimical to the stated goals of equality, socialism, rural improvement and national control over indigenous resources. Tanzania, too, was by 1967 witnessing a widening of gaps in income and life-styles between rural and urban areas and between educated and non-educated people; and a labor aristocracy was being created along with a bureaucratic and political élite. Furthermore, like other African countries with a rhetoric of centrally directed economic development and social change inspired by national leadership, Tanzania's low levels of economic development made it difficult to forge the political instruments for carrying out centrally established goals. Thus the changes which were occurring appeared to the leadership to be taking place outside their direction and control.

The promulgation of the Arusha Declaration marks an important departure from the patterns of contemporary African history chiefly because Tanzania has proved atypical in following up the Declaration with a further elaboration of ideas contained in it and a whole new array of assertions, policies and ideological statements, which were put forward in the course of 1967. Much talk of "back to the land" and of the need to reduce unemployment by making rural areas more attractive to would-be migrants has been heard in many African countries. In Tanzania, however, agricultural development has been defined as the building of rural socialism, which means increasing production through the construction of Ujamaa or communal and coöperative villages (rather than either state-farms or independent peasant homesteads). And unlike other African countries, Tanzania has not considered agricultural development in isolation or narrowly construed it as government provision of technical assistance, capital inputs or land reform. Another innovation is the new education policy, which emphasizes preparation for a rural existence. And even more unusual for Africa, policies have begun to be implemented to change in fact the educational system, the pattern of rural development, the control of industry and the relationships between ruler and ruled.

II

In some spheres, it has been relatively easy to bring intentions to fruition. This is the case with state policies in the industrial sector. Thus TANU could announce its intention to take control of banking and certain industrial and trade enterprises in accordance with long-standing clauses in the TANU Constitution; the Government could nationalize the banks and the targeted enterprises; and the National Development Corporation could negotiate for a 60 percent interest in other selected industries (e.g. breweries and tobacco) without too much difficulty. Indeed, although the steps in nationalization taken immediately after the Declaration itself have received most attention in the world press, it is a mistake to consider nationalization the most radical segment of the Arusha formulations. President Nyerere's own perception of nationalization as "a little exercise" which "set the mood" for what was to follow is more accurate. While nationalization was bound to attract a great deal of attention abroad, there was nothing either in principle or in implementation which was striking about it except that it defied the notion that tropical African countries are too weak and too reliant on foreign capital and expertise to get away with it.

The merits of nationalization in Tanzania are debatable, but the doctrine of self-reliance for development seems the least ambiguous part of Arusha, the one most demonstrably applicable to Africa, and the one whose implementation marks a radical break with past policy. Self-reliance is neither a romantic notion nor a policy of autarchy, but a means of insuring that an independent foreign policy will not lead to disruption of economic plans. Tanzania is inevitably tied to world markets it cannot control because it has to export agricultural commodities which are not in scarce supply. And the Government has never denied wanting to attract foreign investment and skilled manpower from abroad. Tanzania has not despaired of achieving economic growth, and its doctrine of self-reliance is more than a tactical move of the leadership to build support at home. It is a practical reaction to the exigencies of economic development.

Aid to Tanzania and to Africa should be put in proper perspective. The amounts provided are lower and the costs to the recipient higher than most people realize. Furthermore, throughout the African continent aid is increasingly difficult to get; and as the prices of industrial goods rise faster than the prices of the agricultural commodities which Africa exports,, the aid given by donors buys less of their own goods than might first appear. In Tanzania, and undoubtedly in many other countries, the fall in prices of export goods (in Tanzania's case sisal primarily) and the rise of import goods are costing considerably more than the total of all aid receipts. While this does not make foreign aid undesirable, its benefits to African economies should not be overestimated.

Self-reliance must also be viewed in relation to specific events in Tanzania's recent foreign relations. Tanzania had been criticized in the West for casting off its former ties and specifically for strengthening relations with China. Its acceptance of Chinese military assistance and economic aid, its provision of a home for southern African liberation movements, the union with Zanzibar in 1964, and Tanzania's stand on Viet Nam all strained relations with major Western donors. After the union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar, the new state ran into difficulties with the Federal Republic of Germany since Zanzibar had previously recognized East Germany. When East Germany was permitted a consulate in Dar es Salaam, the West Germans broke an agreement to aid the Tanzanian air force and Tanzania then told the Federal Republic to withdraw all aid.

Even more costly for development efforts in the short run was Tanzania's break with Britain in accordance with an Organization for African Unity (OAU) resolution on Rhodesia. In the name of anticolonialism, African unity, African honor and freedom of action, Tanzania lost British assistance at a crucial time in the first Five Year Plan period. Thus it seemed to the TANU Government that Tanzania's foreign policy decisions would have immediate consequences for its economic prospects as long as it continued to rely on foreign capital for development. And in its Five Year Plan for development Tanzania was relying on foreign investment and foreign aid for more than three-quarters of central government investment.

Furthermore, Tanzania is not as attractive to foreign investors as neighboring Kenya, which is more industrially developed. It was felt by some economists in Tanzania that on the one hand not enough foreign investment could be attracted to make a real difference to total growth and on the other hand that foreign investment made a negative impact by favoring the urban-industrial sector over rural areas, utilizing wrong techniques and creating a privileged stratum in the country.

It was asserted that foreign investment accentuates social and economic gaps as it furthers the creation of a labor aristocracy in the industrial sphere and creates pockets of managerial wealth. There are some weaknesses in this argument. The creation of a privileged industrial working class both in Tanzania and elsewhere in Africa has had less to do with foreign investment than with the reactions of African governments to trade union pressures. Tanzania has shown a typical pattern. Rising wages and the imposition of minimum-wage legislation follow union demands. Employment falls as enterprises try to avoid high labor costs through the utilization of capital-intensive techniques which would be irrational in Africa were it not that wage increases were outstripping productivity. In Tanzania, there were continuous declines in employment from 1961 to 1966; only in 1966 and 1967 did employment increase, by about 3 percent a year.

Therefore it is not clear that nationalization alone will be able to keep wage demands in line with increases in productivity or to equalize income between better-off employees and poorer ones (not to mention the gap between wage laborers and farmers).

Since corporate profits were declining in the pre-nationalization period, while wages were going up, the Government may have nationalized both economic and political trouble. It is possible, however, that the TANU Government will now be better able or more determined to hold wages down. In 1966, the public sector's total wage bill rose faster than the private, but in 1967 the order was reversed. Since the Arusha Declaration, the Government has imposed an average 5 percent ceiling on wage increases. The stage is set for periodic confrontations with the unions, which are ostensibly tied into the ruling TANU structure but which in practice rebel against wage restraint.

III

TANU's policies of self-reliance and socialism are meant to be linked just as self-reliance and national independence are thought to be inextricable. As applied to individuals and social groups, self-reliance is meant to signify hard work, the absence of exploitation, and coöperation among local producing, marketing and political organizations. But in Tanzania it is extremely difficult to disseminate ideas from the center without a great deal of distortion taking place. Abstract political words may acquire very different connotations when translated at local levels. And TANU is not an organizational juggernaut which can spread the word throughout the country in monolithic fashion. This must be done by local TANU district or cell leaders whose interpretation of the ideology, goals and policies is often very different from that of the national leaders. For example, TANU's leadership has certainly never construed self-reliance as antithetical to coöperation. But individuals have justified opting out of communal relationships on the ground that self-reliance means individualism. The Arusha Declaration asserts that socialism has no relationship with racialism. But posters meant to publicize the exploitative nature of shopkeepers have had distinctly racial connotations.

Jobless persons in the towns have been the targets of political attack and have been periodically rounded up to be sent back to their rural places of origin. But the categories of "jobless" have not been precise. Water- carriers fulfill real functions in the towns, but they have at times been considered exploitative and at other times as part of the jobless! To further self-reliance, one district council determined to end education subsidies to poor people in the district-despite the increased official emphasis on local cooperation in making education more widely available at the local level.

The difficulty of translating slogans and policies into action at the grass roots becomes clearest in regard to the Arusha formulations on rural change. The logic of a policy of self-reliance calls for direct action on rural problems. A major gap has existed in Tanzania between wage-earners and "self-employed" farmers. Arusha recognized that a solution to Tanzania's problems could not be found in industrial development, that rural development therefore had to be the main focus, and that the drift of rural population to urban areas resulting in increased unemployment must be stopped. Policies for dealing with both the traditional rural economy and the changing rural society of cash-crop farmers then had to be formulated. For along with distinctions between rural and urban, economic differentiation on the land has been taking place. Arusha also sought to halt an increasing social and economic differentiation among farmers.

In so far as guidelines are provided for rural change, they are laid out in those parts of the Arusha formulations known as Ujamaa Vijijini or "Socialism and Rural Development" and in "Education and Self-Reliance." These are perhaps the most important parts of the Arusha ideology, but while they are addressed to real issues, they are also the loosest in conception, the most difficult to apply and the most debatable with regard to their appropriateness for tropical Africa. Surely, one argument of "Socialism and Rural Development" must be accepted. This is the understanding that Tanzania cannot transform its rural society through widespread use of heavy equipment or through capital-intensive pilot agricultural schemes which would somehow revolutionize agrarian techniques through the force of their example. The society simply does not have the social and economic resources to support either strategy; thus there must be better utilization of land and labor through improved tools and better organization. Or, as President Nyerere puts it, a move from hand tools to the ox plough rather than the tractor is needed.

Nyerere's prescription for rural development is to synthesize old and new values; he intends to combine efficiency and rapid development with equality and freedom-clearly maintaining the primacy of equality. But the Arusha statements reveal the major difficulties in translating the simultaneous goals of economic growth and egalitarianism into agricultural and social policies. On one level, Arusha's answers consist of Benjamin Franklin-like injunctions. People are given homilies on the management of their household affairs and they are exhorted to work hard. On another level it is stated that the basis of Tanzanian life should consist of rural "economic and social communities where people live together and work together for the good of all, and which are interlocked so that all of the different communities also work together in coöperation for the common good of the nation as a whole." The nation should be made up of such Ujamaa village communities. A democratic system of local government is to grow out of these living and working communities. For practical reasons and because they would violate the moral meaning of socialism, both a universal blueprint and coercion are rejected as instruments for getting people into these villages.

The village communities are to be characterized by joint decision-making on matters affecting village life and by the absence of marked social and economic divisions between members, although distribution of returns is to be according to work done. The call for coöperative and communal farming is not a harking back to simple family or extended-family homesteading, for the village center is not supposed to be a parochial family group. Moreover, some specialization of work and modern production techniques are to be introduced where possible. The crucial point emphasized is that a man not be dependent on anyone except the community for land and tools. And one man should not be able to hire another. It is recognized, however, that in some areas private profit will continue to be a major incentive. The immediate limitation of private profit is called for, not its abolition.

IV

What has been accomplished so far? Tanzanians will disagree over how many Ujamaa village communities have been created. Before the Arusha Declaration, Tanzania had experimented with different kinds of pilot- village programs. Some were communally run; others had coöperative components but were run by expatriate farm managers and were capital- intensive, with the Government providing equipment and some social services. Now "naming" is going on; that is, old schemes are being renamed Ujamaa villages without a fundamental transformation in their organization and operation. This has happened before in Tanzania as local government organs were revised and renamed with little real institutional change taking place. Purists contend that there are no more than twenty Ujamaa villages in Tanzania at present. Some of these were communal villages started long before 1967.

A Ujamaa section was created within TANU in the summer of 1968 to help organize the building of new villages, to train a cadre of organizers in the economic and organizational problems of Ujamaa living and production, and to coördinate efforts made by various government ministries in promoting rural development. The head of the section is a Member of Parliament who led a famous communal farming scheme in southern Tanzania. But as in other TANU projects, staffing is short; project leaders wind up traveling abroad; programs remain uncoördinated. Much of the action that takes place is symbolic.

This has been true also for measures designed to repatriate urban unemployed to rural areas-an undertaking of great magnitude. In most African countries the slogan of "back to the land" is not backed up with any administrative measures actually to take unemployed townspeople to the land, nor are any incentives given for people to go back voluntarily, nor is land always available. In Tanzania there were periodic roundups of unemployed before Arusha, and individuals have had to get permission from the head of government in their home district before they could migrate to the capital, Dar es Salaam, or to certain other towns. But people rounded up can slip back to the towns, and individuals can avoid the regional administrative barriers. The effort again becomes symbolic unless machinery exists for helping people to open up new land and for providing initial assistance in resettlement, including, perhaps, aid in starting cottage industries. TANU and the Government lack trained manpower and capital to facilitate this process.

Where there have been successful Ujamaa villages the success has been due to good local leadership. Indeed, it is not likely that building up a staff in an administrative section located in the capital would decisively affect the implementation of the program. Its success will depend on the ability of local TANU and government organs to produce local leaders and establish Ujamaa villages. Centrally directed organizers will have limited impact, if past Tanzanian history is any guide.

What incentives exist, then, for local initiative? What kinds of incentives will there be for peasant farmers who are getting ahead to coöperate and give up individual peasant homesteading or to utilize traditional communal forms in new ways? For one thing, poor people in poor countries measure the possibility of attaining increases in income very carefully against other desirable goals like social security and social acceptance. Thus, for many farmers, the virtue of communal villages may be apparent even if they do not perceive immediate economic returns. But for those who have abandoned or are in the process of abandoning communal units for capitalist farming, it remains to be seen whether the example of socialist villages will prove attractive.

So far, there is no evidence that better-off farmers are being forced into communal villages. Exerting force against those farmers who are getting ahead would have severe economic and political consequences, and this policy has not been envisioned. In fact, it was only in October 1968 that village development committees were empowered to impose sanctions on those who refused to participate in local nation-building activities. Where local coercion has occurred in Tanzania it has not stemmed from centrally established policy directives.

Therefore, the successful absorption of individual peasant farmers into larger coöperative or communal village units does not appear to be an early prospect. Even family-based producers' coöperatives seem given to splitting off as more ambitious farmers try to get ahead or individuals chaff at the personal restraints and close contact the coöperative venture entails. Difficulties also arise in working out a division of labor over food-crop and cash-crop work, and the role of women's efforts where women traditionally have specified rights and duties.

For many people, living in villages represents a break with the past. A number of historical studies have indicated that groups in Tanzania resisted being organized in villages in both colonial and pre-colonial periods because the village became the organizational nexus for extracting economic resources and political duties. For people with these historical memories, Ujamaa villages may appear as another such attempt and much persuasion will be required before voluntary changes in behavior take place.

V

It is precisely because Tanzania's leaders are aware of the varied social patterns and values which exist throughout their country that they have tried to influence these patterns and values by intervening directly in the educational system, using TANU as a conveyor belt for new ideas.

In "Education and Self-Reliance," Nyerere has cogently argued that Tanzania's school system continues to foster élitist attitudes. Like earlier critics of African education, he maintains that scarce resources have been too heavily committed to an educational system which has a negative effect on society. Nyerere, however, unlike his predecessors, recognizes that pressures for education come from the populace itself and not from the élites' commitment to some myth of education. Nyerere does not want to abandon emphasis on education but to alter the form and content of the educational system. Although far fewer can be enrolled in secondary schools than in primary, Tanzania cannot afford to increase substantially the number of secondary-school places available. The few who do finish secondary school go through a boarding experience which cuts them off from their rural roots. The rest are the so-called "school-leavers," who cannot be absorbed in the wage sector, who do not want to return to the land and who constitute an explosive element in the society. Moreover, by 1980, at the present rate of expansion, Tanzania will have reached a saturation point for the absorption of secondary-school graduates into the wage economy.

To meet these exigencies, Nyerere proposes that primary-school education no longer be considered as preparation for higher schooling, but that it should be a full education in itself, training people for the life they must lead on the land. This requires a radical change both in the educational system and in community attitudes. Whereas in the past schools have been isolated from the rural countryside, now they must be integrated into the surrounding community. Schools should also be self-sufficient farming communities and work with neighboring farmers to improve agricultural standards. A social-service ethic must be created and maintained at all levels of the educational system, and students should be judged in terms of this ethic as well as by their academic accomplishments.

Should the school system of Tanzania be fundamentally revised, this would mark a revolutionary break with contemporary African patterns. For here the problems of discontented school-leavers, urban unemployment and allocation of national resources would be attacked at their roots. Some changes have been made already. Agriculture has been reintroduced into the school syllabus. Primary and secondary schools are creating their own farms where these have not existed. Prior to Arusha, Swahili had become the official language of Tanzania and was the language used in primary schools. The Ministry of Education is now considering use of Swahili as a medium of communication in secondary schools, and revisions of the syllabus in history and civics as well as agriculture are in process.

Implementing fundamental curricula changes necessarily involves great difficulties. A major problem is the lack of teachers who are committed to these changes. Most of the present secondary-school teachers either have been recruited from overseas or are university graduates who themselves were educated under the old system. The latter, who have been the major beneficiaries of the old system, are imbued with élitist attitudes. There is also a shortage of teachers trained in agricultural education.

Perhaps the greatest changes have taken place in the primary schools in Ujamaa villages. There students are part of a whole community, and thus farm work, academic work and direct participation in communal living can be tied together. Moreover, primary-school teachers themselves have proceeded less far in the educational hierarchy and may be more sympathetic to changes. Similarly, it is likely that adult education in Ujamaa villages can be carried out in accordance with the Arusha goals.

TANU has been charged, along with the Ministry of Education, with effecting these changes in education. In 1965 TANU Youth League sections were introduced into the secondary schools and in 1966 TANU became more active in the University College. The party is to coördinate its activities with the Ministry of Education and direct its own programs through a political education section established at TANU Headquarters in Dar es Salaam. The small staff at the National Headquarters will find it difficult to centralize direction of the education program. Whatever the inclination of the Ministry of Education and TANU Headquarters to infuse the syllabus with more political education, the implementation of central directions again will depend on the interest of local TANU organizations and the coöperation of local teachers.

VI

Leadership is of course a central issue of the program. Arusha has been formulated and articulated by Julius Nyerere. The public definition of the Tanzanian way and the international publicity given to it have depended almost exclusively on the President's own writing and speeches. This raises important questions about the nature of support for Arusha within TANU, especially since one important part of the Declaration deals with restrictions imposed on TANU leaders.

A specific trigger of the Arusha Declaration was the refusal in 1966 by students at the University College in Dar es Salaam to do National Service because of its low rates of pay. They also rejected what they called political indoctrination during the National Service program. The President saw the students' rejection of National Service (which required of them both some short-term quasi-military service and a period of employment in earmarked jobs, largely as teachers, after graduation) as a rejection of commitment to the nation which had financed the students' education. He foresaw the emergence of an educated élite cut off from its own rural roots and without an ethic of service to the nation.

With this incident in mind, the framers of the Arusha Declaration laid down qualifications for leadership in TANU which attempt to prevent the separation of privileged government and party leaders from the mass of society. Every TANU and government leader is supposed to be a worker and peasant and to have no connection with capitalism and feudalism. What this means concretely is that leaders at all levels must divest themselves of shares in corporations and memberships on boards of directors, and must cease renting property they have acquired. These injunctions apply to high and middle-level civil servants and their husbands and wives as well as to political leaders. Those who do not meet the requirements within a year's grace period are to lose their posts. So far, some of those who sounded most "radical" in the past have been accused of flagrant accumulation of wealth and violation of socialist ethics. A prominent example is the former Secretary General of TANU, Oscar Kambona, who had earlier fled the country.

As a result of student complaints that they were the targets of Government austerity when Ministerial salaries were high, the President announced he was taking a permanent 20 percent pay cut in October 1966; Ministers promptly offered to follow suit. Heads of the government and party in the regions and districts took 15 and 10 percent cuts respectively and civil servants with salaries over $5,300 a year took 10 percent pay cuts. Members of Parliament did not take salary cuts but they did not get increases for which they had pressed. (Tanzanian parliamentarians receive about $2,200 a year, which is around two-thirds of the amount a Kenyan MP gets.) Moreover, Ministers gave up their state-owned Mercedes, which had been full time at their disposal, and made do with a government-business car pool. Government low-cost loans for automobiles were ended too, and TANU and government leaders had to sell their "second" houses, causing a fall in property values in Dar es Salaam. Some people, including a Junior Minister, who wanted to hold onto their commercial stake, have resigned. That MPs were worried about their financial positions was indicated clearly when President Nyerere answered questions about the Arusha Declaration from MPs in April 1967. Almost all the questions were about restrictions on government and party officials; no one asked about the ideological aspects of the program.

These restrictions strike at what has been a fundamental means to enrichment in new states-wealth through politics. Even with Arusha, Tanzanian leaders and many salaried officials will still be living much better than all but a few of their countrymen, but they are no longer supposed to feather their nests for the future. Political responsibility is not intended to lead to economic security.

The whole thrust of Arusha has been to sharpen the definition of political commitment in Tanzania. No longer does TANU aim to enroll all citizens. (TANU is supposed to be a party of workers and peasants but these terms have not been sharply defined.) It is not yet clear whether qualitative criteria for membership are being strictly imposed at lower levels, but within the leadership the President himself is being pressed to tighten TANU discipline. At a meeting of the National Executive Committee held in Tanga last October, nine TANU members were expelled. They included the former Secretary General, Kambona, already in exile, and the former TANU Youth League Secretary and MP, Mr. E. Anangisye, who was in detention and apparently was closely connected with Kambona. The other seven who were expelled were all Members of Parliament who had been outspoken on various issues. Two had objected to the way that Ujamaa villages were being set up in their region, West Lake; another had complained about lack of freedom within the party and had objected to the failure of Zanzibar to carry out elections. The MPs who were expelled from TANU lost their seats in the National Assembly. They were not accused of specific violations of the Arusha provisos on economic accumulation but were said by the party newspaper to have "grossly violated the Party creed both in their actions and attitudes, all of which sum up to a very clear opposition to the Party and its policies."

The National Executive Committee has now shown its willingness to move against people who are in one way or another vigorously opposing a TANU line. It remains to be seen how freely the labels "anti-people" and "anti- TANU" will be applied-whether they will be used chiefly against those who oppose the Arusha formulations or whether they will become a weapon against those who voice dissent of any kind.

VII

While the Arusha Declaration cannot be separated from Nyerere personally- indeed he has been responsible for its promulgation and the subsequent elaboration of its themes-it would be a mistake to view the Declaration merely as a personal statement. The political élite of Tanzania has remained relatively unified in support of Arusha and in fact the formulation has been a force for unity-in part because it creates an élan among the leaders and in part because it responds to felt needs in the population. In other words, Nyerere has been successful so far in creating an ideology for development in accordance with political and social goals widely held in Tanzania. The Arusha formulations should be seen in relation to practicing politicians who are trying to stay in power as they harness social forces to their goals. The widening gaps in Tanzanian society threaten Nyerere and the present TANU leadership just as in other parts of Africa.

Arusha then is not an exercise in ideology-making for its own sake or the acting out of one man's ideas. The function of the Arusha Declaration is to legitimize rule and to come to terms with conditions which are going to persist for some time. Arusha also provides a vision of a different and better future and it gives guidelines for achieving it.

Some TANU people believe that it was the absence of clear ideological direction which made it impossible in the past to exert strong central control; people literally did not know what they were supposed to do, either in superior or subordinate positions. Now the answers to What Is To Be Done are given in Arusha.

Of course, there have been large gaps between ideas and implementation. But it would be wrong to minimize the significance of Arusha and the events of the past two years in Tanzania. A national leadership has examined the critical issues of development in Africa and has announced steps to meet them. Concrete measures have been incorporated in an ideology of development. Tanzania's leaders have recognized that Africa must change and that change must be directed rather than merely reacted to. To control change rather than be carried away by it is more than a noble idea; it is a practical necessity for those who rule.

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