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The Return of Geopolitics
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The Illusion of Geopolitics
The Enduring Power of the Liberal Order
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New World Order
Labor, Capital, and Ideas in the Power Law Economy
America in Decay
The Sources of Political Dysfunction
The Populist Threat to Liberal Democracy
Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault
The Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin
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China's Imperial President
Xi Jinping Tightens His Grip
Bitcoin Goes Boom
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Erdogan Loses It
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Foreign Policy à la Modi
India's Next Worldview
The Price of Poverty
Psychology and the Cycle of Need
Meet Pakistan's Lady Cadets
The Trials and Triumphs of Women in Pakistan's Military Academy
Notes From the Underground
The Long History of Tunnel Warfare
Why Beijing Is Buying
The Poor and the Sick
What Cholera and Ebola Have in Common
The Myth of the Caliphate
The Political History of an Idea
The Turkish state changed hands a decade ago, when Islamic conservatives (supported by the liberals) prevailed in elections against the country’s old guard, the rightist nationalists known as Kemalists. It may be about to do so again. The conservative alliance of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the movement of Fethullah Gulen, a Muslim cleric who leads his congregation from self-imposed exile in the United States, has imploded. As it does, the military is gearing up to insert itself into politics once more.
The trouble started in 2011, when Erdogan decided to purge most Gulen supporters from the AKP party list ahead of the general election in June. No longer willing to share power with anyone else, Erdogan also ousted most liberals and supporters of the moderate President Abdullah Gül. Then, a subsequent reform of the public administration served as an excuse to remove many Gulenists from key bureaucratic posts.
The Gulenists’ response came in February 2012, when a prosecutor believed to be affiliated with the movement tried to summon Hakan Fidan, the head of the National Intelligence Organization and a close confidant of Erdogan, for questioning over his role in then-secret negotiations between the Turkish government and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). The Gulenists had made their opposition to talks with the Kurdish movement known and wanted to derail them by charging Erdogan’s envoy -- and by implication the prime minister himself -- with treason.
Last summer, the rift between the two groups widened as protesters occupied Gezi Park. Gulen-affiliated media criticized Erdogan, comparing him to a “pharaoh.” The government, with its reputation tarnished and Gulenists gaining the upper hand, announced in late 2013 that it would shut down Gulen-operated schools. That would have deprived the movement of its main source of revenue and recruits. Not ready to take the hit lying down, the Gulen movement retaliated by supporting a corruption probe, led by the prosecutor Celal Kara, against relatives of several cabinet ministers
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