As Turkey watchers obsessively monitored the results of the Turkish constitutional referendum on Sunday, it appeared for a few short hours that something momentous was taking place. Across Turkey, the Yes votes that would transform Turkey from a parliamentary system into a presidential one and create a highly empowered presidency with few meaningful checks and balances seemed to be underperforming expectations. As Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir—Turkey’s three largest cities and the first two reliable AKP bastions during its nearly 15-year reign—all voted No, there was a brief moment where it looked as if President Recep Tayyip Erdogan was going to be handed his first real defeat. Although the Yes vote pulled ahead and the constitutional amendments passed, many in the opposition camp and its supporters are taking solace in the narrow margin of victory and the fact that Turkey’s capital along with its biggest city (and Erdogan’s hometown) both rejected the government’s agenda. Their hope is that this portends a new willingness to compromise on Erdogan’s part.
This hope is misplaced. Narrow victories are nothing new for Erdogan and the Justice and Development Party (AKP), who saw their seats in the Grand National Assembly decrease in three successive parliamentary elections, and who fell nine full percentage points from the June 2011 elections to the June 2015 round. Following the 2015 election, Erdogan did not change his tune but instead doubled down, campaigning for the AKP despite being constitutionally barred from doing so, hounding his political opponents, and stepping up his campaign against the terrorist Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in order to make the argument that only a stronger show of support for the AKP would return stability to Turkey. The aftermath of this latest victory will be similar. Erdogan is not going to be cowed by the latest evidence of Turkey’s polarization; rather, he will do everything he can to deepen that polarization.