The Overstretched Superpower
Does America Have More Rivals Than It Can Handle?
EXPORT or die" is a challenging phrase, but like so many catchwords expresses only half the truth. When Hitler told the Germans in early 1939 that they must export or die, and when The Economist several years later used the same words to describe England's postwar situation, neither nation was overburdened by its own productive capacity and neither was in the position of having to dispose of surpluses abroad or see its economic life stifled by their weight. Actually, "export or die," as they used the expression, meant "import or die;" it meant that a highly industrialized country had to buy from abroad each year large supplies of foodstuffs and raw materials. Lacking these supplies, millions of its factory workers would lose their jobs and millions of its closely packed urban population would suffer actual starvation. Furthermore, cut off from outside supplies of strategic materials, its military potential would be drastically reduced. Thus, for a nation to stop the inflow of goods might so reduce its economic and political strength as to cause it to lose its status as a Great Power. States in this situation must have imports to survive, but they can get imports only by exporting; hence in this sense it is true that they must export or die.
Americans are not in the habit of listing their country among the have-not nations. Traditionally, we have taken great pride in our "inexhaustible resources," our vast area of arable land, our great forests, and our abundant and varied deposits of minerals. We are accustomed to think of ourselves as self-sufficient, as not dependent in any critical degree on a large and uninterrupted flow of goods from abroad. It is true that wartime shortages of rubber and tin and many other metals jolted our complacency, but most Americans still would consider "import or die" a ridiculous exaggeration if applied to their own country. A poll on the question, "Are imports vital to the American economy?" would probably show that a majority of Americans considered them of minor importance. But if asked whether exports are vital to us, most Americans would reply emphatically, "Yes."
The accent on exports is one of the ideological relics of seventeenth and eighteenth century mercantilism which still beclouds our economic thinking and distorts our economic policy. We glorify exports as a means of producing employment at home and of carrying American culture and prestige into remote parts of the world. Imports have no such glamor. In the popular view, in fact, importers are engaged in a somewhat dubious occupation. They bring in foreign goods which seem to displace an equivalent amount of domestic products, thus creating unemployment and sabotaging the national economy. But, as a matter of fact, neither of these views can be accepted as a general rule of national policy. There is no magic in exports or imports by which either of them inevitably promotes prosperity or creates depression. Just now the fear of postwar unemployment is responsible for ambitious plans for pouring American goods into foreign markets. But unless the goods are to be given away -- and probably a considerable amount should be thus disposed of -- the boosting of exports will mean a corresponding flow of foreign goods into American markets. An old truth is at long last making its impression on American thinking: Since our purchases abroad furnish the dollars with which foreigners buy goods from us, exports and imports really are two sides of the same coin. Our policy, therefore, toward both branches of foreign trade must be consistent. We cannot logically bless one and curse the other.
Apart from the interdependence of exports and imports, what can imports, in and of themselves, do for the American economy? What are some of the positive benefits which we might obtain by more liberal purchases of the products of foreign countries?
The most significant thing that can be said about importing is that it is the means of getting goods cheaper than we ourselves can produce them. This is the basic advantage of all trade, whether it be between the United States and England or between New York and Indiana. Foreign trade is a means whereby Americans can draw on the natural resources of all the countries of the world; it is the peaceful method by which we persuade their outstanding technical experts and skilled laborers to work for us, with mutual benefit. But in addition to this long-recognized general advantage, imports can make certain special contributions to the American economy in the years that lie ahead. (1) Imports of foreign raw materials, particularly minerals, can help safeguard our economy against the too rapid exhaustion of our natural resources. (2) Imports can help break up monopoly situations and keep American business functioning on a free-enterprise basis. (3) Imports of foreign consumers' goods can, by educating consumers' tastes, stimulate American manufacturers to raise the artistic quality and technical excellence of their output.
The Second World War, even more than the First, has made Americans think about imports -- particularly about those raw materials which military men call strategic. In 1941 and 1942 we were terrified by shortages of tin and rubber which threatened to strangle our rearmament and war production effort in its infancy. In the pinch of war's necessity, the not unfamiliar facts that we produced no quinine, rubber, quartz crystals and other strategic materials took on new significance. The appearance of the atomic bomb turns our attention with dramatic force to our meager sources of supply of uranium. A great many people now understand why conservationists and military men have been preaching for decades that, for the United States, the idea of self-sufficiency in raw materials is a dangerous delusion.
Dr. Pehrson, in the July issue of this magazine,[i] showed how narrow is our margin of supply of certain minerals. Domestic production of tin, antimony, chrome, nickel and industrial diamonds is either nonexistent or else deposits are so small, or of such poor quality, as to be negligible either in peace or in war. In a second group containing important non-ferrous metals and ferro-alloys -- copper, lead, zinc, manganese -- our commercial reserves might possibly last for two to 35 years at the 1935-39 rate of consumption. Our iron ore is good for somewhat over a century, but the most accessible deposits, the open-pit mines of the Mesabi Range in Minnesota, may be exhausted in a decade. Our supply of bituminous coal seems practically infinite, but the end of our petroleum and natural gas seems definitely in sight; proved reserves of petroleum have an estimated life of 18 years, assuming 1935-39 rate of consumption.
These estimates, as Dr. Pehrson and other engineers readily admit, have no iron-clad validity. Some previous pessimistic predictions have proved to be wrong. The Conservation Commission of 1909, for example, far overestimated our future consumption of timber, iron ore, and coal; and its predictions of the early exhaustion of petroleum and natural gas were upset by unexpected new discoveries. But the advance of geological science in the past generation, and the wider range of explorations, give greater validity to present-day estimates and diminish the prospects of important new discoveries. Furthermore, we may expect that in postwar years our industrial economy, geared through a policy of full employment to expanding domestic and foreign markets, will devour raw materials at a prodigious rate.
In view of these facts, the expression "import or die" begins to make sense. No one can now deny that in wartime imports are vital. In peacetime, also, the dependence of key industries on foreign sources of supply is a hard economic fact. In 1937 American factories used a billion dollars' worth of imported raw materials. Of these, something like three-fourths were non-competitive; the remainder supplemented inadequate domestic supplies. We might, of course, insist that American engineers produce automobiles and airplanes, radios and telephones, exclusively from domestic materials, but by so doing we would block technical progress in these industries and put an end to their ability to compete in foreign markets.
The need for conserving our declining reserves of metallic minerals and our fuel resources would seem to point logically to the reform of our tariff policy on minerals. "We should make every effort," according to William Batt, Vice Chairman of the War Production Board, "to import all we can of the critical materials and use as little as possible of our own precious remaining supplies." Tin, antimony, chrome, nickel and industrial diamonds are properly on the free list. But imported copper, lead, zinc, tungsten and manganese pay duties varying from one-third to three-fourths of their foreign values. On economic grounds, protective tariffs on the products of an extractive industry such as mining have been particularly hard to justify. The argument that they are infant industries does not apply, for these industries were never young, in the sense that radio or television is young. A mine, from the beginning, is an aging industry with wasting capital assets. Import duties may help a newly introduced branch of manufacturing to overcome the temporary handicaps of lack of skilled labor or of "know-how." But the handicaps of the high-cost American mines are not temporary; they are in the order of nature: narrow veins, refractory ores, bad location. Tariff protection, no matter how high or how long continued, cannot overcome these disadvantages. No import duty can widen a vein of copper in a Montana mine or bring it a mile nearer Detroit.
A lower tariff policy which permitted larger imports of minerals would mean cheaper raw materials for American manufacturers. It would concentrate domestic production in the low-cost mines; imports would supply that part of domestic consumption formerly supplied by marginal operations. Such a policy would also conserve national resources, even though some of the closed mines might have to be permanently abandoned. If a certain amount of domestic production, in addition to that which can exist without tariff support, were considered necessary on military grounds, it should be supported by direct government subsidies, chargeable, like expenditures for the Army and Navy, to the costs of national defense. In emergencies we should rely principally on stockpiles and on imports from allies and friendly neutrals. This amounts to saying that for the United States the wartime supply of critical materials is a political problem. Our safety is to be found not in adopting a program of economic self-sufficiency actually impossible of fulfilment but in an adequate Navy and merchant marine and in a farsighted foreign policy.
Mine owners, particularly in states in the inter-mountain area, may be expected to cling stubbornly to protection; but their opposition to lower tariffs is less united, less confident now than in the halcyon days of Hawley and Smoot. Some of the mineral industry's closest advisers already are pointing to handwriting on the wall. The Engineering and Mining Journal, for example, calls attention to a national drift toward reduced tariffs and warns: "Unless there is a definite about-face in public thinking, it seems hopeless to plan on tariff increases [on minerals], or even on retaining present margins of protection. . . . The most a protectionist can expect under the present outlook is that reductions of tariff will be gradual." [ii]
Americans have been brought up to believe that active competition among businessmen is the dominant principle of the free-enterprise system. They have been accustomed to defend that system on the ground that competition keeps prices and profits at a reasonable level. But among businessmen the tendency to combine has often proved stronger than the urge to compete. Hence our history is studded with anti-monopoly movements and laws against restraint of trade. When, after the Civil War, the development of a great national market revealed the economies of large-scale production and management, industrial combinations grew to such dimensions that federal action was taken to restrain them. In the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, and later legislation, Congressmen reflected the strong anti-monopoly sentiments of their constituents. They wanted to protect the small producers and distributors against the menace of big business and to protect the consumer against monopoly prices.
But Congress and the people, suffering, as it were, from a split personality in their economic thinking, thought they wanted something else, something contradictory; they believed they needed to protect domestic manufacturers against foreign competition. Hence we find protective tariffs growing up side by side with anti-trust laws. On the one hand, Americans denounced and penalized restraint of trade, and on the other, by shutting out foreign competition, created conditions favorable to combination among domestic producers. Woodrow Wilson saw the connection between the trusts and the tariff. "For a long time . . . we have sought in our tariff schedules," he told the Congress in 1913, "to give each group of manufacturers or producers what they themselves thought they needed in order to maintain a practically exclusive market against the rest of the world. Consciously, or unconsciously, we have built up a set of privileges and exemptions from competition behind which it was easy by any, even the crudest, forms of combination to organize monopoly. . . ."
Most economists would deny that the tariff has been the sole or even the primary cause of business combinations. Conceding that the tariff might be the mother of some of the trusts, they ascribe the paternity of all of them to the newly discovered economies of large-scale production and large-scale management. But Taussig, the leading tariff authority of his day, found definite evidence that the drift toward monopoly conditions was "promoted" by protective import duties. In the case of sugar refining he found that the monopoly had been "both easier to bring about and a source of greater profit, because of the protective duty. . . ."
Within the past decade the long struggle against business monopolies in the United States has moved into the area of foreign trade. Thurman Arnold, becoming in 1938 the head of the Department of Justice's anti-trust division, launched a series of indictments against American firms which had participated in international cartels. Since that time the Department has initiated more than 50 suits charging that cartels have restrained American export and import trade by fixing prices, by restricting production, and by dividing world markets. The Department's charges have not been sustained in all the cases which have come to trial, but enough admitted facts have been spread on the record to indicate that a substantial part of American foreign trade, somewhere between 15 and 20 percent by value, has been conducted under agreements controlling competition between American and foreign firms.
In reviewing the cartel cases, one is struck by the frequency with which the protective tariff is connected with this new aspect of our monopoly problem. In 1940 Clair Wilcox, in an investigation for the T.N.E.C., found evidence of American participation, either direct or indirect, in international cartels controlling the sale of aluminum, copper, dental supplies, electric lamps, ferromanganese, lead, leather, paraffin, potash, quinine, railroad cars, rayon, rubber thread, steel tubes, sulfur, tin plate, titanium and zinc. With two exceptions, potash and quinine, the producers of all of these items are beneficiaries of tariff protection. Corwin Edwards, a few years later in a report prepared for the Kilgore Committee, listed 105 cartelized commodities or groups of commodities, of which 90 were dutiable when imported into this country. Anyone conversant with tariff history will recognize at once among the indicted firms the names of companies that for years have fought energetically and successfully to secure high import duties for their products -- for example, matches, plate glass, rayon, dyestuffs, optical instruments.
This interrelation between cartels and tariffs is not fortuitous. As Professor Walton Hamilton pointed out in the July issue of this magazine,[iii] cartels are one method by which businessmen with international interests have attempted to make their adjustment to autarchic restrictions on trade imposed by the tariff laws of many countries, including those of the United States. A rather different view was held during the optimistic 1920's. Then European publicists were advocating cartels as a substitute for tariffs. According to this notion, businessmen, if allowed to set up their own controls of international trade, would cease to demand that national states should control it by import duties. But the course of events was different. Actually, cartelized industries -- iron and steel, chemicals, rayon and aluminum -- have continued to demand that tariffs in their respective domestic markets be maintained at a high level. They have found tariffs useful as a bargaining weapon when new cartel negotiations are in progress. Also, when cartels break down, as frequently happens, they cling to the tariff as a secondary line of defense against the competition of their former business associates. It is true that in some international business agreements in which American firms have participated our tariff has not been a large factor. In copper and electrical appliances, for example, American firms have dominated the domestic market and have been strong contenders in foreign markets. But in general it will be found that cartels supplement and reinforce the restrictions on foreign trade imposed by import tariffs and do not replace them. This truth is now being recognized in the Administration's foreign trade policy, which by a simultaneous attack on both cartels and tariffs aims to cure our economic schizophrenia.
A more active import trade, induced by lifting cartel restrictions and reducing tariffs, would help directly in the perennial American struggle against monopoly. Indirectly, freer imports would help to perpetuate the class of small businessmen which constitutes such a valuable element in our democracy. In the past few years some of the larger department stores have expanded their sales of imported goods and are planning to carry this policy further as soon as more foreign products become available. But it is still true that the importation of consumers' goods such as watches, linens, laces and embroideries, and fancy groceries, is typically a small business, often carried on by a single entrepreneur using his own capital and aided by only a small staff of employees. Furthermore, the foreign goods which he handles become in turn the stock in trade of small shops in all parts of the country.
For the enterprising small retailer, imported goods provide new and distinctive merchandise which are a valuable supplement to the standardized mass production articles of domestic manufacture. Before the war small department stores, women's ready-to-wear and specialty shops, gift shops and linen shops sold Irish and Czech linens, French, Chinese and Belgian laces and embroideries, Swedish and Bohemian glassware, German and Japanese chinaware. Retail jewelers, who make their living chiefly by selling watches, found Swiss wristwatches a fast-moving item. Imported whiskies and other liquors were sold at retail largely by small dealers. Neighborhood delicatessens carried a varied stock of imported fancy groceries, Portuguese sardines, Japanese tuna fish and crab meat, Russian caviar, Polish hams, and cheeses and honey from a dozen foreign countries. When, after 1940, imports from most of Europe were cut off, importers made a vigorous attempt to supply their trade with substitute merchandise from other parts of the globe, chiefly from Latin America.
Historically, war and trade have been the principal mediums by which culture has been diffused from centers such as ancient Egypt, Greece and Rome to distant lands. In school and college we were taught to marvel at the rapidity with which traders in olden times scattered the knowledge of new fabrics, new metals, new industrial arts over the world; but we are less well aware that foreign trade still has an important cultural function. It is easy to see that the exportation of American sewing machines and refrigerators into central Africa, or the mountains of Bolivia, or the jungles of the upper Amazon helps to raise standards of living in those areas. But the United States can receive as well as transmit culture through foreign trade; even in an advanced industrial country like our own, imports exert an energizing force on cultural standards. Textiles afford numerous illustrations of this process. Embroidered handkerchiefs imported from Switzerland add variety and color to American women's wardrobes, for example. But the imports do not supply nearly the total demand; as soon as a design has proved popular it is immediately imitated in quantity by American manufacturers and sold at a somewhat lower price than the imported articles. Next season the Swiss send over new designs, and so the process of innovation and imitation continues. Velvet imports had a similar history. When plush velvets went out of style importers introduced chiffon velvet, and domestic firms promptly copied it. Driven out of that line by domestic competition, importers developed an erect pile velvet for the American market. When that also was successfully copied, they brought in a third product, transparent velvet.
The process of enriching American life through imports is taking place constantly in a great variety of forms. The ribbed woolen hose so popular with men were first introduced from England, as were also gabardine trench coats. An American manufacturer regularly advertises the fact that his shoes are so faithfully copied from English models that even the most discriminating purchaser cannot detect the difference. For generations American manufacturers of women's hats and dresses have followed the style leadership of the Parisian couturiers.
But, it may be asked, why must we import French fabrics, English shoes, or Paris gowns in order to get the benefit of foreign pioneering in styles? Why not let representative American shops and factories procure the designs abroad and do away with imports? That is possible and is occurring constantly, but it is risky business. The design may look promising, it may prove popular abroad, but will it "take" in New York, Chicago or Kansas City? That question is usually answered by the importer; he takes a chance, brings in a limited supply of the novelty, repeats his order if he makes a killing, and is always prepared to introduce new designs as soon as domestic competition catches up with him.
Most Americans, on reflection, would agree that in clothing, house furnishings, and interior decoration this country has benefited and can still benefit from foreign -- particularly European -- leadership in style. In invention and machine design, on the other hand, Yankee ingenuity has often given us leadership. Yet even here we can learn from foreigners. We are apt to forget that the gas-engine automobile was originally developed abroad and that even after its successful domestication on this side of the Atlantic, American manufacturers took over various improvements which had first been tried out by French, German and English producers. The recent progress of the British in the development of radar, television and jet propulsion indicates that in engineering Great Britain may still make great contributions to our civilization.
Swiss watches show how foreign trade facilitates a cross fertilization in engineering and design. American factories first demonstrated that interchangeable parts of watches as well as clocks could be made by machinery, and the Yankee dollar watch, really a pocket clock, was exported to a wide market. The Swiss watchmakers, taking a leaf from our book, soon developed a cheap timepiece of their own which competed in third markets. But in making good, low-cost, 15-jewel watches the Swiss showed real competitive superiority. They were responsible for taking the American businessman's watch out of his vest pocket and putting it on his wrist. Importers of Swiss watches also first introduced into this country a practical small wristwatch for women's use and also pioneered in rectangular, oval and other non-circular movements and non-magnetic, waterproof and shockproof watches. All of these innovations were eventually adopted by domestic manufacturers after the importers had demonstrated that they added to the saleability of the product.
The outlook for a liberal import policy is now much brighter than after World War I. At that time economic isolationism, partly induced by the collapse of the postwar boom, and partly a sympathetic response to the political philosophy that rejected the League of Nations, replaced the low rates of the 1913 tariff with the record-breaking tariffs of 1921 and 1922. This time, we have many proofs of the willingness of Congress, reflecting strong popular sentiment, to go along with a well-defined program of international coöperation. The extension of the Trade Agreements Act, the approval of the Bretton Woods monetary plans, the decision to join the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, and finally the ratification by the United States Senate of the Charter of the United Nations -- all these indicate an attitude far different from that which prevailed a quarter of a century ago.
The action of the 79th Congress in extending the life of the 1934 Trade Agreements Act for a new term of three years, with an important amendment substantially enlarging the President's powers, places the responsibility for postwar tariff policy squarely upon the Executive. Should President Truman be disposed to use his new powers to the limit, he could cut in half all the tariff rates as they existed on January 1, 1945. Taking into account reductions already made in 11 years of tariff bargaining, he would be able to reduce many import duties to only 25 percent of the rates fixed in the Hawley-Smoot Act. The power is there, but no one expects that the President will use it so drastically. In fact, the danger lies in the opposite direction, for Mr. Truman has given the Congress explicit assurance that he will make no trade agreements which would endanger industrial, agricultural or labor interests. This blanket commitment, it is hoped, will not prevent the Department of State from negotiating new agreements on a broader basis, especially with the United Kingdom and Canada. Such action would probably find strong support in public opinion, for radio and newspaper comment, as well as Congressional hearings and debates, show a new tactical situation. The low-tariff team now has the ball; the protectionists are on the defensive and, in industrial areas at least, are steadily losing ground. Important sections of American industry no longer tremble at warnings of competition from "pauper labor," and this confident attitude is shared by the workers. James Carey, Secretary-Treasurer of the CIO, recently told the Senate Finance Committee that in 1940 less than 2,000,000 out of 45,000,000 gainfully employed men and women were working in industries benefiting from tariff protection.
The pattern of Congressional voting on the extension of the Trade Agreements Act may indicate a new geographical line-up on the tariff. With but few exceptions, representatives from districts in the country's great manufacturing centers, clear across the continent from New York and Philadelphia to Seattle and Los Angeles, supported the low-tariff policy. Boston and the industrial cities of eastern Massachusetts and Rhode Island, according to these votes, seem to be the last urban strongholds of uncompromising protectionism. It would, of course, be a mistake to interpret the Congressmen's votes simply on the basis of the economic interests of their constituents. Party allegiance was no doubt a large factor, though it is difficult to tell where party politics stops and economic influences begin. It is possible that the Democratic Party's control of the principal industrial cities rests in part upon popular approval of that party's low-tariff program.
Although tariff reduction has gained ground on a broad industrial front, isolated pockets of resistance still remain, in communities manufacturing woolen textiles, gloves, glassware, chinaware, watches, cutlery and hardware. Singly, or even in combination, these interests are not strong enough to reverse national policy in the direction of protection, but they may become formidable if supported by allies in the agricultural and mining areas. In these areas, excepting the Solid South, Congressmen consistently voted against the enlargement of the President's powers to reduce tariffs.
To assure a generous flow of imports into the United States tariff reduction is essential. It is true that imports, particularly raw materials, follow the curve of national income. If we can keep our industries operating at full capacity in the postwar years, we may expect that they will purchase abroad large quantities of foreign minerals, textile fibers, and fats and oils. But there will be no dollar-for-dollar relationship between increased income and increased imports. Compared with countries like Canada and the United Kingdom, our "marginal propensity to import" is small; according to de Vegh's calculations [iv] the addition of a dollar to our national income gives rise to only seven cents' worth of additional imports. Moreover, the expansion of our national income principally stimulates imports of raw materials. To stimulate imports of consumers' goods, government action is needed to reduce import duties, to simplify customs formalities, and to make commercial intelligence available to importers.
But first let us see what the importers can do to help themselves. Studies of the Tariff Commission and the Treasury have called attention to the high costs of marketing imported merchandise, the mark-ups being regularly higher than in handling domestic trade. Traditionally, importers of consumers' goods have been content to bring in small quantities of high-priced specialties to be sold to a limited clientele. For this situation high import duties which tended to limit imports to luxury goods have been partly responsible. But just before World War II disrupted trade, a few large department stores had discovered the possibilities of mass merchandising of foreign-made bicycles, chinaware, men's furnishings, and food specialties, and as soon as V-E Day had been announced their buyers were in Europe planning the resumption of a vigorous import campaign. The economical handling of foreign goods, however, is not limited to large business units; small specialty stores in various parts of the country have found that by forming buying syndicates they can considerably reduce the costs of importing.
The Department of Commerce's announcement late in 1944 of a policy of active assistance to importers is revolutionary. Hitherto, the importer had few friends in Washington outside the State Department, which was responsible for negotiating trade agreements. The Tariff Commission went to the importers for information, but could offer little comfort in return, being bound by the impossible requirements of cost comparisons. The Treasury officials, while not actively hostile, considered it their duty to protect the revenue. That meant giving the government, not the importer, the benefit of the doubt wherever the law permitted any discretion, and in general administering with uncompromising rigor a mass of intricate customs regulations. The Department of Commerce has long had a Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, but in this connection "foreign" has meant only "export." Mr. Hoover, as Secretary of Commerce and later as President, spent millions in building up a large corps of commercial attachés and trade commissioners who provided American exporters with effective aid in marketing their goods abroad, but long-established policies strictly limited the help these officials might give to American importers. Now it appears that the Department has abandoned this one-way conception of its foreign trade functions. Secretary Wallace wrote recently: "If we are to avoid the mistakes of the twenties, it is important that we start now specialized research to discover just what types of imports will best help the economy of the United States. We must learn to look on imports as a benefit to the United States, not as a damage." When legislators as well as administrators adopt this way of looking at imports we may expect that foreign goods will be allowed to make their full contribution to national welfare.
Americans will not die, nor will the United States cease to exist, if we fail to increase our imports. But we shall not live as well as we might, nor as safely. This is a rich country. The high productivity of our industry gives us abundant supplies of purchasing power in foreign markets. Unlike Britain, we are under no pressure to restrict imports in order to bring our international accounts into balance. On the contrary, we cannot hope to balance them without expanding our purchases abroad. Yet, with all our riches, we have persisted in playing the miser, spending in normal years less than one percent of our national income on consumers' goods of foreign manufacture. Instead of reaching out for the useful, appetizing and beautiful things which foreigners are so eager to supply, we put up tariff walls to protect ourselves against prosperity and abundance. If we will adopt a new attitude toward imports, if we will accept them and make the most of them, we shall increase national security, we shall provide the competitive stimulus necessary to maintain our free-enterprise system at a high pitch of efficiency, and we shall enable our people to attain the high cultural standards befitting a rich and powerful nation.
[i] Elmer Walter Pehrson, "Our Mineral Resources and Security," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, July 1945.
[ii] Evan Just, "A National Mineral Policy," Engineering and Mining Journal, April 1945.
[iii] Walton Hamilton, "Cartels, Patents and Politics," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, July 1945.
[iv] Imre de Vegh, "Imports and Income in the United States and Canada," Review of Economic Statistics, Vol. 23, 1941, p. 133.