THE Atlantic Pact Governments are recommending that the West German Federal Republic be admitted to the Western supra-national community and that West German troops be integrated with the mutual defense organization which they wish to bring into being as rapidly as possible. At the same time Western public opinion, particularly in Western Europe, has frequently voiced doubts as to the expediency of this policy.

The thesis that Germany should be neutralized rather than integrated with the West is based on several arguments. To begin with, there is a belief that a neutral Germany would serve as a buffer zone between the two power blocs of opposed social systems, help relieve the tension between them and diminish the danger of war. Secondly, there is anxiety lest Germany, having risen from being a mere object of policy for the occupying Powers to become once again an active element in her own right, might soon develop into a dangerous factor of power within the Western world. As Le Monde puts it, in what is probably an accurate expression of the present French feeling: "That autocratic and militaristic apparatus which was responsible for two devastating wars and the ruin of Europe would rise again, despite the democratic and peace-loving tendencies which are present in Germany for the first time." In other words, when Germany became aware of her recovered strength she would again develop aggressive inclinations and, driven by the desire to regain her lost territories in the East, draw her future coalition partners into a war. Finally, there is the fear that a rearmed Germany might join forces with the Soviets and turn the very guns which had been purchased with American means against the West, repeating the reversal of fronts which the Prussians executed in the winter of 1812-13 when they signed the Tauroggen Convention with the Russians. Those who oppose Germany's rearmament also point out that her military contribution would be of doubtful value to the West on account of the strong demand for neutrality made by various groups within the Federal Republic.

Now the idea that the neutralization of Germany might help avoid another world war and at the same time relieve her Western neighbors from the nightmare of a new threat arising from her regained strength is indeed so tempting that we must look into its actual possibilities and form a judgment regarding it. It would be a mistake, however, to study the question of German neutrality as a separate problem. It should be scrutinized in the general setting of the world situation created by the opposition of the social systems of East and West.


The conflict between Bolshevism and the nations of the free world has reached a decisive stage. The final victory of Bolshevism and the defeat of the "capitalist," that is, non-Bolshevist, world is the long-range goal of the Kremlin. This has been made clear again and again as a matter of principle in Lenin-Stalinist theses as well as in an uncompromising series of actions in Soviet politics.

Granted that the determination of the United States to hold its ground, rouse the Western nations from their lethargy and build up their defenses has somewhat shaken Soviet hopes that the internal decline and disintegration of the Western nations might in the end save them a long war. Yet the Soviets will keep on striving to realize their imperialist aims without actually letting the cold war turn hot. Their tactics are to create local trouble spots through restricted acts of aggression, civil wars and strikes in order to shatter the Western economy, increase social tension, feed the discontent of the masses and thus prepare them for the infiltration of Bolshevist ideas.

Such endeavors may receive considerable support from the colonial and semi-colonial peoples of Asia and Africa who are in the process of trying to emancipate themselves. As early as 1927, at the Congress Against Colonial Oppression held in Brussels, the Soviets inaugurated a policy of encouraging rising nationalism in those countries which, as a "third force," may become a decisive threat to the economic structure of the West and to its capacity to defend itself.

Parallel with their efforts to wrest one position after another from the West through the cold war, the Soviets keep on arming for a hot war. They steadily raise their defense production, decentralize their industry and evacuate their essential war plants to the Far Eastern areas in order to reduce the effectiveness of enemy air attacks. They intensify stockpiling. They expand the industries of the satellite countries and exploit them for their own defense purposes. They redouble their efforts to catch up with the West in the development of atom and hydrogen bombs. In spite of all this, a considerable time must still elapse before the Soviets will have pushed their preparations to the point where they would be in a position to conduct a lengthy war.

On the other hand, it is now too late for Soviet Russia to wage a preventive war. She no longer is able by a limited superiority in equipment and personnel to force a decision which would be so disadvantageous to the Western Powers that they never again could find their feet. Present relative strengths leave hardly any doubt that a Soviet surprise attack would succeed and that Soviet armies would rapidly push forward to the Rhine, probably even to the Atlantic. Certainly the difficulties thereby caused to the Western defense situation should not be underestimated. However, the arrival of the Communist forces at the Atlantic coast would not be decisive. A decisive advantage would be achieved only after they had captured all the air bases from which Western air forces could strike decisive blows against Soviet weak spots and after they had taken all the bridgeheads whence counterattacks could be launched—in other words, if the Soviets succeeded in occupying and holding all Europe from the North Cape down the Atlantic coast through Spain to North Africa, as well as that area itself and the Near East. For this purpose, however, present Soviet forces are insufficient, particularly in view of the fact that Western defenses are increasing month by month. Also, the inefficient network of communications in Eastern Europe would delay the arrival of reinforcements from inner Russia to such an extent that the West would have ample time to take counteraction.

From all that we know about Stalin, we may assume that he is not likely to plunge into military hazards and foolishly risk his life accomplishments. If he makes war, he will see to it that the risks involved have been reduced to a minimum. He will soberly weigh the key factors and decide to bring about the final showdown only after Soviet preparations have reached a climax, and political as well as economic stability have been established in his own domain. Until then, the Kremlin will have to put up with the "peaceful coexistence" of the two social systems.

The Soviets, of course, do not use this period only to reinforce their own position. They seek at the same time to weaken the West and thus improve the conditions for a final decision. By aggression at second hand, through satellite nations, they engage parts of the Western defense forces at fronts which are of little importance to the total operation. And by bribery, propaganda and intimidation they try to prevent the formation of an integrated front in the West and to undermine the will for defense which has just started to rise there. Thus they use every opportunity to extend their power and weaken their antagonists, the while carefully avoiding a direct clash between Soviet and American troops, well aware that this would risk the long war for which they are not yet prepared.


The Western Powers know what countermeasures are needed against the Kremlin. They seek to stabilize the Western economy to stand against any crisis and to immunize the free world against Soviet seduction by relieving internal social tensions. And they reinforce their own military capacity so as to deter Soviet political and military aggression. They realize that modern political, economic and strategic conditions no longer permit individual nations to lead isolated existences and that selfish barriers of national politics and national economy must be removed in order to prepare the way to a free future. Not only will the merging of small national economies into a large community by the removal of trade barriers cause a tremendous rise in business activity in the Western World, but a fairer participation in profits by the individual will build up moral strength in the West to such an extent that eventually it will become immune to all attempts at Soviet infiltration. What is more, it will gain sufficient strength to penetrate the Soviet-dominated area with psychological and spiritual weapons. All nations of the non-Bolshevist world, including the peoples of Asia and Africa, must be admitted on a par to the Western community, thus winning for the West the "third force" which will decide the future political shape of the international situation.

However, even on the assumption that Stalin does not for the moment want a war, we are not relieved from the duty of building our strength. Wars do not break out only when they are "desirable" to one or other of the two opponents. In most cases they are the product of a complex of circumstances, or the unexpected result of developments understood too late. If Soviet Russia were to realize that she must abandon hope of the Western world's internal disintegration and if she were pushed onto the defensive, politically and economically, she might feel tempted to use her military power. The West at that moment must be so strong that it can issue a warning to the Soviets with more emphasis than England and France were able to muster in addressing Hitler in 1938-39. The Kremlin must be made to realize that a resort to force will involve the risk of total defeat, the loss of everything it has gained in the past decades and more besides. And Western strength is not only necessary to check Soviet expansion; it is needed also to hearten elements of resistance in the East European countries and even within the Soviet Union itself.

These ideas are familiar in Germany.[i] The knowledge that all free nations are inescapably linked by a common fate has come to dominate German public opinion to an increasing degree. More and more it is the guiding factor of German national decisions.


Germany lies between the power blocs of East and West, split in two by the Iron Curtain; the German people know that if there is war between East and West their country will be a battlefield, that the tanks of one Power will roll over their fields while the planes of the other will bomb their cities. The knowledge, then, that the Soviets will be defeated by the Western Powers in the long run is but poor consolation. The future existence of Germany will be determined in the first phase of the war.

But the Germans also know—they only have to look across to their compatriots on the other side of the Iron Curtain—what they would lose if the Soviets succeeded in drawing them into their domain. They would lose their freedom and their culture and become slaves in a system of cruelty and terror.

Even more than other Western peoples, the Germans yearn to be spared a war which, regardless of its final outcome, would be fatal to their country. They equally yearn to be spared the fate of Bolshevist slavery which particularly threatens them because of their country's geographical situation. Avoidance of these two dangers is the overriding aim of their policy.

Soviet policy toward the German Federal Republic is also determined by two particular factors:

1. Germany's economic strength and efficiency, her manpower and her key geographical position in control of the European traffic system make her a prize to be separated from the West and incorporated in the Soviet realm. To this end, encouragement is given to Western anxieties regarding the military and political hegemony which Germany might exercise in Europe once she had been rearmed and given the same privileges as her European partners: in order to make her seem an impossible ally in Western eyes, the Soviets strive to create the impression that she is still thoroughly Fascist. Simultaneously, the West Germans are threatened with armed intervention in the event German rearmament takes place. Skillfully playing on national resentment and sentiment, Moscow seeks to make the Germans themselves dismiss the proposal of a German military contribution to the Western community as psychologically impracticable.

2. The Soviets aim to make the Western Powers—above all, the United States—withdraw from Western Germany. This would serve a double purpose. For one thing, it would increase the Soviet chance of some day taking possession of the Ruhr intact. The indispensable factor here is that the Western Powers be manœuvred by political means into withdrawing behind the Meuse—that is to say, that this be done without fighting. Furthermore, Moscow realizes that the chances for the Western nations to resist a Soviet attack in Europe would diminish as their area for preparing defensive operations narrowed. They therefore miss no opportunity to rouse German suspicions against the Western Powers. Great play is made with the illusion of a Germany relieved from the burden of the occupation and living happily and tranquilly between the two rival power blocs. Indeed, the Soviets might even go so far as to put up with German reunification, if that would make American soldiers vanish from the border which separates the East and West Zones, where their presence today means that a Soviet attempt to cross it would start a great war.

In view of the foregoing, the aims of Western policy should be as follows:

1. To strengthen German morale and to continue efforts to immunize the Germans against Soviet infiltration, with the object of preventing Soviet expansion into Western Europe by cold war methods.

2. To preserve Germany's economic capacity for the West and to deny it to the Soviets.

3. To keep a firm hold on West German territory up to the border between the East and West Zones, since this area would be required for effective flexible defense on modern strategic principles. If the Western defense were limited to the area west of the Meuse the Western forces would be prevented from expanding sufficiently. Their airfields, communications, supply depots and ports of debarkation would be crowded together on a narrow strip of land where they would be continuously vulnerable to attack by the Soviet air force.


Before we turn to whether these three requirements of Western policy could be fulfilled if Germany were neutralized, we should first ask whether neutrality is, in fact, conceivable for Germany if war should break out between the two Great Power blocs. A country can stay neutral only under one of three conditions. Either it has to be so strong that neither of the antagonists can afford to attack it without considerably lessening its own fighting capacity; or its geographical position must be particularly strong—as is the case, for instance, with Switzerland; or it must lie so far "out of the way" that recognition of its neutrality does not restrict the operations of the fighting nations. To these three historical conditions for neutrality should today be added a fourth: the unanimous desire of the whole people to stay neutral. Fifth columns, Quislings and political parties backing either of the outside antagonists may make neutrality collapse from within.

Not one of the foregoing conditions for neutrality is applicable in the case of Germany. The supporters of neutralization believe, nevertheless, that Germany might be kept out of a potential war between East and West if only the two opponents could be induced to guarantee her neutrality. But in a war between the Soviets and the West not two nations, and not two groups of nations, but two whole worlds would be facing each other. The entire northern hemisphere would become a battlefield. And Germany stands precisely where the two worlds meet, placed so that it would be impossible for either of the two to "pass her by." The Ruhr and the Central European network of communications must always tempt one antagonist to possess Western Germany, the other to take Western Germany away from him. Neither will therefore be able to guarantee German neutrality in sincerity unless both have dropped entirely the idea that the conflict may be settled by force. The probability of this happening is so slight that neither the Germans nor the Western world can base their vital decisions on it.

But if Germany cannot preserve her neutrality by her own means, and if neither the Soviets nor the nations of the free world can in sincerity guarantee it, then the concept of neutrality can never become, as its supporters hope, a contribution to peace and world disarmament. Quite the contrary. Weak and vulnerable spots, particularly in areas of economic and strategic interest, are a greater menace to peace than two opposed Powers of more or less equal strength. A vacuum has drawing power.

The neutralization of Germany would be bound to entail the withdrawal of the occupying Powers. Only in that case could Germany assume the role of "buffer" imagined by the "neutralists." Only so, also, would the Soviets agree to it, since the whole value of German neutrality in their eyes lies in the fact that it would get the Americans out of the West German Federal Republic. But that withdrawal would cause an explosion of all the inner German political and social conflicts which so far have been kept under control through the presence of the occupying Powers. Fifth columns would get to work; riots, strikes and civil war would break out. There is no doubt that the well-prepared underground movements of the Communist Party, aided by the People's Police of the Soviet Zone—an organization especially trained for fighting against "enemies of the people"—would quickly introduce a Soviet-supported régime of terror. Abandoned by the Western Powers, the freedom-loving forces in Germany would lose their capacity for resistance. It is simply absurd to believe that a Germany troubled within, threatened by Soviet troops from without, and defenseless and feeble in the very center of a vast international dispute, would be able to summon sufficient moral and spiritual strength to build a bridge between the two social systems.

Let it be granted that a neutralized Germany—a "buffer" between East and West, as the popular phrase goes—might relieve the tension temporarily. This, of course, is the Soviet aim, on the assumption that the nations of the West would fall back into their old lethargy and discord which for the time being have been dissipated by the feeling of common danger. The Soviets push ahead wherever they detect a weak spot. A vacuum in Germany would offer them a tempting chance to improve their position.

The possibility of neutrality for a country located between two hostile economic systems depends also on certain economic conditions. The would-be neutral either has to be self-supporting, or must be of so little economic importance that it does not constitute a prize worth striving for. Neither condition applies to Germany. The likelihood of success of a bilateral control system, based on a Soviet-Western agreement not to attempt to exploit Germany's economic capacity from either side, can readily be imagined. And if it was observed in good faith, the effect would be to keep the German standard of living at a low level and thus make the German people all the more susceptible to Soviet infiltration. And even if no attempt were consciously made to restrict the economy of a neutral German state, trade relations between Germany and the West would be bound to be severed; the West would reason that it was dangerous to build up a German economy that might fall as a prize to the Soviets; or, at the least, that such a Germany was a funnel through which Western economic strength would pour into Russia. The upshot would be that the Iron Curtain would move westward from the present eastern border of the Federal Republic to the eastern frontiers of France and the Benelux countries, while Germany, merged in the Soviet economic system, would rapidly sink to the level of her Sovietized neighbors.

And if war should come between East and West, with Germany neutralized, the military factor thus created would be decisive. The Soviets would not have evacuated even one percent of the territory which they now control in Europe, whereas the Western Powers would have given up more than 11 percent of the area which they dominate, equivalent to about 30 percent of the area between the present East-West border and the Atlantic. They would be pushed back into the exceedingly narrow corner of the Continent.

To sum up, one may say that the neutralization of Germany would not help to prevent a war, but would weaken the position of the West from both the moral and economic point of view and would greatly reduce, if not critically destroy, the chances of successful military operations should war in fact come.


The integration of Western Germany within a supra-national Western community is the only course which will equip her with sufficient moral firmness to hold her own. If she knows that she need not rely entirely on her own strength, still weakened from the aftermath of total defeat, but will find assistance and support in the common front of all free nations, she will be able to resist the tactics of Soviet political warfare. Moreover, as part of the Western community she can serve as a "show case" for the material and moral values which the West offers to individuals in Eastern Germany and the East European countries now suffering from Soviet terror; by force of example she can help restore their hope and build up their will to regain the freedom they have lost. But to set up a community of the free nations without German participation would be to block the way for any further eastward integration which might finally include all peoples unwilling to bear the Soviet yoke.

Only the integration of Western Germany with the other Western nations will enable her to develop her economic forces in free competition with them and in such a manner as to help achieve the common aims of the whole Western community. These aims are to increase defense production in order to secure peace, and to make life worth living for every individual—in other words, to enable the least privileged classes to realize the advantages of Western freedom over Soviet dictatorship. The inclusion of the German economy as part of this process becomes even more important because of the larger tasks faced by the West in developing the world's backward countries and in incorporating this "third force" also into the Western economic system.

Only the integration of Western Germany with the West will in the long run preserve the space needed by the Western Powers to defend themselves successfully against potential Soviet aggression on the European Continent. Some military experts say that the Central European battlefield would play only a minor role in a war between the Western Powers and the Soviets, reasoning that the Soviets would not take aggressive action in that area. It is true, of course, that the further west the Central European front is moved, the greater the Soviet disadvantage due to the increasing distance; however great might be their efforts to base their supply service as largely as possible on the industry and agriculture of the German Soviet Zone and the satellites, the Russians would constantly have to receive additional supplies from inner Russia. It is pointed out rightly that, in this event, the "road of starvation" between Warsaw and Moscow which was fatal first to Napoleon and then to Hitler would become a problem to them in reverse, and that every further step which the Russians took into Western Europe would, so long as North Africa and the Near East were still in Western hands, stretch their flanks and damage their strategic position. There is indeed something to be said for the theory that in another war the Soviets would once again try to turn to advantage Russia's vast depth and poor traffic system, and hence might base their strategy upon defense of their own territory. If they inclined to take preventive measures with a view to improving the conditions for such a strategy, these measures would consist of an attack in the direction of the Suez Canal—to break the claws of the Western pincers, to eliminate the air bases in the Near East which would otherwise become particularly dangerous to Russian industrial centers, and finally to get possession of Persian oil.

But let us remember, first, that this is theoretical; and second, that none of it means that in case of war the Soviets would refrain from any military action in Western Europe, particularly under conditions of Western weakness in the area between the East-West zonal border and the Atlantic. A local and limited Soviet raid toward and across the Rhine will always have to be expected, unless the Western Powers become so strong beyond the Rhine that the Soviet forces would feel the need of engaging them at a point where their operations could not be decisive. The danger for the Western economy of such a Soviet penetration into the industrial center of Europe is obvious, as are the devastating effects which it would have on the morale of the Western European peoples, quite aside from the losses caused in personnel and matériel.

In order to counter this danger it is necessary to be able to mobilize all available forces at the point which, though possibly of secondary interest from the point of view of operations, is of particular strategic importance. It is in relation to this necessity that the question of a German military contribution should be studied. The object of Western policy is twofold: to give the Germans—soldiers with special experience in fighting the Russians—a chance to defend their own soil as members of a supranational military organization; and at the same time to bring a considerable reinforcement to the Western potential. A German military contribution would also have psychological importance. All the nations of the Western world would in that case be united in a common effort to ward off the Soviet menace, regardless of the ancient hereditary feuds and discords which may have separated them in the past. The German people would be given a sense of security, their self-confidence would be awakened and they would be brought to realize their own responsibilities—both for their own future and for the future of Western civilization.

Will a rearmed Germany be a danger to the West? Warnings have frequently been given that a draft of German troops would rouse a new militarist and imperialist spirit in Germany, and that this would again crush all efforts to build up a peaceful democracy there. But such warnings do not take account of the change that has taken place in the German social system. The abuses of a criminal régime, the loss of two wars, the experiences of two inflations, and the expulsion of millions of East Germans from their homes and soil have brought a vast majority of the German people to a realization that the old road which led them over the precipice must not again be trodden. Most Germans know that the ideas which gave the German soldier a disproportionate influence in the country's social structure are obsolete. The reluctance of the Germans to take up arms again is genuine—hard to believe abroad though that may be. It will be overcome when the German people realize that they must protect themselves against Bolshevism; but it will help to prevent any attempt of the military to increase their influence in the state beyond fixed limits. A future German military force will be supported by the people, and will in turn contribute to Germany's military and moral strength, only if it seeks to train the people to defend their democratic freedom as responsible citizens and avoids any attempt to impose an autocratic system.

The concern of Germany's immediate neighbors that the poilu will have to go to war some day to help the displaced German peasant from Silesia get back his farm overlooks a number of factors. In the first place, once German units have been integrated with a supra-national army, and once the nation has become part of a Western community, a common view and policy will tend to develop. The suspicion that the Germans will follow a line of their own, diverging from their coalition partners, is, I think, unfounded. Again, let us remember that the deepest desire of the German people is to be spared another war. Even the spokesmen for the German expellees from the Eastern Zone have repeatedly stated that the way back to their old homes must not lead by new-dug soldiers' graves. The final settlement of the refugee problem, and of Germany's future relations with her Eastern neighbors, must be arranged peacefully and on a supra-national level after a careful consideration of the vital needs of the individual nations concerned.

Fear lest the Germans, once they had been rearmed, would reverse fronts and join the Soviets is based on a total misapprehension of the German situation. The Germans realize well that the free world could not tolerate a German-Soviet alliance which soon would come to dominate the European Continent, and hence that the formation of such an alliance would automatically bring about war. That is precisely what the Germans want to avoid. The more closely Germany is integrated with the West, especially as regards her economy and her defense, the less point or chance there will be in her trying to break out of the community.

No Western nation knows the Soviets—their terror, their cruelty, their brutal totalitarianism—as thoroughly as do the Germans. To compare what might happen now with what happened at Tauroggen a century and a half ago is to miss the point entirely. When the Prussians under General Yorck broke the coalition with Napoleon and entered into an alliance with Russia they were withdrawing from slavery and choosing the way to freedom. Today, a Tauroggen would mean the reverse: Germany would be leaping from freedom into slavery.


One further argument is used against the rearmament of Western Germany and her integration into the Western community—namely, that large parts of the German people themselves are opposed to it. The point is made that the idea would be so openly rejected in Germany that the West would suffer a decline rather than a rise of moral strength. In this connection references are made to the strong echo which the views expressed by Mr. Niemoeller and other advocates of neutrality have found among the population.

The actual fact is, however, that the majority of the German people feel that they belong to the West. They know that Germany is a Western nation and that it is of utmost importance for her to be closely connected with the countries of the free world. The misgivings about a military contribution to Western strength spring from fear that it represents a first step toward another war, and from grave concern that it would postpone indefinitely the reunification of German territories severed by the Potsdam Agreement. Popular judgment is often clouded by resentment and a certain distrust, typical of the German people under present conditions, which puts them in continual fear of being used by a foreign Power for its own purposes. The German people have been slow in readjusting themselves psychologically from their role as an object of policy to that of being an active element—from demilitarization, with all its unpleasant if understandable characteristics, to rearmament. At any rate, they could not keep pace with the speed at which the resurrection of the German soldier was prepared, in political terms and in actual practice, at Petersberg and in Paris. A readjustment of that size needs time and patience.

The German people are beginning by degrees to understand that integration with the Western community protects their own interests just as much as it helps the entire Western World; that the purpose of rearmament is not to cause war but to prevent it; that restoration of German unity will be beneficial only if it brings freedom to the Germans on the other side of the Iron Curtain and not if it means slavery for all Germans in the long run; and that the best chance for it lies in making it part of the question of the freedom of all the anti-Soviet nations.

Germans who believe in a Western brotherhood and the necessity of forming a firm front against the Bolshevik menace have a single aim: to speed the process of psychological readjustment. They believe that their particular task is to try to overcome resentments and suspicions by reasoned argument and personal example. They know that the German people must be convinced that the Western World realizes the pointlessness of harnessing three fast race horses with a fourth whose front legs have been tied together. Confidence must be mutual if there is to be a basis for honest coöperation. It is hard for both parties to understand one another, to forget former injustices and to draw a final line under the past. But in no other way can a community be created—and it must be a real community if it is to withstand the pressure that will be levelled against it.

It is true that the German people themselves must take the lead in winning the confidence of other nations, lost during the Nazi régime. But they must also be helped, if they are to recover the moral strength required from them; their fall from the height of boundless insolence to the depth of helpless despair has tested that almost to the breaking point. In material respects, help has been granted most generously in recent years by the United States. But the Western Allies should not forget that the value of a German contribution to Western rearmament will depend less on the number of its divisions than on the moral preparedness of the Germans. Let us hope that psychological blunders which raise doubts that the spirit of genuine partnership exists can be avoided. These will simply strengthen the extreme elements in Germany and forward the objectives of Soviet propaganda. There certainly is no reason for considerateness toward German resentments; but the decision which the German people are facing will be easier for them if they can be made to feel that there is no reason to distrust the sincerity of Western intentions. If the West succeeds in overcoming this distrust—not too difficult a task, if both sides coöperate—the majority of the German people will, in full conviction and consciousness of responsibility, make the one decision which will prevent them from being engulfed by the Soviets. That right decision will at the same time serve the security of the entire Western world. I believe that the German people should be given this chance.

[i] In particular, they have been presented in recent years by the Wirtschaftspolitische Gesellschaft von 1947, of Frankfurt.

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  • ERICH DETHLEFFSEN, former General in the German Army; Secretary of the Wirtschaftspolitische Gesellschaft von 1947, of Frankfurt.
  • More By Erich Dethleffsen