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ON September 1, 1951, New Zealand, jointly with Australia, entered into a treaty of mutual security with a foreign Power, the United States. Great Britain was not a party to the pact, commonly known as the Anzus Treaty. The new alliance is a practical recognition of the defense requirements of the two Dominions and an earnest of their determination to defend themselves against any future aggression, in conjunction with the United States, the strongest Power in the Pacific. The Treaty is unprecedented in the history of the British Commonwealth, but it does not weaken, and is not intended by any of the parties to weaken, the existing close ties of affection and interest between Great Britain and New Zealand and Australia. In particular, it will not detract from the close military, naval and air liaison among these three members of the Commonwealth.
Indeed, the average New Zealand citizen does not regard the Anzus Treaty as one made with a Power which he would describe as foreign. To quote from a speech of General Smuts delivered in 1934, "There is a community of outlook, of interests, and perhaps of ultimate destiny between the Dominions and the U.S.A. which in essence is only the first and most important of them."
New Zealand realized that it was the path of wisdom to give the Japanese a generous treaty of peace and not seek a vindictive settlement. Nevertheless, the New Zealand Government, with the Australian Government, felt strongly that the resurgence of Japanese militarism is possible. Because of that possibility both Australia and New Zealand considered that while they were justified in agreeing to a lenient treaty of peace with Japan, they were entitled to an undertaking by the United States that if Japan again launched an aggressive war in the Pacific, the United States would come to their aid. We in New Zealand were anxious to secure ourselves against any aggression in the Pacific, whether from a resurgent and militaristic Japan or, what is certainly of equal importance, from Communist disturbers of the peace.
New Zealand's Minister of External Affairs, Mr. T. Clifton Webb, has rightly said that the most important provision in the Treaty is the one which declares that an attack in the Pacific on any of the three parties constitutes a common danger to all, and consequently each one pledges itself to come to the other's aid in accordance with its constitutional processes. The parties have established the Anzus Council "to consider matters concerning the implementation of the Treaty."
The strategic importance of the Treaty is emphasized by the foresight of a great American: ". . . we must instantly move to save Hawaii, Fiji, New Zealand, and New Caledonia, and we had to make certain of the safety of Australia itself. . . . we simply had to save the air lifeline through Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, and Hawaii. . . . Our base must be Australia, and we must start at once to expand it and to secure our communications to it. In this last we dare not fail." These are the words of Brigadier-General Eisenhower, as he then was, in an official report written by him on December 14, 1941, for General Marshall. His observations concerning American interests in the event of aggression in the Pacific have an enduring significance for New Zealand and Australia.
As Secretary Dulles, who negotiated both the Japanese Peace Treaty and the Anzus Treaty for the United States, correctly pointed out in February 1952:
In one sense this Treaty merely formalizes a fact which all the world knows, namely that each of our three countries would consider that an armed attack upon the other would endanger its own peace and security and that it would act accordingly. That fact has been proved in two World Wars when we were fellows in arms. However, it is useful to declare publicly and formally our sense of unity, so that no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that any of us stands alone in the Pacific area.
And he continued, "The Treaty will, I hope and believe, have by-products beyond the formal contemplation of the Treaty itself. It will, I hope, help to bring about greater unity of policy in the Pacific between the United States and the Commonwealth." It is to be observed that Mr. Dulles refers to the Commonwealth as a whole, not solely to New Zealand and Australia.
The New Zealand Government is aware that Great Britain has shouldered heavy military obligations in Europe and elsewhere; as Mr. Webb said in October 1951 during the debate on the Treaty in the New Zealand House of Representatives, "It would not be fair to ask her to come and commit herself in the Pacific when she has committed herself in the Middle East." It is surely wise for New Zealand to enter into military arrangements with the United States and Australia for the preservation of peace in the Pacific, thus lightening Britain's burden. The Government of the United Kingdom was kept fully informed of the negotiations for the Treaty and warmly welcomed it as a valuable reinforcement of the security of all the members of the Commonwealth and as complementary to the understanding and mutual support existing between the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand.
The Treaty is indeed an example of one of those regional organizations sanctioned by the Charter of the United Nations. The Anzus Council is authorized by the Treaty to maintain a consultative relationship with states in the Pacific area which are in a position to further the purposes of the Treaty and to contribute to the security of the Pacific. There is thus an express provision for full consultation with interested Powers. Great Britain, who is responsible for the defense of Hong Kong and Malaya and administers such territories as the Solomons and the Fiji group, is obviously an important Pacific Power. The United Kingdom is and will be kept fully informed of all plans and developments under the Treaty.
The Treaty is not in itself a Pacific pact, but, as Mr. Webb said on February 27, 1953, "only one of a series of Pacific defense arrangements, in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter." Thus, it should be remembered that there is a security pact between the United States and Japan, and a mutual defense treaty between the Philippines and the United States. These are valuable beginnings which should be strengthened before their extension is considered. Moreover, it is to be noted that Five Power military discussions on defense problems affecting Southeast Asia were held at Honolulu in April of this year as part of the routine process of military liaison among the United Kingdom, the United States, France, New Zealand and Australia. The Anzus Council must necessarily be concerned to ensure that Southeast Asia should prepare for its effective defense. And in a significant statement to the House on April 28, 1953, the Prime Minister of New Zealand, Mr. S. G. Holland, declared that the Government "would welcome Britain being added as a party" to the Treaty, and that in his opinion the solution of the problem would be found in the development of the Five Power discussions. Meanwhile, the United Kingdom was being advised on every development under Anzus.
If Britain's independence and strength are essential to the survival of the free world, then the defense of New Zealand against invasion and the maintenance of her sea communications with Britain are interests that New Zealand shares with all free people. The suggestion that the Anzus Treaty represents a weakening of New Zealand's ties with Great Britain shows a complete misapprehension of her history, and of her position in the British Commonwealth and Empire. Although New Zealand is a little larger than England, Scotland and Wales together, she has a population of only 2,000,000. Her importance and influence in the British Commonwealth of Nations, of which she is, under the Crown, an autonomous member, stem from many factors. Owing to a benign climate and a most efficient system of agriculture, New Zealand is able to send to Britain quantities of butter, cheese and meat without which the United Kingdom could not feed her citizens in peace or war--twice as much meat, for example, as Britain gets from both Australia and the Argentine. Her soldiers, moreover, have won a reputation as good fighting men in two world wars. There are approximately 2,000 New Zealand troops in Korea at the moment. Though this may not seem a large number, it represents one out of every thousand of her population--a proportion that few other members of the United Nations can equal.
From her remote position in the southwest Pacific New Zealand has to send her products to Britain over a very long route, and a great proportion of the manufactured goods she requires are imported across the oceans. And in war her forces must be transported great distances to the scene of battle. Thus geographical considerations have had a considerable influence on her foreign policy, and always will have. But, of course, a nation's foreign policy is not determined by any single factor. Dr. Nicholas Mansergh has pointed out that New Zealand's attitude to Britain has been conditioned by the origins of her people, by the smallness of her population, by her geographical isolation, by the nature of her economy and by her history. And of these various factors he rightly puts the origins of the people at the top of the list.
The population of New Zealand is overwhelmingly Anglo-Saxon; 93 percent of the inhabitants have British or Irish antecedents. Of the remainder, only 1 percent were born in other foreign countries, and 6 percent are Maoris. It has been said that the Colony provided "the nearest approach attained to successfully accomplished intention in colonization"--a rather clumsy phrase meaning, in simple English, that in 1840 and afterward those who founded New Zealand took every care in the selection of emigrants. Not that there are no dissenting voices! One of the most famous founders of the Colony, Edward Gibbon Wakefield, remarked in 1849: "The whole emigration to Upper Canada and New Zealand furnishes no instance of the ultimate settlement of a gentleman's family with satisfaction to themselves and their friends at home." Be that as it may, a great many families of English and Scottish blood were among the early settlers in New Zealand, including many from middle-class families experienced in government and the professions, and the fact was reflected in her politics. It has been said that in the middle of the nineteenth century the standard of debate in the New Zealand House of Assembly was not outrivalled in the Empire.
The character of the early colonists and their profound affection for Great Britain, against whom they had none of the ill feeling nourished by those who had been transported to some colonies, and the complete dependence on Britain in matters of trade and defense linked New Zealand very closely to the mother country and have had a deep and continuing influence. Indeed to this day when a New Zealander speaks of going home, he frequently means that he is proposing to take a trip to the United Kingdom.
It is true that there have been and are New Zealanders ready to criticize the survival of a "mother and daughter complex" in the relations of the Dominion to the United Kingdom, but even though a more independent outlook developed in the thirties of this century, the close kinship with the British plays a part of overwhelming importance in New Zealand's view of international relations. It would be a mistake, however, to assume that even in the nineteenth century New Zealand was unwilling to make the strongest representations to Downing Street in the realm of Pacific affairs. A New Zealand historian, Dr. J. C. Beaglehole, hardly exaggerates when he puts the matter thus:
It is a mistake . . . to regard this country as traditionally the most uniformly and unthinkingly loyal of all British dominions or colonies. . . . New Zealand, in common with the generality of colonies, either in the old empire of the Atlantic seaboard or in the new empire the world over, throughout most of its history has had no difficulty in reconciling a high degree of devotion to the person of the ruler with a great capacity for assailing the deeds and motives of the ruler's constitutional advisers.[i]
New Zealand's politicians of the nineteenth century, Sir Julius Vogel in particular, were aware of the agricultural prospects of the two islands and of the significance of their strategic location, and they nursed visions of a Pacific federation of all the southern islands led by New Zealand and including Fiji, Tonga and Samoa. The federation was to be an integral part of the British Empire, and thus New Zealanders would be the "custodians of the British imperial tradition in the south seas."
In 1884 Vogel took part in an inter-colonial conference called by Australia, whose various governments were concerned over German aspirations in New Guinea. The Colonial Office described Sir Julius Vogel as "the most audacious adventurer that perhaps has ever held power in a British Colony." Indeed, Vogel had more vision than the Colonial Office, which repudiated the attempt by Queensland to annex northern New Guinea. This territory fell into German hands and eventually, when the Japanese occupied it, became a dagger pointed at the heart of Australia.
The Colonial Office likewise showed scant sympathy with Vogel's proposal for the annexation of Tonga and Samoa and for their federation with Fiji. When Germany occupied Samoa in 1884, Downing Street, anxious to retain the goodwill of Bismarck, recognized the occupation and disregarded vigorous protests from both Australia and New Zealand. It was not until the outbreak of the First World War that New Zealand rectified this error and seized Western Samoa.
One of the country's best known Prime Ministers, John Richard Seddon, who held office from 1893 to 1906, was ready to follow in Vogel's footsteps. On his way to London in 1897 he called on President McKinley and informed him of New Zealand's interest in Hawaii. London, however, took no notice of his representations on this subject and two years later the United States annexed Hawaii. In 1891, however, London had approved New Zealand's annexation of the Cook Islands, and in fairness to Downing Street it should be said that in 1874 Britain had yielded to pressure from both Australia and New Zealand and annexed Fiji. The Colonies were given no voice in the administration of the Fiji group and, not unnaturally, refused to share in its cost.
Throughout the nineteenth century, and indeed until 1935, New Zealand governments accepted the principle that Great Britain had the right to decide foreign policy for the whole Empire. Men of the stature of Vogel and Seddon made the strongest possible representations to Downing Street on occasion, but they always finally accepted its decisions. They were well aware that the Royal Navy was the guardian of New Zealand's long line of communications with England and, not content to accept its protection passively, New Zealand contributed a battleship to the Grand Fleet. In 1909, a proposal for a separate Dominion Navy was firmly rejected. The attitude of New Zealand politicians was summed up in the phrase, "One sea, one navy, one empire." It was only in 1921 that the New Zealand naval forces were officially designated as the New Zealand Division of the Royal Navy, a title changed to that of Royal New Zealand Navy in 1941.
A distinguished Prime Minister, Sir Joseph Ward, suggested an Imperial Federation in 1911, animated by the desire to have some influence in the formation of British foreign policy. His proposal for federation was the very antithesis of separatism, but he had to bow to the dictum of Mr. Asquith, the Prime Minister, who stated categorically that high policy--foreign policy in supreme issues, affecting all the members of the Empire--remained and must remain exclusively in the control of the Cabinet of the United Kingdom. "That authority," Mr. Asquith said, "cannot be shared."
Even the events of the First World War, in which New Zealand's contribution in blood and money was so high in proportion to her population, did not weaken her adherence to the principle of imperial unity, or, in particular, to the idea of a common imperial foreign policy. The Government did not regard its separate signature to the Treaty of Versailles as a step towards greater independence, either constitutionally or in the determination of foreign policy. When, in the Chanak crisis of 1922, Mr. Lloyd George proposed action to halt the Turks, the New Zealand Government offered, immediately and without consulting Parliament, to send a contingent to the Middle East. In 1925 Prime Minister J. G. Coates thus explained New Zealand's rôle in imperial affairs:
The method that has been adopted is just this. The British Government carry on the negotiations. We . . . express our opinions quite definitely. If the Government . . . think that arrangements under consideration are likely . . . not to be in the interests of New Zealand, we say so. But if after that it is decided to go ahead, we say to the British Government, after knowing all the facts of the case: "Very well, if that is the arrangement to be made, we are prepared to stand by it."
This readiness on the part of New Zealand to follow Britain, after saying her piece, was, I reiterate, the product of kinship, of the realization that geographical isolation made British protection necessary, and close economic association.
A change in the attitude of the New Zealand Government towards the formulation of foreign policy came with the accession to power of the Labor Government in 1935. There occurred no weakening of the ties between Great Britain and New Zealand. The Labor Government was as loyal to the throne as any of its predecessors, and even though it embarked on new methods of trade through bulk selling of primary products and import licensing, it was no less anxious to maintain close economic ties with Great Britain. The Labor Government was, however, convinced that wars arise from economic causes and can be prevented by creating economic security for all nations. It took a strong line against the appeasement of Italy in the Abyssinian crisis. Its views are best explained in the words of the Right Honorable Walter Nash,[ii] New Zealand's first Minister in Washington, former Minister of Finance and now Leader of the Opposition:
If, in the days before Munich, the attitude of the New Zealand Government on specific issues differed from that of other governments, it was simply because New Zealand firmly believed that for small and relatively defenseless nations collective security through the full and effective application of the League Covenant offered the best and only guarantee against aggression. . . . Mistakes were, no doubt, made; but it is true, nevertheless, that as early as 1936, New Zealand imposed an embargo on the export of scrap iron to Japan, that at Geneva and elsewhere she gave her strong and unequivocal support to China's successive appeals for enforcement of the Covenant, that as late as May, 1939, New Zealand formed one-half of a minority of two which favored the principle of collective aid to China in her resistance to Japan, and that still later in 1940, she protested vigorously at the closing of the Burma Road.
New Zealand took the lead in arranging a Pacific Defense Conference in 1939 and, as Mr. Nash says, from the moment war broke out in Europe her defense policy was based on the assumption that Japan would attack.
These facts [he wrote] are mentioned not in any spirit of commendation of New Zealand's past actions and policies since her voice has, after all, been a very small voice in the councils of the nations, but for the purpose of suggesting that small nations, equally with big ones, may often have something to say that is worth listening to, worth paying attention to, even, perhaps, worth acting on. These small voices--and there are many besides that of New Zealand--may well express useful ideas and progressive trends of thought that will prove valuable in the task of reconstruction which lies ahead. The magnitude of the task will be such as to tax the capacity and the ingenuity of the wisest leaders. Neither Britain nor America, nor any other great power, can claim a monopoly of wisdom and inspired leadership. China and India, the Philippines and the Netherlands, New Zealand and Australia will each have a significant contribution to make and their contributions will be very much needed when the time comes for facing the problems of a "New Pacific."
When war broke out in September 1939, there was no doubt where New Zealand stood. Her Prime Minister, Mr. Savage, spoke decisively: "Where Britain goes we go, where she stands, we stand." Evidence of New Zealand's status as a sovereign nation is supplied by her separate declaration of war, which was made without reference to her Parliament, although Parliament subsequently and unanimously approved the Cabinet's action. The declaration, while an example of the exercise of sovereign power, thus emphasized New Zealand's unity of purpose and action with Great Britain.
Weighty considerations of geography and mutual interest have naturally brought Australia and New Zealand into the closest relations. It is true that they have sometimes approached their common problems from a different angle, as when New Zealand decided in December 1942, at the request of Mr. Churchill and Mr. Roosevelt, to leave her Division in the Middle East, while Australia thought best to bring her forces back to the Pacific. Special factors distinguished Australia's case, but New Zealand's decision is strong evidence that, when the occasion requires, she can look beyond the Pacific and recognize vital interests in areas like the Mediterranean.
In January 1944, Australia and New Zealand signed an agreement, generally called the Canberra Pact. This document envisaged coöperation in defense and in the organization of peace, and in particular the application of the principle of trusteeship to the peoples and territories of the Pacific. New Zealand was the first Power to accept that principle under the Charter of the United Nations and to apply it to the Territory of Western Samoa. Her administration of the Territory is both an earnest of her devotion to the ideas of the United Nations and of interest in the progress of the peoples of Polynesia towards self-government. The Canberra Pact was supplemented at the instance of New Zealand and Australia by the Six Nation Agreement, establishing the South Pacific Commission, an advisory body to the six governments administering dependent territories in the Pacific south of the Equator. The United States recently proposed the extension of the scope of the Commission to include the American trust territory of the Pacific Islands and also Guam, and the other member governments agreed.
Since the very earliest days of colonization there have been close relations between the United States and New Zealand. There were colonists who believed that eventually New Zealand would gravitate towards the United States. Fox, who was Prime Minister of New Zealand in 1870, disturbed the British Foreign Office by suggesting that the New Zealand and American Governments should confer directly and not through London on the question of admission of New Zealand wool to the American market free of duty. There was talk in 1869 and 1870 of the secession of New Zealand from the Empire and of independence or accession to the United States, but events proved that this was only talk and superficial talk at that. The New Zealand Parliament made plain the country's intention to remain within the Empire, and the Governor declared: "Even those who five months ago were all agog for separation from England and annexation to the United States are now loyal again."
In the twentieth century the average New Zealander displayed a much greater awareness of the significance of events in Europe than of those in Asia. If Manchuria was ignored, the importance of the Middle East and of North Africa was understood. One of the two life lines in the flow of New Zealand's primary products overseas lies through the Suez Canal. She is always concerned that this trading route should remain open, and is therefore vitally interested in any political unrest that occurs in the countries near the Canal. In the First World War New Zealand troops were for some time stationed in Egypt; thousands fought at Gallipoli and a considerable force in Palestine. And in the inter-war years the danger of Mussolini's ambitions in Abyssinia was quickly perceived and the Government refused to recognize the King of Italy's title as Emperor of Abyssinia.
But it took the attack on Pearl Harbor and the terrifying onrush of the Japanese forces through Malaya and Indonesia down to New Guinea and Guadalcanal to make many New Zealanders realize that they were very much a Pacific people, that the Far East was the Near East for them--and that it lay, not at their back door, but at their front door. The onslaught of the Japanese immediately brought the United States and New Zealand close together. New Zealand's military forces were then engaged in the Middle East, and Britain was unable to afford effective defense for the Pacific--a fact proved with brutal suddenness after the fall of Singapore. Of necessity, it was the United States which then protected New Zealand and Australia from Japanese aggression.
Thousands of American troops came to New Zealand in 1942 and 1943, received their training there, and left to fight magnificently for the liberation of the Pacific. Naturally, therefore, we came to know Americans as individuals, and to understand something of the American outlook. The New Zealand Government showed its awareness of the necessity for forging close relations with the United States by establishing a legation at Washington, later to become an embassy.
The country is proud of its contribution in goods and services to the value of more than $280,000,000 made to the United States forces in the Pacific during the war. Besides maintaining land, air and naval forces and furnishing equipment and supplies, camps, warehouses, hospitals and ships, New Zealand largely fed the American forces sent from her shores to the Pacific, dispatching to that area a quarter of her vegetables and apples, a seventh of her meat and a twelfth of her dairy produce. The whole of the Pacific needs in butter was met by rationing in New Zealand, without reducing the quantity sent to the United Kingdom.
By deciding to leave her Division in North Africa, New Zealand proved her traditional interest in the Middle East and her awareness that in a world war the fate of a small country can be decided in a far-off area. But she was fully committed to transferring all her troops to the Asiatic theater after the collapse of Germany, and would have done so if Japan had not capitulated; as it was, New Zealanders took part in the occupation of Japan. The Government attached the greatest importance to the terms of the treaty of peace with Japan, fully appreciating the argument of Mr. John Foster Dulles that a weak and impoverished Japan could create a power vacuum in the Far East which might be filled by Communism. New Zealand accordingly became a party to the Japanese Peace Treaty. The accession to power of the Communists in China, closely aligned as they are with Soviet Russia, is one of the most significant events in the history of Asia and the Pacific. New Zealand continues to recognize the Nationalist régime in Formosa and regards the Anzus Treaty as one of the defensive outworks erected against the expansionist tendencies of Communist China.
Controversy over whether Asia or Europe is more vital to the countries of the Pacific is sterile. These regions are interdependent. New Zealand has vital interests in both and does not believe that the problem of guarding against aggression should take the form of a conflict for priority between the two areas. Obviously, my country would not be a party to the Anzus Treaty unless we were ready to play our proper part in the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. On the other hand, our ties with Great Britain, our interest in the Middle East, and the necessity of preserving our line of communication make European affairs very important to us. It is not surprising therefore that we have dispatched a unit of our Air Force to Cyprus and have agreed to participate in the proposed Middle East defense organization.
Lenin said that the road to Paris lies through Calcutta and Peking, and Communists show their awareness of this by doing their best to drain British resources by insurrection in Malaya and French resources by the continuous fighting in Indo-China. If the forces of France and Vietnam were overwhelmed, the countries of Southeast Asia would be exposed to a deadly peril, fraught with menace to Australia and New Zealand. No one is inclined to underrate the significance of Communist imperialism in Asia. But there is also a road to Paris across the Elbe and the Rhine, and it would become a shorter and more convenient one if it were not well guarded.
Conversely, again, there is need for creating economic conditions that contribute toward peace in the East, as well as in the West. As one of the original signatories to the Colombo Plan, New Zealand has shown her recognition of the obligation succinctly described by Mr. Webb: "If we wish to maintain our standard of living we must bestir ourselves to raise the standard of living of others less fortunate than we are." The plan aims at raising the standard of living in the countries of South and Southeast Asia, where present poverty is a threat to peace everywhere. New Zealand's agricultural system is one of the most efficient in the world, and we can help the countries of Southeast Asia in their problems of rural development. Although we have a population of only 2,000,000, and our resources are therefore limited, the Government has promised to provide $2,800,000 a year during the first three years of the plan, with the sole restriction that this sum should be devoted to agreed-upon projects, which are to be placed high in the scale of priorities of the recipient countries. In addition, we shall provide training, experts and equipment to the value of $1,120,000 over the first three years of the scheme, and have offered to provide $700,000 as our first year's contribution for economic assistance to Ceylon, preferably for financing a dairy-farming scheme.
Economic assistance will also be given to Pakistan and India, with whose magnificent soldiers the New Zealand Division fought as comrades in North Africa in the last war--$700,000 to cover part of the capital cost of the All-India Medical Institute at Delhi, $700,000 to be spent on an irrigation scheme in Baluchistan, and a like sum to be placed in reserve for later allocation. And, with Australia and Canada, we shall assist in the establishment of a livestock development and research farm in the Thal area of India. Scholarships are being provided to enable students from India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Malaya and Borneo to study in New Zealand, and these young men and women receive a warm welcome. These are only a few examples of the practical interest shown by New Zealand in the prosperity of Southeast Asia and in the legitimate aspirations of the newly independent Asian nations. In particular, the Asian states of India, Pakistan and Ceylon have been welcomed as free and equal partners in the British Commonwealth.
William Henry Seward said in 1852, looking eastward from North America: "The Pacific Ocean, its shores, its islands and the vast regions beyond will become the chief theater of events in the world's great hereafter." Evidence accumulates today of his prescience. Today the chief threat to the peace and freedom of this whole area comes from the effort of Communist imperialism to exploit conditions of weakness in Southeast Asia. To combat the Communist aggression and to prevent its further extension, the free nations must do three things: first, strengthen its defenses, in regional groups and as part of the world organization of the United Nations; second, be prepared to fight if necessary; third, assist in the economic development of the countries of South and Southeast Asia.
New Zealand, an autonomous member of the British Commonwealth of Nations, is committed to all three of these objectives. She is a member of the United Nations and a devoted adherent of the principle of collective security. Her men are now fighting for that principle in Korea. She has established a system of universal military training, and has military commitments in conjunction with Great Britain, Australia and the United States. She has entered into a treaty of alliance with the United States and Australia "whereby each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on any of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes." She is pledged to come to the assistance of any one of her allies who is the victim of aggression. She is playing her part in the economic development of Southeast Asia, under the Colombo Plan.
We have come a long way since the day when the Treaty of Waitangi was signed in 1840 and the Maori people gave their allegiance to the Queen. Modern inventions have annihilated distance and made isolation a thing of the past. While as close to Britain as ever, we have become an ally of the United States. We see the web of our destiny woven in Europe, the Middle East and in Asia. As a democracy living in One World, we seek, within the limits of our resources, to discharge our responsibilities to those weaker than ourselves. Above all, we have learned the lesson that in a world confronted by forces dominated by an aggressive and wicked philosophy, the chief guarantees of survival are the unity and strength of all democracies.
[i] "New Zealand," edited by Horace Belshaw. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1947, p. 292.
[ii] "New Zealand: A Working Democracy," by Walter Nash. N. Y.: Duell, Sloan & Pearce, 1943, p. 271-2.