I do not think that this is particularly likely. Russia has already formally (from its point of view) annexed Ukrainian provinces. It is not clear that a Ukrainian concession of these provinces or parts of them would be meaningful to Moscow, the more so as Moscow portrays the Ukrainian government as illegitimate and as having no right to rule any territory at all. Russia’s avowed war aim, per Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov quite recently, remains the destruction of the Ukrainian state and the control of the entirety of its territory.

Russia has also made clear that it regards negotiations as something to be done with the United States and has repeatedly described the Ukrainian government as illegitimate and its leaders in terms that are unusually abusive.

On the Ukrainian side, public opinion is very strongly in favor of continuing the war until all Ukrainian territory is regained, and the government has been clear that this is the objective. Ukrainians are aware, as we sometimes forget, that people under Russian control are subject to deportations, torture, and mass murder. This makes the idea of abandoning territory feel like an abandonment of people. The official Ukrainian position is that peace negotiations begin when Russian troops have left Ukraine. In a democratic country with an elected leader who wishes to represent his people, as Zelensky clearly does, it would be difficult to explicitly renounce territory at any point, and all but impossible now. On the battlefield, conditions favor Ukraine.

Even if Ukraine loses the war, it is hard to see a scenario in which territory is formally conceded. The Russian aim is to replace this government with one that would negotiate, in the sense of submit, but it is hard to see how that is possible or, even if possible, how it would actually end the war, since Ukrainians would keep fighting. I think that any sovereign Ukrainian government would reject the principle that military aggression justifies a change in legal boundaries. So I think even a sovereign Ukraine that cannot win back all its territory is unlikely to formally concede it. And, frankly, it is hard to see why anyone would advise Ukraine to do so, since that would be a violation of the basic principle of international order. That said, these are matters for Ukrainians to decide for themselves.

I think putting the issue of “negotiations” front and center, as this question does, is a way of avoiding the basic reality that the most probable way for this war to end is with a victory by one side on the battlefield. There might be negotiations, but if so, these will flow from conditions set by battlefield victory and defeat. Once that reality is accepted, the real question emerges: who should win (Ukraine) and how can that victory be achieved (military and economic support). In other words, we cannot really see this question as neutral, since the course of the war also depends on what powers beyond Ukraine decide to do. If U.S. or European policy shifts to denying Ukraine weapons in order to force negotiations, we then end up with a longer and bloodier war.

This war has been a strategic catastrophe for Russia, and the longer it goes on, the worse it is. The quickest way for this war to end is for the United States and European powers to arm Ukraine such that further pursuit of aggressive objectives will seem senseless in Moscow. I think that the war ends with Ukrainian victory, in the sense that Russian politics shifts away from the Russian fantasy of winning in Ukraine and to the hard reality of competition for power in the Kremlin (or possibly something else, like avoiding total dependence on China). When this begins to matter in domestic politics, the war can end. It is bad to lose in Ukraine, but it is much worse to lose in Russia. I would not expect formal negotiations or an admission of defeat from Russia, but rather a change of subject, where what seemed so important yesterday seems much less important today. That is the usual Kremlin practice. It will not be easy, but these are matters for Russians to figure out for themselves.

The “outcome of the war” in a broader sense includes peace and recovery. It is very important to think ahead to that stage. In this sense as well, I take issue with the way the question is framed; I would emphasize that the United States bears a great deal of responsibility for the “outcome” in this broader sense. The “outcome” of World War II had much to do with how the United States engaged once combat had ceased.

An important caveat: history shows that war is very hard to predict. Almost never is anyone’s scenario fulfilled. That is why I put my confidence level in the middle. I am confident that we are not getting a negotiated settlement between Russia and Ukraine in the present circumstances. But very often what happens in a war is “something else entirely,” something that no one forecast. If this war has reminded us of anything, it is that people who regard themselves as experts have to be humble in the face of the unpredictability of war, and respectful of the agency of those who are seeking to defend themselves.

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