TO Americans the word "food" has fairly simple connotations. Food satisfies man's most basic and urgent need, and so seems eminently an affair of civilian economy. It is "our daily bread" of the Lord's prayer -- the stuff that keeps people from going hungry. Whether a person gets his share or not generally depends upon his income and food prices. For two decades, moreover, our government has been worried by the presence of too much rather than too little food. It has tried to master the unwieldy food surplus in order to help the farmer, and has made a virtue of necessity by distributing surplus supplies free of charge among the needy and unemployed.

In the course of the public debate in this country regarding the European food problem Americans have shown that they are thinking too largely in conventional physical terms. They speak about shortages created by the hostilities on land and sea, about food losses and destruction, about the consequent threat of famine to civilians, and about how to transfer enough from our land of plenty to relieve the stricken areas. Such thinking is natural enough in a democratic country where there is an abundance of the consumer goods typical of a competitive price economy. But the resulting picture is incomplete. The American public is not yet aware of the full implications of what is really going on in connection with Europe's production, distribution and consumption of food.


In the totalitarian state food has ceased to be simply food as we all know it -- a commodity of civilian origin and destination. It has acquired new and different aspects. It has become a complete chest of tools in the workshop of the modern tyrant. Even statistically food has been driven underground. Information on how much is harvested, imported, exported, lost or fed to the people is now a military secret, guarded almost as carefully as the blueprints of a new bomber. Hence, a survey of Europe's food situation cannot at the present time be nearly so accurate as one compiled before the war. The economist must patch together incomplete statistics and bits of circumstantial evidence drawn from a multitude of unconventional sources.

In this total war, every nation considers food and feed essential factors in their struggle for eventual victory, along with coal, oil, electric energy, fibres, minerals and metals. They know that thrift and foresight must be used in connection with them all. The German totalitarian state in particular, in preparing for war, made its food control a model system for all the phases of its rigid, thoroughgoing, centralized, planned economy.[i]

From the moment the Nazis seized the reins in Germany they copied the Soviets in transforming food from an economic end into a political means. Food became an instrument for executing domestic policies, for forcing the integration of the race, for persuading farmers to coöperate, for breaking the backbone of processing industries, for weaning a "degenerate" and miseducated people away from luxuries and unheroic attitudes. The granting of food became a premium for accomplishment and the withholding of it became a punishment for failure or dissent. Food could establish equality or set up distinctions, it could "liquidate" inferior individuals and groups, it could play Santa Claus or the big bad wolf. Since food is an inescapable necessity for the human animal, the Nazis saw what a beautiful instrument it could be for manœuvring and disciplining the masses. Their control of food put their thumb at the throat of every man and woman, of children as well as of the aged.

During the Third Reich's six years of peace and eighteen months of war numberless legislative and administrative decrees have given effect to this new concept of food as an all-round political instrument. The concept is entirely harmonious, of course, with the philosophy underlying the totalitarian state. If man's destiny lies in the survival of the fittest group in perennial warfare, and if his virtues flower under the enforced discipline of military command rather than in a harmonious relaxation of self-respecting citizens, then obviously it becomes a postulate of statesmanship that food is a political and military instrument. Once this idea has been conceived, it is only a matter of time before the Lord's gift of bread turns into Mephisto's rod, coaxing or cajoling, crushing or breaking, in the hands of der Führer, Il Duce, El Caudillo and the master of the Kremlin.

In the struggle of the democratic nations to survive they must understand all the techniques of their opponents, including their food policy. They must, so long as the war continues, resist aggression in every field by taking countermeasures in that same field. To fight the war strictly as gentlemen may mean the death of all gentlemen.


The result of efficiently engineering a nation's food policy is to give the entire food economy unprecedented elasticity. It is freer than in a "free economy," because it is relatively well protected against disturbance and can ignore both increasing costs of production and popular resentment arising from higher prices and consumer controls. Today, it is safe to say, the Germans are fairly well-fed, despite a lack of some commodities; and they will probably continue to be well-fed so long as they do not lose control of the conquered continent.

The Nazi régime started its Erzeugungsschlacht, or battle of production, in 1934, in imitation of Mussolini's earlier battaglia del grano. Food imports were curtailed, farm prices for food were raised, dealers' margins were narrowed, and consumer prices were raised moderately. Agriculture, the food processing industries, and trade were studied and reassembled in accordance with the blueprint of the food cartel. Every living soul, whether farmer or laborer, grain dealer or milk retailer, thereby became a soldier in the Reich Food Estate, subject to the equivalent of martial law and bound to obey it on penalty of losing his freedom or his neck.

This revolutionary reconstruction of the Food Estate was undertaken to prepare it to withstand the test of war. The next step was to condition the consumer psychologically, to change his eating habits and the customs of kitchen management. The masterminds who planned total war anticipated shortages and hardships. Hence, they put their best nutrition specialists, dieticians, economists and psychologists to work to devise a streamlined rationing system that would feed the people sufficiently well, that would permit the regulation of the carry-over through a tightening or loosening of the national belt, and that would be proof against bootlegging. On the morning of the day the war against Poland began, September 1, 1939, ration cards were distributed to the German population. Rationing had been tried out long before with textiles and all sorts of other materials, and animal husbandmen had been subjected to feed rationing. In Germany, rationing is not an indication of existing real shortages of foodstuffs. It is an engineering and political science.

Addressing the German workers at the Rheinmetall-Borsig works in Berlin on December 10, 1940, Hitler[ii] elaborated on the food rationing system. "We want to avoid one person having more of the most vital commodities than another," he said. "Not everybody is in a position to buy a Titian, even if he had the money." And he added: "But in the case of food, everybody must be served." This is the socialistic refrain. But although such an égalitarian policy aims at preventing the rich from gorging or hoarding food, it establishes a class distinction between the various groups of recipients of rationing cards. First comes the "warrior caste," embracing the armed forces, the Gestapo, and to some extent the party militia. Next come the most skilled and essential laborers. Further down the scale come the unemployables, the aged, the incurably sick. At the bottom come those to whom it is an act of grace to give any rations at all: prisoners, inmates of insane asylums and concentration camps, and Jews. Food cards express the quotation of the utility of citizens to Leviathan.

Allotments of higher rations are one means of promotion. They signify approval for laborers who pass from the unskilled to the skilled category, or from easier to harder work. One of the basic considerations is, of course, the actual caloric requirement for maintenance of any useful person's physical fitness. But a multitude of entirely different and partly contradictory calculations -- including consideration of larger economic problems and astute political estimates -- also come into play.

Rations may be lowered simply to accumulate greater reserves. Temporary limitations may be used to impress the people with the seriousness of the general situation, even when actual supplies on hand would allow more generous rations. Or extra rations may be granted to bolster morale in a difficult moment, even though stores thereby are drastically reduced. Cutting off luxuries prepares the people for being thankful later when a trickle of them reappears -- some coffee, a little whipped cream, candies or chocolate. After the French collapse, when the German masses remained apathetic, special rations of modest luxuries were distributed to create an atmosphere of cheer and enthusiasm.

When the Ministry of Propaganda or the Gestapo deems it advisable to play a more radical tune it turns the wrath of the masses against the "capitalists" by starting single meal campaigns. Or a plan for compulsory public kitchens turns up, with the hint that a Spartan cuisine would have a good educational influence on epicureans. Hoarding or bootlegging food, or violation of the rationing laws, carries the death penalty, or in minor cases a term in a concentration camp.


Food has also served the Nazis as an instrument for outmanœuvring their political opponents in neutral countries and for exacting complaisance. In fact, control of foodstuffs, including annual staple crops such as grain and sugar, or perishables such as milk, eggs, meat, fruits and vegetables, is the main way in which the Nazis overcome patriotic resistance. It works particularly well in agricultural countries. Agriculture is relatively less elastic than industry. If the demand slumps, prices crash and farmers default on taxes and interest. Countries with a large agricultural export are therefore most vulnerable in the game of squeeze, and the Nazi strategists have exploited the fact.

The technique used to force an agricultural country to yield, first to economic domination and later to military and political domination, is incredibly adaptable. One method is to concentrate in one hand all the foreign food purchases for the whole German nation, 80-million strong. This single authority offers to buy a gigantic volume of goods in the country in question at fairy-tale prices; it sets the conditions, political or otherwise; it sees that its tempting offers become known through agents and by radio and the newspapers; and then it sits back to wait for the farmers to "turn the heat" on their governments, knowing that in all agrarian export countries the farm bloc is the most powerful of all political pressure groups. Payment is arranged through a clearing arrangement with the national bank, which has to provide the interim payments to the farmers in national currency. Once the nation in question is in the grip of a big and powerful debtor it has to do as it is told -- or lose everything.

Knowing the inner structure of their victims, all their weak spots, the German experts in foreign trade, food and feedstuffs have had an easy time preparing for "peaceful conquest." By outbidding competing countries with arbitrarily chosen higher prices; by granting subsidized credits and clearing agreements; by buying on a national scale in certain selected transactions; and by the simultaneous use of diplomatic and military pressure, Germany succeeded, between 1933 and 1939, in forcing the proportion of exports taken by her from Bulgaria, Greece, Jugoslavia, Rumania, Hungary and Turkey from a former low of 15 percent to a high of 40 percent. Simultaneously she forced these countries to raise the percentage of their purchases in Germany, so that instead of representing 19 percent of their imports[iii] these represented 46 percent.

Since actual warfare began, these forms of pressure have been supplemented by various schemes resulting in the inflation of the currencies of the neutral or conquered countries. The ratio between the mark and the currencies in question is arbitrarily fixed, and so are the prices offered by the German Government for foodstuffs. Indeed, nominally neutral countries like Hungary and Bulgaria which have a food surplus have established rationing in order to force larger exports of food to Germany. Thus you may live in a neutral country that has food aplenty, but this does not guarantee that you will be allowed to eat it. If the food squeeze exercised from Germany becomes strong enough, not only the urban population but even the farmers themselves may have to suffer from malnutrition due to an unbalanced diet (though perhaps sufficient in calories), until for some reason of strategy the pressure is relaxed.

All the Balkan countries which, as I write, are still neutral -- Jugoslavia, Bulgaria, Hungary, and the European part of Turkey -- are in the same boat so far as food is concerned. If they resist Germany, their food surpluses will cause them grave trouble; if they play ball with her their bread basket still will be hung high. Sweden and Switzerland are in a better strategic position, even though from a military standpoint they are at Germany's mercy, because both are food deficit countries. Switzerland will be able to adjust her agricultural production. And Sweden is so important both as a source of industrial raw materials and as a purchaser of German industrial goods that certain needed food imports are permitted by the Germans to pass from occupied Denmark into Sweden. Moreover, as neutrals, both Switzerland and Sweden benefit from receiving British navicerts and from German willingness to let them import through the blockade.

Incidentally, if this German technique were ever tried against the Latin American countries, it would work magnificently in most cases. It also would work well against Canada, Australia, New Zealand. If Hitler should occupy the British Isles, thereby gaining control over Europe's normal purchases, amounting to an average of 2.5 billion dollars a year in the Western Hemisphere alone, he could throw every one of those countries into political convulsions and stir up violent hatred against the United States. To do this he would not need to make a single military move.


It is in the conquered and occupied countries, of course, that the totalitarian food strategy is applied in its fullest extent. Central Poland, before the war part and parcel of an agricultural surplus producing country, is exposed to the worst suffering. The hatred and contempt which the Germans feel for the Poles has led them deliberately to aim at wiping Poland out as a national entity. This central area has been severed from the annexed parts of West Poland, and into it are being dumped increasing numbers of people considered undesirable. The food situation there, as a result, grows worse and worse. Only the large potato crop and American relief activities prevent complete disaster.

Czechoslovakia, with its strong industrial backbone, receives different treatment, because it belongs in the orbit of the "Greater Reich." In fact, the food situation in the Czech and Slovak areas does not differ much from that in the Reich and Austria.

Norway has had a hard time because its supplies of grain, leguminous vegetables, sugar, fats and fruits are short under the blockade, even though in normal times she is able to export annually 200,000 tons of fats, 85 percent of her catch of fish and 65 percent of her potato crop. Her fisheries still yield enough for her to send train loads daily to the Reich.

Denmark fares best among all the occupied nations. Although the Danes still stubbornly maintain their tariff border, the area is, for all practical purposes, incorporated into the Reich. Food and feed are rationed. In 1940 chickens and pigs were cut down to half. Cattle were also cut heavily, though the herd of dairy cows was kept almost normal. All the butter, bacon, eggs, and cattle that can possibly be spared are sold to Germany. Instead of exerting direct pressure in Denmark, which might diminish the supply at the source, Germany has resorted to the methods of an otherwise greatly despised liberal economy -- she has raised prices to such a height that foodstuffs are produced and flow freely southward over the border. Indeed, for the last quarter of 1940 the German fat monopoly raised its prices per ton for Danish butter from 2,400 kroner in 1938 and 2,750 kroner in August 1939 to 4,500 kroner.[iv] For the first quarter of 1941, the price has been boosted to 5,000 kroner for the first 8,000 tons, 4,250 kroner for the next 4,000 tons. Thus Denmark has a real export boom. By December 31, 1940, her former debit on clearing account had turned into a 1.5 billion kroner balance in her favor.[v]

The Dutch likewise find themselves in a favorable situation, even though, like the Danes, they have lost their British market. Their state, a model of intensive and up-to-date farming, has been closely integrated with Germany. Huge shipments of Dutch vegetables, butter, cheese and meat roll eastwards day and night. The incentives are skyrocketing prices, paid in depreciating guilders, and the withdrawal of German duties. Dutch farmers desperately need an outlet. German purchases prevent wholesale bankruptcy. The only risk from the point of view of the Germans is that stubborn Dutch political resistance might force them to impose penalties. But they will avoid this if possible, because, as in the case of Denmark, Holland is too valuable an asset in the Reich's wartime food economy to be ruined.

Belgium, as the European country with the greatest density of population and next to Switzerland the highest degree of industrialization, is probably in the worst straits of any of the occupied territories. However, there is a great difference between Germany's treatment of the Belgians and the Poles. Immediately after the occupation of Belgium the German authorities began to coöperate with the Belgian administration in planning adjustments in the production, distribution and consumption of food. Belgium is short of fats, fluid milk, grain and potatoes; but she has an excellent sugar-beet crop and some milk and vegetables. While Norway, Denmark and Holland have bread rations of roughly 80, 90 and 89 ounces per capita per week, the Belgian ration is only 56 ounces.[vi] To promote efficiency, industrial workers are allowed up to 112 ounces. Some food is said to be passing into Belgium with navicerts through the British blockade. But the minimum supply of staple food needed can be arranged only by Germany, by transport either from Soviet Russia or the Balkans or out of her own reserves.

In occupied France food is strictly under German control, but the situation is much better than in Belgium, the wheat-bread ration being 87 ounces a week. The occupied region contains France's main wheat, sugar-beet and dairy areas. But these are also the principal scene of the present Battle of England. R.A.F. bombings, German military movements and civilian evacuations disrupt transport, trade and administration so that local shortages are common.

Industrial unemployment is widespread in Belgium, Holland and occupied France, while in Germany, with German war industries booming and German armies spread out all over the Continent, there is a desperate shortage of skilled labor. Consequently, Germany is eager to import as many mechanical workers as she can, especially from the Lowlands, France and the Scandinavian countries where skilled labor is particularly well-trained and hard-working. Food is the lure used to secure them. German employment agencies offer jobs in Germany to unemployed Belgian, Dutch and French workers. If these refuse they lose their rationing cards. Sometimes rationing cards are withheld from workmen -- who then are informed that plenty of food can be had in such-and-such a German industrial center.

Unoccupied France has been manœuvred into an exceedingly difficult situation. Vast numbers of refugees are crowded into a small area which is ill prepared to secure or distribute the supplies necessary. Communications and transport are strained, the civilian administration is overburdened, hoarding and bootlegging produce unequalities and, in many spots, shortages. Rationing, so far, has been badly organized and remains largely ineffective. In view of this the reduced (though still not alarmingly low) ration of 74 ounces of wheat bread does not mean very much one way or another.

The territory under the Vichy Government produces winter vegetables, fruit and wine, but is short of grain and fats. Wheat came normally from northeast France, now occupied, and the former imports of tropical vegetable fats -- normally from 500,000 to 600,000 metric tons net annually -- are no longer available. While the chess game between Pétain and Hitler continues, the Germans have no intention of relieving the food situation in unoccupied France. Indeed, food is one of the men in the game. Thus the French people read that Germany has promised to ship 100,000 tons of potatoes from Germany to Paris.[vii]

All the occupied areas have to support vast German armed forces. On the other hand, Germany feeds, on German supplies, probably an equal number of prisoners of war and drafted foreign laborers. There still remains a large net profit for Germany in this account, however, since prisoners receive the smallest and German soldiers the highest per capita ration. Moreover, German soldiers buy and send home all the bootlegged and non-rationed food they can find.


In general, we see, the European food situation no longer can be measured in ratios of physically available supply and more or less urgent demand. Although crops and stocks still act as delimiting factors, the civilian food ration is determined largely with an eye on other matters. The most orderly and satisfactory situation, of course, prevails within the boundaries of "Greater Germany." In Italy, too, bread is free of cards. In the neutral, the nonbelligerent and the conquered countries every sort of condition prevails, from one roughly approximating that in Germany down to real stringency.

It would be going too far, however, to say that conditions everywhere are strictly what the German conqueror wants them to be. He took six years to build his totalitarian power economy at home. It works there with the precision of a carefully built and solicitously tended machine. But in the conquered territories he had hurriedly to superimpose similar methods upon radically different economic systems. Neither the psychological coördination and control, nor the technical execution, approaches the perfection achieved in Germany proper. This is why there is general disorder in the European transportation system, universal disruption of wholesale and retail trade, speculation, and a lack of information regarding stocks. All these factors hamper the proper distribution of the food which is available and assigned for use.

The longer Nazi legions and administrators rule the Continent the more order they will restore. Since the threat of undernourishment, or even actual starvation, is the canker that destroys public morale, all governments, conqueror and conquered alike, concentrate their energies on banishing this fear. And they have made remarkable progress. The point to remember is that the commanders of the German army of occupation, with the keys to the big granaries in their pockets, will tighten or relax their grip not in accordance with the size of available supplies of food but according to the dictates of broad political strategy.


Late this spring, probably, will come the critical period in Europe's food problem in this war. Thereafter the food situation will tend to become less tense even in such hard-pressed areas as Poland, Belgium, unoccupied France and Spain. With the coming harvest, if the weather favors, the energetic German drive to work out necessary adjustments may well begin to show astonishing results.

The yield of the Danubian basin and the Balkan countries in food and feed crops is not likely, in general, to increase substantially (except for a larger oilseed output, especially in Hungary). Yet the more advanced agricultural methods introduced by the Germans will give new proof of their efficiency and will exploit all the latent skill of the farmers. Practically all of the northern and the middle parts of central and western Europe will show increased agricultural production. The acreage devoted to potatoes, sugar beets and mangels will be drastically increased, and more calories will be produced on the same acreage of cultivated land.[viii]

All these root and hoe crops require an increase in draft power, in manual labor and in fertilizer. These things can be provided. The armies of the occupied nations will be demobilized, horses will be turned back to the farmers, oxen will be used where horses are too few, nitrogen and potash fertilizers are plentiful, and industrial unemployment prevails. Nothing is more sensible, then, than to turn to more hoe crops.

Indications are that Greater Germany and all the occupied areas except Norway are preparing to do so. Even Belgium expects to be self-supporting in grain in the new crop year by boosting the wheat area from 160,000 to 260,000 hectares, and the potato acreage from 147,000 to 177,000 hectares. At the same time, the extremely productive small family gardens in the suburbs of all the European cities will turn out more small fruit and vegetables in due season. True, in Holland, Belgium, Norway and Denmark the poultry flocks have been cut by emergency slaughtering to less than one half, and the hog population has been reduced considerably. More calves and young cattle have been slaughtered than under ordinary conditions. But these inroads have not, contrary to press reports, reached alarming proportions; and as feed supplies improve, the number of chickens and pigs may well increase again fairly quickly. In the Danubian countries the stock has definitely been increased.

If in 1941 the war does not turn into a sweeping movement of invading armies on the Continent itself, and if a general crop failure does not occur, we are probably safe in assuming that the threat of famine will gradually vanish, though a dearth of fats will still persist, and eggs, fluid milk and cream will continue to be scarce. The need for activity by the Red Cross and by local relief associations in the various nations will persist, especially on behalf of children, the poor and prisoners. Finland, Spain and unoccupied France have already received some overseas supplies under British navicert; recently French convoys from North Africa reached Marseilles without being molested by the British. Finland has obtained 20,000 tons of edible oils, bacon and pork from the United States. Morever, the United States and Great Britain have agreed to a more flexible treatment of medical supplies and concentrated foods shipped under navicerts.

This appraisal of the European food situation may seem overoptimistic. But pessimists often forget that the continent's total import deficit in foodstuffs before the war did not amount to more than 5 percent of its bread-grain requirements or 6 percent (10.5 million tons) of bread and feed-grain requirements combined. The real shortage is in fats -- 1.3 to 1.4 million tons. Germany today has an untouched war reserve of 6.5 million tons of grain, and this alone would permit her to adjust the situation in countries of greatest need without seriously depleting her stocks. The fat deficit will persist, but it will decrease as potatoes, sugar beets and mangels become available for feeding hogs, cows and sheep, and as more oilseeds, such as rape, are grown. A herd of 100 million pigs now consumes tremendous amounts of feed which could be used as human food. Before starvation gripped the population this herd, along with cattle and sheep, would be slaughtered and eaten. Furthermore, exceptionally high prices of food and feed in all areas outside of Germany will certainly stimulate increased production and will enforce the utmost thrift in consumption. At present the greatest pressure seems destined to fall on England because of her shipping losses.

The Nazis consider themselves complete masters of the European food situation. On September 30, 1940, Walter Darré, German Secretary of Agriculture, stated that there would be "no special difficulties to overcome" in occupied countries, and that the available food supply was greatly underestimated abroad.[ix] He did not think it necessary to lay any blame for food shortages on the British, though he naturally would have been tempted to do so. On January 7, 1941, the German Ambassador in Madrid, Dr. Eberhard von Stohrer, insisted that Spain did not need a hundred-million dollar credit from the United States, because Germany was in a position to carry out an offer to provide her with all the gasoline and other supplies she needed from Rumania and Russia.[x] On February 11, 1941, the radio brought the news that a joint German-Belgian commission had negotiated food shipments from Soviet Russia to Belgium. In February Russia offered Norway to barter a million tons of Russian grain for Norwegian aluminum. Immediately Germany interfered. The Nazis do not object to relief supplies coming in to Europe if they have no political implications. But they consider the regulation of Europe, including feeding it, their affair -- their self-assumed right as well as obligation. It is a key factor in their New Order.

In conclusion, it may be worth while to reflect upon the rôle played by food in the World War. Food alone did not win that war. In October 1918, General Ludendorff forced the German Chancellor, Prince Max of Baden, to sue for peace within 24 hours. He did this because the German Army had lost the battle of Amiens and would have been thrown back to the Rhine by Christmas. Certainly the food stringency was one of the factors which had exhausted the fighting stamina of the nation as a whole. Yet even in November 1918 the front-line troops still were well fed. The Nazis have laid their plans well. They are determined that no shortage of food will arise to create even as much difficulty for their juggernaut as it did for the Kaiser's. Our sympathies must not be allowed to distort our judgment about the rôle of food in the tremendous struggle ahead. Appraisals of the food and raw material situation made before the commencement of the Battle of Norway and the Battle of France still hold.[xi]

The Nazis will think twice before spreading pestilence and starvation in western Europe so long as they can avoid it easily. But if their plans go awry, if starvation does impend, they would and could manage so that famine would proceed in concentric rings from the extremest rim toward the German center of the fortress. In this process they would dispose of the lives of the 150 million hostages they now hold without batting an eye. This is their true advantage from the conquest of the Continent.

The blockade impedes the wheels of Hitler's war machine; but that machine is not going to be halted for lack of food or raw materials. The present Nazi domain contains too large resources for that, so long as they are exploited by the skilful politico-economists who drew up the blueprints of the Nazi economic tyranny. The Nazi machine will be defeated only by superior diplomacy, superior steadfastness and superior military strength.

[i] Karl Brandt, "The German Fat Plan and Its Economic Setting." Stanford University, California: Food Research Institute, 1938.

[ii]Facts in Review, January 20, 1941, p. 22.

[iii]Wochenberichte, Institut für Konjunkturforschung, XIII, September 3, 1940, page 105.

[iv] This price applied to the first 12,000 tons. Beyond that the price was 4,750 kroner. Cf. Neue Zürcher Zeitung, November 15, 1940.

[v]New York Times, February 2, 1941.

[vi]Wheat Studies of the Food Research Institute, January 1941, p. 238. This issue gives detailed bread rations for 12 countries.

[vii] By the end of November, she had actually shipped 8,000 tons. Potatoes, be it noted, are free from rationing in unoccupied territory.

[viii] Potatoes yield two or three times as many starch calories per acre as does wheat or rye; sugar beets from four to six times as many.

[ix]New York Times, October 1, 1940, p. 9.

[x]New York Times, January 8, 1941, p. 5.

[xi] Karl Brandt, "Germany Behind the Blockade," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, April 1940.

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