With the obvious exception of Viet Nam, nothing the U.S. Government has done in recent years in the field of foreign policy has created so much controversy as its intelligence operations, especially the secret subsidizing of private American institutions. The sinking of the Liberty with the loss of 34 American lives during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war and the capture of the Pueblo by North Korea in 1968 brought home to the American public the dangers involved in one type of intelligence collection and embarrassed an already beleaguered Administration. Of all the U.S. intelligence organizations, the Central Intelligence Agency has been the most vociferously attacked. It has been accused of perpetrating the 1967 Greek coup, arranging the death of Ché Guevara and even fanning the flames of the recent student riots in Mexico as a means of influencing the Mexican Government to adopt an anti-Castro stance in hemispheric affairs.

Some critics of CIA view it as omnipotent and evil; others attack it as bumbling and incompetent. Although only a minority accepts either of these extreme characterizations, many Americans and foreigners are concerned about CIA's activities, and they are far from reassured by repeated official statements that it is an efficient and fully controlled instrument of the U. S. Government. The CIA has undoubtedly contributed more than other agencies to the alienation from the U. S. Government of an important segment of the academic-intellectual community and of young people; the arrival of its recruiters on a college campus is more likely to start a student riot than those of any other institution-with the possible exception of talent scouts from the Dow Chemical Company.

Present attitudes toward CIA represent a sharp departure from the situation a decade ago. Yet in the immediate postwar years there was considerable uneasiness about establishing such an organization. To do so seemed undemocratic and out of keeping with American traditions. Many Americans regarded spying as a dirty business, and looked on interfering in the internal affairs of other nations as inconsistent with our professed principles of nonintervention. Yet agreement slowly emerged that if the United States was to protect its interests and fulfill its international responsibilities in a harsh environment it had little choice but to engage in such activities.

This consensus, like so many others, has now vanished. Therefore it is appropriate to consider why CIA was created, how an intelligence agency operates, the relationship of intelligence activities to foreign policy, and the difficulties and dilemmas (as well as the capabilities) such an institution creates for a democracy which is also a major power.


The collapse of Soviet-American coöperation late in World War II gradually convinced most Americans that Soviet communism posed a critical challenge to U. S. security. The development of the cold war and the withdrawal of the European colonial powers from Asia made it clear that this country could not escape a much deeper involvement in world politics than had formerly been the case in peacetime. Complex and difficult decisions had to be made on a bewildering variety of issues in a rapidly changing international environment. The United States was becoming involved in areas of the world about which it knew next to nothing. It was uncertain about the capabilities and intentions of both friendly and unfriendly nations-and sometimes not sure which was which. The implications of the scientific revolution for world politics and military affairs were difficult to discern with any clarity, and the relationships between American interests in different parts of the world were obscure.

It soon became apparent that the United States lacked not only a foreign policy adequate to cope with this new situation but even the institutions within the U. S. Government necessary to develop and carry out an effective policy. Institutions and procedures had to be established which would enable the President to bring together the key U. S. officials who dealt with the various aspects of foreign policy to consider the relevant facts, weigh the alternative courses of action, make the necessary policy decisions and see that they were carried out. The result was the National Security Act of 1947, which created the National Security Council to help the President formulate foreign policy and established the Department of Defense as a step toward unification of the armed forces. This Act also created the Central Intelligence Agency; it was the nation's first separate peacetime intelligence organization.

Those responsible for U. S. foreign policy in this period felt keenly the need for more and better information on many unfamiliar areas and problems, and they decided that the task of providing much of this information should rest with men who had no direct policy responsibilities and thus no position to support, no interest to defend. American leaders also concluded that the United States needed an organization able to perform certain tasks in the execution of policy that fell between the traditional instruments of foreign policy and the open use of armed force. Thus CIA was given three general functions: (1) to gather information by covert as well as overt means; (2) to combine the information it collects with that of other agencies, to evaluate it and to present it in useful form to the policymakers; and (3) to be prepared to intervene covertly in the affairs of other nations when so directed.[i]

The communist seizure of power in China and Peking's involvement in the Korean War greatly intensified the cold war. This led to a major expansion of U.S. military forces and of CIA and other U. S. intelligence organizations. A less tangible but perhaps more important effect of the communist gains in East Asia, coming so quickly after the imposition of communist rule on Eastern Europe, was to create in American minds the image of a worldwide movement of incredible unity and dynamism pressing hard on a disunited and weak non-communist world. America was the only serious obstacle to even more dramatic communist gains, and American leaders were determined that this country would not fail in its responsibilities as it had after the First World War.

When uneasy stalemates developed in Europe and East Asia, the struggle between the communist bloc and the West shifted to Asia and Africa. In view of the inherent weaknesses and immense problems of most Afro-Asian countries, few people were confident that communism could be successfully combatted in all these lands. CIA was assigned an important part of the task of turning back the communist offensive-partly because in the atmosphere of those years Congress would not have openly provided funds for those liberal or leftist groups which were often the most effective in opposing the communists. U. S. covert operations during the late 1940s and the early 1950s were successful in a variety of situations. CIA was generally regarded as something new, exciting and effective, and it stood rather high in public esteem.

Simultaneously, the advent of hydrogen weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles made it of crucial importance that the U. S. Government have reasonably accurate knowledge about enemy capabilities. Fortunately, the technological revolution which led to the development of such weapons also made it possible to develop means of penetrating the Soviet veil of secrecy. The U-2, reconnaissance satellites and electronic intercept stations around the edges of the communist world enabled the United States steadily to increase its knowledge of the Soviet military establishment.

These technological advances first came to public attention in connection with the U-2, which was an invaluable instrument of intelligence gathering until it was shot down on the eve of the 1960 Summit meeting. The U-2 affair, followed by the spectacular failure of the Bay of Pigs operation in 1961, ended the relative immunity of such operations from public criticism. Those members of Congress who had long been convinced that the legislators should exercise a more formal and extensive control over CIA renewed their push for creation of a Joint Committee on Intelligence. The press began to take a more critical view of American intelligence operations, and gradually became eager to disclose information about them. From then on there were periodic revelations of past U. S. intelligence operations, and after each disclosure there was a new outcry for more control over CIA and less reliance on it. (It was only among the novelists and television producers that the intelligence agent remained the hero par excellence.)

The more critical public attitude was also stimulated by changes in this country and abroad and by the impact these developments had on American views of the world. The Sino-Soviet split, the declining intensity of the U.S.-Soviet conflict (especially after the Cuban missile confrontation), the growing awareness that the intense nationalism of the Asian and African nations limited communist prospects in these countries, and the upheavals in China gradually convinced many Americans that the external dangers were declining. By the time Viet Nam had reached crisis proportions, the case for according higher priority to domestic affairs was winning growing support, especially among young people. To them Stalin was but a name from the past, and the Cuban missile crisis was either a blurred memory or was looked upon as an aberration in Soviet policy. In this atmosphere the revelation in 1967 that CIA had been supporting the National Student Association and other private institutions led to such bitter and sustained attacks on the U. S. Government and on CIA as to force a basic reëxamination of American intelligence activities.

Perhaps the most important lesson of these events was to make it clear that even supposedly secret intelligence organizations do not and cannot operate outside and apart from the American milieu or mood. Clearly, American attitudes toward intelligence activities are closely related to the public view of the external dangers facing the United States and the foreign policy the nation should pursue. Yet today the task of reaching even general agreement on these matters is most difficult. As the danger is seen less clearly, confusion concerning U. S. goals has correspondingly increased. The United States is coöperating with the U.S.S.R. on some issues and competing with it in others. The decline in many Americans' fear of communism and the lack of agreement on foreign policy has led many to argue that covert operations should be drastically curtailed if not eliminated. This raises the question whether the intelligence community can continue to perform effectively without some degree of consensus as to the threat we face,


Although CIA's covert operations have received most public attention and criticism because of their dramatic nature, far greater resources are devoted to the less spectacular effort of collecting, analyzing and reporting intelligence. These activities permeate the entire foreign-policy process; important policy decisions and the allocation of billions of dollars often depend on the judgments and conclusions reached by U. S. intelligence organizations. In such circumstances, intelligence judgments inevitably become involved in domestic political controversies.

It is simple to state the formal responsibilities and to describe the work, varied and voluminous though it is, of the U. S. intelligence community in the area of intelligence production as distinct from operations. It is to give the policy-makers judgments as to what the situation actually is in the world at any given time, what it will be in the future, and (to a degree) what the implications of such judgments are. A task simple to state, but awesome to contemplate. Historians dispute the meaning of past events, students of contemporary affairs are seldom wholly persuasive when they describe current events and their implications, and the difficulties of forecasting even general trends are obvious to all who have tried it and remember their record.

To carry out its responsibilities the U. S. intelligence community has become one of the largest consumers and producers of information in the world today-and thus in history. It gathers masses of facts, rumors and opinions by reading everything from Pravda to the cables of U. S. missions abroad and the reports of secret agents, and from the photographs taken by satellites to the information gleaned from National Security Agency reports. Even though much of this information goes no farther than the intelligence analysts themselves, the intelligence organizations regularly produce a variety of reports (National Intelligence Estimates, daily and weekly intelligence journals, special memoranda and various studies in depth) and send them forth to compete for the attention of the overburdened and harassed policy-makers.

In theory, the intelligence officer does not recommend policy, but his decisions as to which facts are relevant and the way in which they are presented can make a current policy look sound or silly. He does not fulfill his role unless he brings unpleasant as well as welcome facts and analysis to the attention of the policy-makers. Yet the latter, who must also consider U. S. domestic needs, may have quite different ideas about which facts are relevant. And if the senior policy-makers are to fulfill their responsibilities to inform the public, they must present some of the facts upon which U. S. foreign policy is based; the danger is that their use of intelligence data and judgments will be selected in a manner designed primarily to justify their policies. Thus the relationship between intelligence officers and policymakers is as complex and varied as the personalities involved.

Yet despite the inherent tensions and frictions in this relationship, U.S. leaders have an indispensable asset in the U.S. intelligence community. It is worth the policy-makers' time and trouble to keep the appropriate parts of the intelligence community informed of all significant policy matters coming up for decision, and to learn where and how to tap into the intelligence apparatus in order to ask the right questions of the right people. It is also important for U.S. leaders to let the intelligence community know their opinion of the quality of its output. For the great danger is that the intelligence officer, often involved in tedious and painstaking work, will come to feel completely cut off from the policy- making process. When this happens, he either becomes a time-server or else studies his subject only for its own sake rather than in the light of its importance to the United States.

But, one may fairly ask, has the quality of American intelligence research and analysis been such as to warrant this effort, or even to warrant the cost of the intelligence apparatus? Even the informed part of the public probably has only a vague impression of a few spectacular intelligence failures and of some of the outstanding successes, but no real feel for the general quality of the effort. CIA's researchers and analysts have produced a broad range of studies of a quality that often matches the best turned out by universities and private research organizations. Other parts of the intelligence community have done very good work in more specialized fields. On the whole, the performance of the intelligence community has been effective, especially when one remembers America's lack of experience and the complexity of the problems involved. None the less, there have been more failures and, less excusably, more mediocrity than the United States should be willing to accept.

In any case, there is no room for complacency. The volume of information to be processed will continue to increase and, while computers will in time be of growing value, sound human judgment will remain the crucial element. Moreover, the tasks of the future are likely to be more difficult than those of the past, for international affairs probably will become more fluid and complex. If greater complexity and more rapid change characterize the world of the future, the importance of appraising the attitudes, capabilities and intentions of other nations will increase rather than decline. Yet prediction is especially difficult regarding nations striving to modernize, for in such countries traditional and modern attitudes are intricately interwoven. In such circumstances, the intelligence analyst's perennial problem of deciding when a political leader or a nation will act "out of character" and then of convincing his colleagues and his readers to be ready for a discontinuity of behavior becomes acutely difficult. These problems will remain even if American involvement abroad becomes more selective than it has been in the past.

The size of U.S. intelligence organizations gives them a great capability for research in depth, but their size also imposes limitations, for subtlety of thought is not the most noteworthy trait of any large organization. Special efforts will constantly be necessary to see that thoughtful, unorthodox views and individual insights are encouraged rather than stifled by the system.


The tasks of the CIA clandestine service are at least as varied as those of the intelligence analysts and reporters, and much of what has been written about its activities has condemned or supported its efforts rather than analyzed its functions. Essentially, a clandestine service performs four different types of activities: (1) it collects information secretly- traditional espionage or spying activities; (2) it has a counterintelligence role-protecting the United States against penetration by other intelligence services; (3) it works with the intelligence services of allies and, at times, other nations-exchanging information with them and sometimes helping them to protect their own societies against penetration or upheaval; (4) it conducts covert political operations, which include advising foreign politicians, conducting covert propaganda, supporting labor unions or political parties, and occasionally attempting to overthrow a foreign government.[ii] These diverse activities can be separated in theory more easily than in fact, since a CIA station abroad is at times involved in several activities simultaneously, and they thus tend to interact and overlap.

The most widely accepted of these activities is the counter-intelligence function, for it is difficult to criticize a government for striving to protect itself against penetration by foreign agents. The counterintelligence function is not the exclusive responsibility of CIA, however, for the military services and the Federal Bureau of Investigation are also deeply involved in this area. The difficulty of this task in a world of shifting and uncertain loyalties is attested to by the varied list of men-Richard Sorge, Klaus Fuchs, Kim Philby and Oleg Penkovsky, to name but a few-who long served governments other than their own.

Most of the critics of CIA also accept the necessity of clandestine intelligence collection, but there is considerable public confusion as to its purpose, value and limitations. All governments try to keep certain of their actions and plans secret, and every government of consequence tries to secure as much of this information as it deems necessary to protect itself against the actions of other nations and to formulate its own policies on a sound basis. Properly conceived and operated, a clandestine collection system is essentially an extension of a government's overt information system, and represents an attempt to gain key pieces of information that cannot be obtained from open sources or through other channels.

The intelligence supplied by a Richard Sorge or an Oleg Penkovsky can be of momentous importance. As Hugh Trevor-Roper said in his penetrating article on Kim Philby: "To have a reliable, intelligent, highly-placed agent in the center of a potentially hostile power, with access to 'hard' evidence, is the dream of every intelligence service. . . . A well-placed agent of known fidelity and intelligence who can advise his masters, answer specific questions, comment on the disjointed texts which any Secret Service picks up, correct the illusions to which it is prone, has a value which transcends the occasional questionable scoop."[iii]

But there are few Sorges, Penkovskys or Philbys, and the real question concerns the value of the information supplied by the typical agent. Everyone with any experience in collecting or reading clandestine reports recognizes that they range from the uniquely important to the routine, which at best confirm information obtained through other channels and at worst mislead. Wherever the norm truly lies, it is natural that officers of the clandestine service tend to place a higher value on the intelligence they acquire than do many foreign service officers or even intelligence analysts.

Covert political action-and particularly the use of private American institutions, sometimes with the knowledge of few if any of their officials- is the principal cause of the controversy surrounding CIA in recent years. A more recent criticism by an increasing number of Americans opposed to the basic thrust of U.S. foreign policy is that CIA's coöperation with foreign intelligence organizations in the area of counterintelligence demonstrates that it is a prime instrument of a government intent on upholding repressive régimes against revolutionary movements dedicated to social justice. These activities have led to a broad and sustained barrage of criticism, ranging from the thoughtful and serious to the wild and irresponsible, and have even led some to suggest that CIA is an invisible government which really runs the foreign policy of this country. Whatever CIA is, it is neither invisible nor a government.

Is there adequate control of CIA within the executive branch-by the White House, the Department of State, and (when appropriate) the Department of Defense? (In this connection, it is important to distinguish control from influence, for many of the charges that CIA is not adequately controlled reflect the conviction that the Agency has too much influence.) CIA has always secured approval from the senior policy-makers before initiating covert political action. Although for some years the procedures for approval of new programs were informal and established programs often were not subjected to critical scrutiny, these weaknesses have steadily diminished. Today covert political activities are approved and reviewed by a top-level committee composed of senior members of the White House staff, the State Department and the Defense Department. Moreover, projects are now initially discussed at lower levels with the relevant assistant secretaries in the Department of State or Defense. Ambassadors in the countries involved are also almost always brought into this decision-making process. Control procedures have thus improved steadily over the years, and they enable the appropriate policy-makers to exercise effective and flexible control over the initiation and continuation of covert operations. However, these procedures will remain effective only so long as the officials involved remain determined to make them work rather than let them become a formal ritual.

If control is not the problem, what have been the reasons for the troubles CIA has experienced? And how damaging have these troubles been in comparison to the substantial contribution made to American security by covert operations, many of which remain secret to this day? I make no pretense of having the background necessary to answer the second question. Probably only a handful of men have, and none of them is likely to reveal the evidence which would support his conclusions. However, it is obvious that covert operations have caused considerable trouble and that continual efforts to improve them are indispensable.

CIA's covert operations have suffered from several specific weaknesses. Briefly, the clandestine service has not been able to maintain adequate standards of secrecy and has overestimated its ability to operate secretly, especially for prolonged periods. The U.S. Government's policy of virtually automatic denial when accused of conducting a covert operation compounded the problem once an operation was compromised. Finally, Washington has often overestimated its ability to influence and manipulate the internal affairs of other nations, and has sometimes exaggerated the importance of doing so. This latter criticism applies to its overt as well as to its covert activities. The Government's successes with both types of activities during the height of the cold war led many officials to fail to recognize that America's capacity to influence situations abroad would decline when conditions changed. In time they also discovered that some projects which were successful in the short run had no lasting effect. All of these shortcomings tend to reinforce one another.

The United States intervenes in the affairs of foreign countries in a variety of ways which clearly pose political and ethical questions, but intervention is not prima facie immoral simply because it is covert. People will differ as to whether the ends justify the means in particular circumstances; policy-makers can perhaps agree as to whether a proposed intervention is necessary, judicious and well conceived. What is required is a sense of proportion and a determination not to be unduly influenced by short-term considerations, and these are qualities difficult to gain and hold. Guidelines can be set forth for some aspects of covert activities, but not for all of them, and it is important to understand the differences involved.[iv]

These political and moral problems, as well as those of secrecy, are most acute with regard to covert support of private American institutions. Whatever the arguments once advanced for this practice (and some were compelling), they are no longer persuasive. On the basis of the Katzenbach (Gardner and Helms) recommendations, following the 1967 disclosures, the U.S. Government has announced that it has abandoned secret subsidies to private voluntary American institutions. The Katzenbach report did state, however, that in cases involving overriding national security interests individual exceptions should be made, provided extremely stringent procedures were followed. This is a sound basic policy, but should be supplemented by a major effort by the Administration to secure Congressional approval for one or more publicly financed agencies to extend support to private institutions when it is in the national interest to do so. If some new institutional arrangement is not made, the Government may in a time of danger feel compelled to resort to covert subsidies again, and if this became known the domestic and foreign political impact could be extremely severe.


A second area where a basic policy change would be helpful concerns government-press relations. The disclosure of intelligence activities in the press in recent years is a clear national liability. These disclosures have created a public awareness that the U.S. Government has, at least at times, resorted to covert operations in inappropriate situations, failed to maintain secrecy and failed to review ongoing operations adequately. The public revelation of these weaknesses, even though they are now partially corrected, hampers CIA (and the U.S. Government) by limiting those willing to coöperate with it and increasing those opposed to it and its activities. As long as such disclosures remain in the public mind, any official effort to improve CIA's image is as likely to backfire as to succeed.

Moreover, in the present atmosphere the press will seek and publish any information about intelligence activities it can acquire, probably arguing that, if it can learn about such activities, other governments already know of them. Even if some parts of the press were disposed toward discretion the problem would remain formidable. Voluntary press restraints would have to be accepted by virtually the entire newspaper, magazine, radio and television industries or they would quickly break down. Legislation, whether regarded as desirable or not (and even ignoring the Constitutional problems) is impossible to achieve in the present climate, and it would be unwise to count on improved prospects in the future.

There is one change that could be made to diminish these difficulties. The U.S. Government in the past almost automatically and immediately denied any charge that a particular event had resulted from a U.S. covert operation. Sometimes this ended the matter, but too often enough evidence came to light to strip the denial of its credibility or even to force the United States to admit the truth, thus getting itself into the worst possible position. Gradually the Government has shifted from a policy of virtually automatic and instant denial toward one of refusing to comment on such charges. Refusing to comment should become a firm policy-whether the charges are true or false-and the Government should make clear from the outset that this is now the basic information policy. A policy of refusing to comment would not be easy to initiate and maintain, especially if an accusation was causing a furor in a foreign country, but it would in time substantially improve the public position of the U.S. Government regarding covert operations.

Many critics and some supporters of CIA have suggested two other changes involving American intelligence activities which they think would substantially improve the situation. One is to divide CIA, separating the clandestine service from the intelligence research and analysis function. The other involves the creation of a Joint Congressional Committee on Intelligence to oversee the activities of CIA and perhaps the intelligence components of other government departments as well.

The arguments for and against a division of CIA are intricate and complicated. The arguments in favor are: (1) the organization that produces finished and evaluated intelligence conclusions which influence policy should not be the same organization which often executes the policy decided upon-even though these functions are organizationally separated-lest the possible bias of the operators affect the judgments of the analysts; (2) given the present reputation of CIA as a vast manipulator of events, its reorganization probably would ease public concern at home and abroad; (3)a separation of functions would lessen the alienation between much of the academic-intellectual community and youth on the one hand and the intelligence agencies on the other, and would ease recruiting problems; (4) a reorganization along these lines probably would make it easier to improve the cover of clandestine officers and increase their capability to act secretly.

Equally weighty arguments can be advanced against dividing CIA. These are: (1) CIA's ability to secure money from Congress has been due in part to the variety of tasks it performs, which has given it a broad Congressional constituency. It is questionable whether the part of CIA responsible for research and analysis could secure its present level of funding if it were separate from the clandestine services, while the latter might suffer a similar fate after an operational failure had become known; (2) the Director of Central Intelligence cannot be a strong independent force as the President's principal intelligence adviser and continue to be responsible for coördinating the intelligence activities of the U.S. Government unless he heads a broadly based organization; (3) it would be difficult to devise a different organizational cover for the clandestine service which would be any more secure; (4) CIA's capability in the scientific field is an important asset, and any division of the Agency probably would divide this group and weaken its capabilities; (5) operators and analysts each benefit from the other's substantive knowledge and experience.

On balance, the benefits of maintaining CIA as it is now organized presently outweigh the advantages of splitting it, but it would hardly rank as a disaster if it were divided.

The case for creating a Joint Congressional Committee on Intelligence rests largely on the view that such a committee would ease Congressional and public concern about CIA activities. Advocates argue that the present subcommittees of the military and appropriations committees in the House and Senate do not really influence and supervise those activities in the way Congress should and would if there were a Joint Committee solely involved in this task. On the other hand, such a committee should logically be responsible for all intelligence organizations and activities, and the Armed Services committees are unlikely (to put it mildly) to relinquish their jurisdiction over military intelligence. A formal Joint Committee would also create additional pressure on CIA to adopt a cautious and bureaucratic approach in a field where imagination and flexibility are important qualities. Finally, the creation of a formal Joint Committee probably would reduce the willingness of foreign intelligence services to pass intelligence to, and coöperate with, CIA, because of their fear that such relationships would become known and create domestic political problems. These disadvantages seem persuasive, and to date a majority of Congress has reached the same conclusion.

Moreover, it is misleading to suppose that organizational structures or executive-legislative relations are the basic problem involved in covert operations, for changes in these areas would not touch the central issue. This is the question of policy: under what circumstances should the United States resort to covert operations? It would be immensely useful if a set of rules or even guidelines could be developed, but this is probably impossible unless one is willing to decree an absolute prohibition of specific kinds of operations, and few Americans want their Government to be this rigid. Even Senator J. William Fulbright, in an article which attacks many of CIA's activities and points out the corrosive effect they can have on American values, says that in times of supreme emergency such a rigid rule cannot be applied. "We are compelled, therefore, to lay down a qualified rule, a rule to the effect that the end almost never justifies the means, that our policy must almost always be open and honest and made in accordance with constitutional procedure."[v]

Thus we cannot escape reliance on human judgment, and our judgment will depend on how we view our place and responsibilities in the world. This will involve us in painful dilemmas, for the United States is trying to do two quite different things simultaneously. It is trying to adhere to certain principles and values which often seem in conflict with the means employed to protect its security and advance its interests. The decisions we make in the field of intelligence will ultimately reflect the interaction between our estimate of the danger we face and the values we hold. American leaders will need a sense of proportion, a combination of boldness and caution, a thorough knowledge of men and nations, and the uncommon quality of common sense. Finally, they should have the vision and strength of character to think in terms of years and even decades rather than weeks and months. These are difficult qualities to come by, but unless they are possessed in large measure by American leaders the United States will be unable to conduct a successful foreign policy in any area.

[i] CIA was thus the central element of the intelligence community, and the Director of Central Intelligence was made responsible for coördinating the intelligence activities of the U.S. Government. The intelligence community is now composed of CIA, the Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence Research, the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency (which is responsible for communications intelligence), the intelligence components of the Army, Navy and Air Force, and-on certain matters-the intelligence units of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

[ii] Technically, covert political action is not an intelligence activity, but since it is carried on by intelligence organizations it must be considered in any discussion of intelligence activities.

[iii] Hugh Trevor-Roper, "The Philby Affair: Espionage, Treason, and Secret Services," Encounter, April 1968.

[iv] If the CIA's sharpest critics-the radicals who favor support of revolutionary movements-were to gain power in the United States, they would almost certainly have to rely on covert operations to achieve their aims. Reactionary and oppressive régimes are not easily dislodged, as Rhodesia and South Africa demonstrate, and will not fade away because of moral disapproval or even economic boycott. An activist policy short of direct military intervention would lead such critics to adopt the very instruments and methods they had formerly denounced.

[v] Senator J. William Fulbright, "We Must Not Fight Fire with Fire," The New York Times Magazine, April 23, 1967.

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