An Iraqi security forces member takes position during clashes with ISIS in Ramadi, February 12, 2014.
Courtesy Reuters

In early February, al Qaeda’s central leadership announced that it had severed ties with the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), an affiliate in Iraq and Syria. This step came at some cost of reputation for al Qaeda, but it will serve al Qaeda’s interests far better than maintaining a relationship with an affiliate that subverted al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri and damaged the terrorist group’s image. Now that ISIS is disowned, its own reputation is in peril, with potentially devastating consequences. In the weeks and months to come, the United States would be wise to use the rift between al Qaeda and ISIS to promote its own interests in Syria and Iraq.

The move wasn’t particularly surprising: over the years, there have been many signs that the relationship between al Qaeda Central (AQC) and the group’s strongest, most unruly franchise was strained. The 2004 merger between al Qaeda and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s al Tawhid wal Jihad (it became al Qaeda in Iraq after the merger and then the Islamic State of Iraq after Zaraqawi’s death) had always been more a matter of mutual interests than of shared ideology. But despite growing unease

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  • BARAK MENDELSOHN is an Associate Professor of political science at Haverford College and a Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI). Follow him on Twitter @BarakMendelsohn.
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