In this series a number of Allied and German generals discuss the work of the American reinforcements in the war. By far the most important chapters are those by Foch and Ludendorff. The former stresses the unpreparedness of the Americans when they entered the war and pays a high tribute to the organizing ability of the American commanders. The physical condition and moral freshness of the troops had much to do, he believes, with the final outcome of the war. Ludendorff is more critical. He recognizes the obvious advantages enjoyed by the American forces, but has much fault to find with the leadership and the actual conduct of the troops in action. Among the other contributions special mention may be made of the discussion of the Meuse-Argonne operations by General Savatier, French assistant chief of staff, and General von Gallwitz, the German commander. The book as a whole is interesting and instructive and comes as a relief after a long series of uncritical panegyrics.