In This Review

Pouvait-on Signer L'armistice à Berlin
Pouvait-on Signer L'armistice à Berlin
By General Mordacq
Grasset, 1930, 400 pp.

Mordacq was formerly chief of Clemenceau's military cabinet and has written extensively on the military problems of the later period of the war. This volume, like his others, is well written and provocative; it comes very opportunely at a time when the Clemenceau-Foch feud is being fought out by the followers of the two men. Mordacq goes into considerable detail in discussing the projected offensive in Lorraine, which did not materialize because of the signature of the armistice. He maintains that the preparations were so complete that the drive could have been started several days before the armistice and believes that it would have been completely successful. Foch, however, wanted to close with the German negotiators, and, as a matter of fact, the terms of the armistice were quite sufficient to ensure the acceptance of any peace terms by the Germans, in Mordacq's opinion. The chances are that the armistice, even if signed at Berlin, would not have secured more for France at the peace settlement, for the difficulties arose not from the inadequate whipping of the Germans, but from interests of the Allies that were not the interests of France.