The former president reviews the Vietnam war and concludes that it was "winnable," had the U.S. pursed the proper military strategy-at least in the period prior to his own presidency. He sounds a note of regret that his administration did not seek a military victory, but he doubts this was feasible: the American public would not have sustained such a policy in 1969 and, he insists, it would have undercut his efforts to open relations with both China and the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, he also believes that the war was "won" when the Paris Accords were signed. He holds the Congress responsible for the final defeat because supplies were withheld from the South Vietnamese and the threat of American retaliation was no longer credible. He concludes that Vietnam was a Soviet victory, and in this light advocates no more Vietnams, by which he means no more losses-not that the U.S. should never intervene in Third World crises. The reader will have to judge whether the loser, the U.S., is in better shape ten years after than the winner, the Soviet Union and North Vietnam.