This book serves as a refreshing counterpoint to the almost universal belief among foreign-policy specialists (implicit in the books on fundamentalism and nationalism above) that the end of the Cold War has led to a frighteningly anarchic and dangerous world. It grew out of the late Aaron Wildavsky's frustration with the media and academic pundits who argued that because bad things happened in Bosnia or Somalia, there was no world order, period. The authors take issue with traditional realists by arguing that democracies do not fight each other, and that consequently military balance-of-power considerations will be supplanted by economic struggles within the "zones of peace." The "zones of turmoil"-much of the non-industrial world-will make steady, if discontinuous, progress toward development. While one can dispute a number of their specific judgments and recommendations-for example, that air power confers a decisive military advantage on its possessors, or that the United Nations could be reformed through the formation of a "democratic caucus" within it-the book goes against the grain and raises stimulating questions about long-term change in international relations.