This product of a special study at the U.S. Air Force's chief graduate educational institution, Air University, focuses on the three weeks of air operations conducted by NATO in September 1995 against Bosnian Serb forces. That campaign was, as is now known, merely a precursor to a much larger operation four years later conducted against Serbia over Kosovo. The bumbling and indecisive application of force in 1999 rested on the assumption that the sprinkling of air strikes that caused the Serbs to give up without much of a fight in 1995 would work again. But this book, albeit useful as a study of coalition warfare, technology, and command and control, may not correct that blindness. An analysis of the simultaneous Croat ground operations in 1995 is beyond its purview, but clearly that offensive played as large or perhaps greater a role in ending the Bosnian conflict. Nonetheless, the officers who wrote these chapters have conscientiously assembled much useful material. Given their commitment to the Air Force and its way of war, they have produced a study of considerable utility and interest.