This outstanding study of the Rwandan genocide by a U.N. diplomat augments earlier works with significant new analysis based on the author's extensive interviews and cogent insights about conflict resolution. Although not completely dismissing the conventional view that timely outside intervention could have prevented the 1994 holocaust, Jones argues for an appreciation of the conflict's complexities and the multiple roles played by outsiders during each of its stages. Particularly valuable are the discussion of the 14-month negotiation process that produced the unsuccessful 1993 Arusha accords and the analysis of why the abortive peace process failed to resolve the problem of extremist spoilers within the Hutu-dominated Rwandan regime. A chapter on the postgenocide crisis in eastern Zaire adds to the litany of lessons learned. The inclusion of a set of hypothetical alternative outcomes, as well as a stimulating section on the Rwandan disaster's wider policy and research implications, make this work a model study for students of conflict resolution; its only unfortunate lapse is the absence of a map.