The Pakistani security establishment has always relied on proxy jihadist groups to counter threats from neighboring Afghanistan and India and to destabilize Indian-ruled Kashmir. But according to the expertly researched essays in this book, jihadist attacks have boomeranged on the Pakistani state. The U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, however incomplete, has diminished the incentives for Washington to help Islamabad fight domestic jihadist groups. China and Saudi Arabia are unlikely to commit many resources to help protect Pakistan from its self-inflicted problems, which also include dysfunctional electricity and tax systems and the unreliable security of its growing nuclear arsenal. The contributors to this volume see glimmers of hope in the modest strengthening of civilian authorities over the military and the fragile growth of civil society. But there is no sign that the Pakistani “deep state” sees any alternative to its counterproductive security strategy.
In This Review
In This Review
Most Read Articles
When Stalin Faced Hitler
Who Fooled Whom?
The Lost Art of American Diplomacy
Can the State Department Be Saved?
How Iran Sees Its Standoff With the United States
And What Trump Should Do to Solve the Problem He Created
The Right Way to Deal With Huawei
The United States Needs to Compete With Chinese Firms, Not Just Ban Them
Greece’s New Groove
Why Athens Is No Longer Europe’s Black Sheep