The NATO nations are phasing out of existence the mass conscript armed force with vast mobilization reserves. This has profound and subtle implications for international relations and also for domestic civil- military relations. In the United States, one campaign promise that President Nixon sought to implement after he took office was to halt the draft as soon as possible and create an all-volunteer force. Paradoxically, the prolongation of hostilities in Vietnam served only to speed the end of conscription and develop congressional support for his campaign promise. Terminating conscription was one issue on which antiwar Congressmen and pressure groups could unite with the Nixon administration. The result was that Selective Service legislation will not extend beyond July 1, 1973, and that military officials plan to reach the objective of a "zero draft" call by January 1, 1973, at the latest.

The end of the draft in the United States will also push NATO nations toward all-volunteer systems or toward new forms of militia systems. Great Britain introduced an all-volunteer system in 1960, and the 1970s will certainly see further overall reductions in its military manpower because of economic pressure and the sheer difficulties of recruitment. In the last three years NATO countries have reduced the length of conscript service and are certain to examine more radical measures closely after the American end of the draft. The Netherlands, with its powerful commitment to NATO principles and strategy, is openly debating and planning for the conditions under which it will institute an all-volunteer system. In Germany Helmut Schmidt, Socialist Minister of Defense, has advocated an all-volunteer cadre augmented by a short-term six-month militia. In Italy, and to a lesser extent in France, the size and type of manpower systems are related not only to international relations but to internal security, so that the debate on the shift toward a volunteer force has been retarded but is being raised with greater frequency.

Can an all-volunteer armed force produce the number and quality of military personnel required for an effective U.S. military posture of deterrence? The concept of an all-volunteer armed force also raises deep concern about civil-military relations and the question of social isolation or even "alienation" of the military from the larger civilian society. In the United States, the military establishment, and especially its ground forces, are experiencing a profound crisis in legitimacy due to the impact of Vietnam, internal race tension, corruption, extensive drug abuse, disintegration of command and operational effectiveness, and widespread anti-military sentiment, as well as a continuous reduction in force levels that limits career opportunities.

A political democracy rests on citizen participation, especially in the armed forces; therefore, I am politically and morally concerned about an all-volunteer force. However, historical trends and the opposition to Vietnam will produce an all-volunteer force. Sociologically, in the contemporary context an all-volunteer force can be made compatible with American political forms if two conditions are met.

First, U.S. foreign policy must be one of flexible deterrence and the military must incorporate a "constabulary" type of strategy. Second, new and higher levels of military professionalism must be developed which recognize that the armed forces, while distinct in many of their operating procedures, must be based more and more on contractual and public service conceptions and less on sheer traditional authority.


The mass armed force has its origins in both technological and sociopolitical factors. The technology of the mass army was rooted in an organizational system created by the increased firepower of the infantry and artillery plus improved means of transporting military personnel and supplies. Historical epochs do not start or conclude on a specific textbook date. The technology for the mass army was in operation during the American Civil War and in the Franco-Prussian conflict, but essential prototypical elements, especially organizational elements, were already present in the Napoleonic wars.

However, there are strong reasons to ground the origin of the mass armed force in the sociopolitical struggle of the American and French Revolutions and the emergent forms of modern nationalism which they produced. These armed rebellions marked the end of the post-feudal armies, as the revolutionary leaders armed the rank and file. The idea that citizenship involved the right to bear arms-truly a revolutionary notion-came into being. In fact, military service was an essential element in expanding the scope of citizenship. To be a citizen of the nation-state was to have the right to bear arms in its defense. (It is striking that during World Wars I and II, elements in the Black community in the United States demanded the right to serve in combat units as an expression of their aspirations for full citizenship.)

In Europe, after the French Revolution, the mass armed force developed professional cadres augmented by a conscript and mobilization system of reservists. The professional officers were distinct from the rest of society, although the military was based on an ethos of citizen participation. In the United States, the professional cadres were smaller and the development of the concept of mass armed force was not institutionalized until after World War I, and "peacetime" conscription not until after World War II.

However, a highly professional armed force did serve the political and ideological cause of nationalism, since the officer corps of Western Europe had no difficulty in transferring its allegiance from feudal authority to the modern bureaucratic nation-state. A corresponding process occurred in the United States, Mass armies gave the lower classes the opportunity to participate directly in developing the national polity in a manner they could readily manage and appreciate. Military service in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was for a significant segment of the population-even after the slaughters of World War I and up through World War II-an act of political affirmation. In Europe it undercut internationalism and socialist political tendencies, and in the United States it was an equally strong expression of popular nationalism. The right to participate in the conscript armed force, as much as the extension of the franchise, was at the core of the political emergence of modern nationalism.

The distinctive professional officer corps of the mass armed force, with its strong sense of separation from civilian society, in due course brought with it its own elements of institutional transformation, including its sheer increase in size. In Europe since the close of the Franco-Prussian War, and in the United States since the Root reforms and the mobilization of World War I, the dominant trend in the mass armed force and in civil- military relations until 1945 was the "civilianization" of the armed forces. The boundary between military forces and civilian society weakened as total mobilization required that an ever larger segment of the population become part of the war apparatus. Within the professional military, recruitment shifts as officers are drawn from more and more socially representative backgrounds, the concentration of personnel with civilian skills increases, and the patterns of military authority shift from authoritarian command to organizational decision-making.

The civilianization of the mass military is not an outgrowth of technology and organizational control alone. The vast resources needed for military operations and the justification for prolonged hostilities and massive destruction require an egalitarian ideology in both democratic and totalitarian societies. Men are progressively less prepared to fight for nationalist sentiments alone; they must see the cause as morally justified. Although the expanded resources of the military permit it to operate as a powerful pressure group, the threat of old-fashioned military dictatorship seems remote.

Both technological and sociopolitical factors associated with World War II started the decline of mass armies in the affluent nation-states of the West, although it has taken 25 years for the process to become fully evident. The deployment of nuclear weapons marked the technological transformation of the NATO nations' armed forces. But the introduction of nuclear weapons per se did not dictate the gradual erosion of mass armies; it was only a precondition.

In advanced industrialized societies, the goals of military institutions have been subjected to massive criticism and belief in the moral worth of conscript service has been shaken. Hedonism, self-expression, resistance to military authority and a new diffuse moral criticism have become paramount among young people. The use of force has traditionally operated within circumscribed limits; new moral and political definitions generate a powerful sense of neutralism and new forms of pacificism. Literacy, mass consumption and political rhetoric have emerged as more important hallmarks of citizenship than military service. Nationalism itself is muted and mixed with diffuse but powerful feelings of transnationalism. The performance of the United States forces in Southeast Asia, of course, supplied an emotional basis for the emerging popular pacificism. These trends are concentrated among an important minority of young people, but they can be found in varying degrees in all parts of the social structure. Thus, in Germany, reluctance to serve in the armed forces and a broad definition of conscientious objection have meant, in recent years, that up to ten percent of the eligible age groups are exempted from service.

Comparable trends exist in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, but in vastly different cultural and political settings. Totalitarian control eliminates political and moral debate about conscription. However, youth's discontent is widely acknowledged and has its implications for conscription. The Soviet Union has sought to limit the term of conscripts, emphasized volunteer recruitment wherever possible, and closed important branches of the armed forces to all but volunteer personnel. The military has been downgraded as a locus of citizenship training; this function has been transferred to premilitary training in high school and involves military personnel assigned for it.

The Soviet military forces are an integral element of the internal security forces, both at home and in the Warsaw Pact nations. These political realities, plus the validity given to the Chinese threat, mean that personal, moral and even political opposition to military service has no direct or immediate impact on manpower policy, but one should not underestimate the extent to which Soviet authorities are concerned and to which they consider the attitudes of youth.


In the next decade, U.S. military policy will obviously be conditioned by the successes and failures of the last 25 years. During them, the United States has essentially pursued a global nuclear-force strategy and two increasingly divergent strategies for its conventional forces, one in Western Europe and one in Southeast Asia. The redeployment of American military forces rests on an effective recognition of the duality of American foreign policy-on the difference between American interests, responsibility, and capacities in Western Europe and in East Asia. This formulation does not exclude the problematic issues of the Middle East, Africa or South America; it places them in an appropriate perspective for the purposes of this analysis.

During the last quarter-century, the prospects for nuclear war were very remote indeed, as was clear to detached observers immediately after 1945. A vast amount of literature during this period has analyzed the delicate balance of terror developed by nuclear technology. Because nuclear warfare would be so destructive the United States and the Soviet Union developed the strategy of mutual deterrence. However, there has been much less recognition of the fact that political leadership and institutions were essential to the deterrence of major war, or, rather, to the ability of the Soviets and the Western bloc to work out an arrangement under the threat of accidental and premeditated war. The essential political element in this formula was: the belief of the Soviet leaders that: (a) the U.S. leaders firmly controlled their military establishment and that the United States, on political and moral grounds alone, had ruled out a preëmptive nuclear attack on the Soviet Union; (b) the conventional forces of NATO would not be used to support any movements of national liberation among the Eastern bloc nations.

As the 1960s came to an end, this political formula was being fundamentally strained by the uncertainties that MIRV weapons and anti-ballistic missiles introduced. Again, the issue is not merely the technology per se, but the political setting, although these new weapons and counterweapons greatly complicate the search for effective political arrangements. The threat of a nuclear confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union remains remote during the 1970s as new vehicles emerge for mutual political communications and negotiations, both formal and informal. First, the SALT negotiations have become a central forum; prolonged discussion will at least inhibit the deployment of new weapons, and more effective negotiations will produce ad hoc and partly formalized settlements. Second, partial resolution of the "German question" and unilateral and bilateral troop reductions will provide a new format for political discussions and assurances. As China develops her potential, the United States must take the initiative in extending and adapting the political formula of the last 25 years to include China, and under these circumstances the threat of nuclear war with China will also remain remote.

The issues center, therefore, on the deployment of conventional forces, which have been conceived of in the West as adjuncts to the deterrence strategy. In Western Europe, the stationing of American troops and the system of defense alliances were compatible with European national and political aspirations. The sociopolitical impact of stationing the considerable numbers of troops required for the overall strategy of deterrence raised relatively few profound questions of community or even national sovereignty. However, in East Asia, the stationing of troops and their direct involvement were relatively compatible with local and national aspirations only until the end of the Korean War. The tasks of American forces have become progressively more difficult because of the opposition they have encountered from national and political forces. Cultural and racial differences have been deeply disruptive. Moreover, the fundamental sociopolitical basis of military strategy has been incompatible with the realities of social structure and social change in Southeast Asia. Finally, civilian military leaders overestimated the impact of conventional strategic air warfare, whose limitation had been demonstrated in the case of an industrialized nation like Germany and could have been projected, on this experience and that in Korea, to have even more limited consequences in Southeast Asia. A result of this misjudgment has been the basic stalemate and atrophy of the U.S. intervention in Southeast Asia.

For its post-Vietnam foreign policy, the Nixon administration has projected that an all-volunteer army could supply the manpower required for a more limited overseas deployment. In 1970, the President's Commission on an All- Volunteer Armed Force estimated a manpower level of approximately 2.6 million, or slightly less than that of the pre-Vietnam buildup. At the time it was made, that projection already appeared to be a major miscalculation. In the spring of 1971 civilian officials in the Department of Defense were stating publicly that the post-Selective Service force would be approximately 2.25 million, while privately they indicated a more realistic 2.0 million. However, a force of 1.75 million by 1975 is even more realistic, and the prospect that even that level may not be reached cannot be ruled out. The major reduction will, of course, be in the ground forces.

While there would be an element of risk, a military force of 1.75 million men could support a meaningful military policy of effective and minimum deterrence rather than merely a balance of terror. Such a military force could also undertake a variety of national emergency tasks which cannot be performed by civilian organizations and which would enhance the force's organizational effectiveness. But it would have to redeploy effectively and reorganize professionally.


In the ever-quickening redeployment and reduction of overseas American military forces, what appears to be a striking strategic consensus has emerged; only in Western Europe does there remain a positive reason for the stationing of any significant numbers of United States ground troops. Even in South Korea, the prospect is one of an American military presence limited to air and naval units. A contracting system of naval and air bases, training missions, and an overseas scattering of specialized troops for communications and logistical purposes would be the augmenting elements. The type and number of ground troops required for deterrence and peacekeeping through a military presence in Western Europe have emerged as a central issue for military professionals.

Military perspectives and doctrine adhered to by professional soldiers persist even as they adjust to changing technology and an altered sociopolitical environment. The distinction between the "absolutists" and the "pragmatists" still dominates the day-to-day struggles over military budgets and missions. The trend, because of the wounds inflicted on professional pride by the agonies of Vietnam, has been more and more toward an absolutist doctrine.

Both absolutists and pragmatists believe that they are sensitive to the interplay of political, economic and military factors in worldwide international relations. But advocates of each school live in different worlds-although it must be emphasized that officers only lean toward one or the other pole. The crucial difference is in the degree to which the professional military man has in effect internalized the implications of the strategy of deterrence and abandoned the "killing business" as the organizing principle of his profession.

Deeply rooted images of professional ideology about violence are at work. At the international level, the absolutists maintain an "assault" perspective, even though they recognize the inhibitions that nuclear weapons place on the great powers. They are concerned that the United States will not realize the full impact of its military forces unless it maintains a "forward" military posture. Such an assault posture implicitly rejects Nixon's "no more Vietnams" as a passing political slogan. A force structure and a deployment of aggressive patrol-air, sea, and forward positioning of ground-forces, and a potential for significant intervention outside Western Europe, are required. The absolutist perspective is in effect a continued affirmation of the inevitability of armed force but in an altered format. At the personal level, the absolutists are deeply concerned and fearful that a military without combat experience will inevitably decline and atrophy; the models of Sweden and Switzerland are rejected as not professional-by implication-and insufficiently masculine.

In contrast, the pragmatists, while emphasizing combat readiness, see the military force as operating under powerful political and moral constraints. They see the possibility of a successful U.S. foreign and military policy without an overt assault ideology. For them, the function of the military is in the political intention it conveys as much as the sheer destructive power it can wield. At the professional level, they are prepared for and hope for careers as soldiers without combat.

Each orientation leads to differing military contributions to the persistent questions of force levels, structure and deployment. For any given budget or force level, the absolutists are at odds with the pragmatists, although service attachments in and of themselves operate to mold professional perspectives. But the issue is not merely "army" self- interest versus an "air force" approach. The absolutist assumes that a higher or at least the current proportion of the gross national product is required while the pragmatist is prepared to accept an adjustment downward from the current nine percent. The hypothetical staff papers of joint staff planning for a 1.7 million force afford an insight into the contemporary professional debates and struggles.

The absolutist, with an assault concept, would recommend a 200,000-man marine corps, with capabilities for tactical nuclear weapons, an air force of 500,000 men, and a navy of 500,000 men that would emphasize aircraft carriers to support amphibious or airborne warfare. The ground forces would be limited to 500,000 and most would be stationed in the United States, with 50,000 in Western Europe. The U.S. ground troops in NATO would be part of a highly automated battlefield of electronic surveillance, with highly "modernized" weapons and deployment, and would operate with tactical nuclear weapons as a trip wire. In addition, 15,000 of the ground forces would be of the Special Forces variety for armed reconnaissance, operations behind enemy lines and counterinsurgency.

In contrast, the pragmatist would limit the marines to 100,000 men, have a small navy and air force of approximately 450,000 men each; the naval emphasis would include anti-submarine warfare. Seven hundred thousand men would be allocated for the ground force; 150,000 of them would be stationed in Western Europe (representing half of the current 1971 force level), and they would be closely articulated with the emerging military and militia systems of various Western nations. The Special Forces would be limited to a few thousand specialists. The forces stationed in the United States would be heavily involved in national emergency work as well.


Adapting the U.S. armed forces to the end of conscription has meant that operational procedures that have emerged since the end of World War II require comprehensive changes. An armed force which is (a) smaller, (b) recruited on an all-volunteer basis and (c) organized more and more as a force-in-being reverses or at least halts the historical trend of the American military establishment toward civilianization. The Vietnam War has drastically delayed a new organizational format; in fact, military historians will look back on the U.S. intervention there as having extended the life of traditional World War II perspectives and strengthened barriers to change. The transition to an all-volunteer system will therefore have to occur abruptly and under very unfavorable circumstances.

In the American environment, it was to be expected that Congress would emphasize economic incentives as the main element in the shift to an all- volunteer system. In the fall of 1971 the economic incentives approach was put into operation with a substantial pay raise under which a private was moved closer to the symbolic annual $5,000. There is every reason to assume that additional major increases will have to be instituted.

Congress dismissed without debate a system of volunteer national service which would allow young people to choose between military and civilian service. Such a program would have strengthened the social definition of service to the nation, which, in turn, would have greatly facilitated recruitment by creating a new legitimacy for government, community and military service. Moreover, the necessary basic changes in recruitment, career lines, education and deployment are being faced very slowly. New operating procedures, especially in the ground forces, have been limited to physically improving the barracks for enlisted personnel, new recreational resources, wider freedom in personal appearance and modification of some aspects of the daily routine of garrison life, particularly early morning reveille; these steps have been described by skeptics as "cosmetic." However, a number of areas of change promise to create volunteer forces appropriate for a democratic society and a military posture of effective deterrence.

First, an all-volunteer service requires a fundamental redefinition of the military career that would strengthen its civil service basis. A significant number of both officers and enlisted men will continue to serve for six or fewer years. For them, military experience is an interlude in an essentially civilian existence; this type of military appears to be viable, although there are a host of attendant issues. However, for another group, military service will cover extended periods, often up to 20 years. For them, military service must be redefined as one step of a two-step career which is essentially a lifetime career in the public service, with the military part being the first step, and the second step being in the civil service establishment.

For enlisted personnel, successful completion of a specified period of service, such as three periods of enlistment, could constitute effective entrance into civil service employment The United States Civil Service and/or the Department of Labor would be responsible for their placement in the federal service or, by negotiation, in state or local government. Such a career system would broaden the basis of recruitment, attract personnel of appropriate quality and eliminate the costly system of reenlistment bonuses and high-cost pension plans. When an enlisted man transferred to the civil service establishment, he would take with him pension benefits equivalent to civil employment that would be paid to him on retirement.

An equivalent system would operate for officers but would go into effect only after the size of the officer corps was reduced. In addition, the length of the officer's term of service would be made more flexible. Retirement with appropriate pension benefits after ten to 12 years is essential to ensure a flow of personnel into the Civil Service which would meet the forces' requirements in regard to rank structure and military tasks to be performed.

Second, an all-volunteer system must deal with the excessive number of general officers that have accumulated in the three services. This concentration thwarts the assignment to important posts of younger men prepared to adapt to the changing environment. The army, in particular, has a deep division between the junior and mid-career officers who actually fought in South Vietnam and the ranking personnel who flew over the battlefield or were in top command positions. Men in their forties who are more prepared for change must be rapidly incorporated into the general officer group to heal the breach and to offer an incentive for able mid- career officers to remain in service. In the immediate future as many as 50 to 60 percent of the general-rank officers will have to be retired, a difficult step. A one-rank deflation for all assignments at the general level is also needed.

Third, the existing worldwide personnel system which leads to continuous, excessive, expensive and disruptive rotation can no longer be justified. Instead, the armed forces, particularly the ground forces, must develop a modern version of the British regimental system-or, in the present context, a modified brigade system. Each man would have a basic unit and would spend a significant portion of his military career within that brigade. For the navy, a home-port concept, and for the air force, a home base, would serve as equivalents.

Fourth, underemployment is a powerful source of negative attitudes toward a military career, especially among young officers. In the past, military personnel were less sensitive to the stimulus and responsibility of their initial assignments, since they could always assume that war would break out and they would be fully engaged. The heavy reliance of the military on short-term officers, and the emergence of the strategy of deterrence, make the intrinsic relevance of the day-to-day job and the avoidance of boredom and futility very important. Many training functions can be transferred from specialized units to operational units both in order to improve training and to reduce the actual amount of underemployment in the latter.

Fifth, there must be a stronger emphasis on Officer Candidate Schools for recruitment and training of new officers. The end of conscription will reduce the pool from which qualified officers can be selected. Officer candidates will become less socially representative-they will be largely from the South, the Southwest and rural and small-town areas. ROTC units must be reorganized so that any college student in the United States, either on entering college or when a junior, will have access to a collegiate ROTC program. In each of the ten major metropolitan areas, there should be a composite program, administered by an existing ROTC group, enrolling students from any accredited college in the area. Such an approach is required if the under-representation of Black officers is to be remedied.

Sixth, the three-step system of in-service professional schools must be consolidated. It is wasteful, often mechanical and repetitious as well as time-consuming. Military officers require extensive education, but many competent officers consider the present system an excessive diversion from professional service. The system should be reduced to a two-tier one, with the interservice component distributed to the service war colleges. A stronger emphasis on brief courses for handling new developments in organization and doctrine would be desirable, as well as permission to substitute civilian schooling for advanced military professional school attendance. In addition, the military academy programs should permit one year of attendance at a civilian university, in the junior year, for example. The academy could have a five-year program with one year free for civilian work experience or service in the enlisted ranks.

Seventh, the services must establish a Department of Defense commission to revise the essentials of military discipline and justice. Combat-ready forces fully sensitive to their heroic traditions and under the closest operational control can be trained and maintained without brutality, personal degradation or "Mickey Mouse" discipline. The Marine Corps may be able to maintain its traditional organizational code of repressive basic training, but an all-volunteer military force must face questions of authority and military forms openly and candidly. For example, extensive saluting on military bases serves no purpose but to degrade the act; saluting can have meaning if it is practiced at selected and significant occasions.

Eighth, it is not the responsibility of military personnel to defend and publicize official military policies; this is the task of elected officials. But the military are not hired "mercenaries;" they cannot be mechanically deprived of participation in community and public affairs. By law, and particularly by judicial decree, military personnel are exercising their particular forms of free speech and citizen petition. In a truly pluralistic society, with dignity and good taste, military personnel, while on active duty, should be able to attend educational and public affairs meetings and state their views on the legitimacy of their profession.

In Germany, the idea of the civilian in uniform has been pressed to the point where regular military personnel-both officers and enlisted men-are permitted to stand for political election while on active duty. In the United States, the military must maintain a nonpartisan posture, i.e. a nonparty affiliation, but a broader perspective on civic participation is possible. Military personnel should be permitted to serve on local school boards, run in nonpartisan local elections, and be members of government advisory boards and public panels where they have qualifications and interests.


The all-volunteer armed force faces a dilemma in the next steps of its redeployment. A powerful self-fulfilling prophecy is already at work: each reduction in force serves only to dampen new recruitment, especially officer recruitment. Why enter a profession whose career and promotion opportunities are highly uncertain and declining? A civil service base for the military profession, as described above, is one device for handling this problem. Therefore, paradoxically, the faster the initial rundown to a long-run troop level, the more readily the adaptation can be made to a volunteer force. The phased withdrawal of troops from South Vietnam represents the single major locus from which the overall reduction in manpower has been achieved. The next step in reductions, and especially in ground troop reductions, must come from NATO forces.

While plans are projected for negotiations with the Soviet Union on European security and on mutual and balanced force reduction, economic pressures may require the United States to reduce American contingents to NATO unilaterally. Senator Mike Mansfield has been a persistent advocate of such reductions. An immediate reduction of five to ten percent of the 310,000 troops could be directly implemented without loss of military effectiveness. The American forces in Europe have become excessively bureaucratized, and a reduction would increase operational morale and reduce tensions associated with boredom.

If troop reductions, however limited, are seen as first steps toward a U.S. neo-isolationism and withdrawal from Western Europe, the Brandt initiatives will collapse and there will be a major political crisis in Western Europe with profound implications for the United States. The actual size of our troop commitment is not more important than the stability of our intention. Assuming an effective transition to an all-volunteer force with a goal of 150,000 United States troops in Western Europe in three to five years, both effective negotiations with the Soviet Union and a political strategy of rectification of the basic principles of NATO are required. These can be accomplished by sending a U.S. delegation of the highest level-including bipartisan representation from Congress-to prepare a new treaty to be ratified by the President and the Senate. Its essential element would be the restatement of a long-term U.S. troop commitment in Western Europe. Such a declaration would set the minimum force level under various conditions, including successful negotiations at the NATO-Warsaw Pact conference.

The politico-military aspects of a reconstructed NATO would include the following points. First, the projected manpower reductions in Europe would increase the U.S. strategic reserve, which would be available for airborne redeployment to Europe should the international situation require it. The Nixon Doctrine of "no more Vietnams" has important implications for the priority tasks for the strategic reserve that should reassure Western Europe. Second, a NATO rear headquarters in the United States would be in order, where European NATO officers could be assigned for planning, staff work and joint command of U.S. strategic reserve forces. Third, U.S. planning and commitment for NATO should be done on a five-year basis rather than the present year-to-year basis. Fourth, the United States and NATO nations should encourage new manpower systems. For Europe, and especially for Western Germany, militia systems, including six-month conscript service, must be developed. In the United States, in addition to the reforms mentioned, the reserve forces must be fundamentally reorganized into three elements: (1) a ready reserve, capable of two-week deployment; (2) a reserve made up of individuals who, following the Israeli pattern, would serve a short period of time each year as filler personnel in operational units; and (3) a traditional inactive reserve-a manpower pool with some limited training activities, which would be compensated accordingly.

Fifth, the following guidelines are proposed for the NATO-Warsaw Pact conference on mutual and balanced force reduction: (a) A hot line between the headquarters of the Warsaw Pact and NATO headquarters and a joint Warsaw Pact-NATO liaison staff for information and communication should be established immediately, to reduce the threat of accidental war and to implement the surveillance aspects of mutual security arrangements. The joint NATO-Warsaw Pact liaison staff could be located in neutral Switzerland. (b) A balanced reduction of the level of troops should be negotiated step-by-step, first to a 25-percent and then to a 50-percent level taking into consideration the strategic positions, weapons balance and lines of communication of both NATO and Warsaw Pact nations. (c) An effective system of mutual surveillance both to guarantee compliance in the results of negotiation and to monitor deterrence capabilities should be established. On-the-spot inspection is probably not necessary if aerial and electronic surveillance are jointly organized.

All these changes in military organization and troop deployment involve shifts in professional ideology and self-conception. Over a decade ago I offered a definition of a constabulary force. The constabulary concept provides a "continuity with past military experiences and traditions, but it offers a basis for radical adaptation of the profession. The military establishment becomes a constabulary force when it is continuously prepared to act, committed to the minimum use of force, and seeks viable international relations, rather than victory, because it has incorporated a protective military posture doctrine."[i]

Today I would emphasize the conclusion that, unfortunately, the prolonged hostilities in Vietnam have diverted the attention and energy of the military from such a goal. Masses of documents have been written about the changing role of the military in contemporary society, and its essence is widely debated by military officers. The military profession is divided and unclear about how much of the emerging doctrines it will accept. The idea that the military is mainly in the "killing business" dies slowly. But the vitality of the military depends on the transformation of its self- definition, so that peacekeeping alters traditional self-conceptions.

Moreover, the military cannot revive its vitality unless it uses its facilities for a wide range of other national emergency functions. The basic issue is not, as traditionalists hold, that the military should not be diverted from its fundamental mission. The military has traditionally been engaged in national emergency functions, but the nature and contents of these functions change. In fact, in the reconstruction of the military, it is essential that it use its manpower and vast resources to keep it an active and responsible institution. Such a professional outlook is required to attract and retain bright and highly motivated men who wish to avoid underemployment and get on with social change.

Clearly, the military cannot engage in activities or programs which are better performed by civilian agencies. The essential issue is to make use of the military's standby resources; that is, its ability to respond to emergencies, broadly defined, and to improvise in a crisis. The military is already deeply involved in control of natural disasters-floods, hurricanes, and the like pose emergency situations which require its flexible resources. To natural disasters can be added the increasing scope of man- made disasters: oil spills, power failures and chemical and atomic accidents are likely to increase rather than decrease. The armed forces are indispensable in a great deal of air- and sea-rescue work, to which is being added, experimentally, medical evacuation, especially of victims of road accidents where alternative facilities are not available.

But the major frontier is in environmental control and the handling of particular aspects of pollution and destruction of resources. The Army Corps of Engineers has moved in this direction, but only the first steps have been taken. Many units in the armed forces have contributions to make; and the concept of a military career as part of a civil service career means new patterns of assignment between military and civilian agencies. An armed force of over 1,500,000 men is a significant manpower pool-one that is urgently needed, given the economic pressures of contemporary American society.

The all-volunteer armed force represents the end of the historical phase of the mass armed force. With the emergence of a new type of all-volunteer force, civilian society will have to assume an active role in directing the military to redefine its professional perspectives and to help to understand that peacekeeping through a military presence, deterrence, and participation in the control of national emergencies are the modern definitions of the heroic role.

[i] See "The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait" by Morris Janowitz. Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press; second edition, 1971.

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